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INTRODUCTION

S

INCE the end of World War II, institutions of higher learning
in the United States have undergone dramatic changes in size,
characteristics of student body, curriculum, research activities, role
in the community and so on. This growth and development appears likely to continue. In this process of change, tensions have
come into being among the various elements which constitute the
educational community. Trustees, faculty, administrators, students
-all have been searching for a definition of their responsibilities
and their rights. The students have argued for a far more influential role in the educational process, as well as for greater freedom
in their personal lives. Faculty members have attempted to build
new concepts of the scholar and of their place in the administration
of the educational institution. Trustees have found it imperative
to clarify their ideas about control of the university and protection
of academic freedom. Administrators have found the balancing of
competing objectives evermore complex as they attempt to manage
what are essentially new types of organizations. The matter of
maintaining order, and at the same time freedom, on the American
college and university campus is the challenge presented.
There has been much valuable discussion concerning these
changing relationships. But one element of the problem has been
frequently ignored. The law-the appropriate, formal, legal relationships governing the educational enterprise-has received very
little attention, although it is apparent that many of the most fundamental issues on the campus involve questions of legal rights and
duties. The precise status of the law, and the appropriate remedies,
have not been systematically examined, and even more important,
the legal principles and legislation needed for the future have not
been explored. In the decades ahead, there will be an even greater
demand for a clear and explicit statement of rights and duties in
legal terms. It is imperative that thought be given to these problems
now so that the law can be developed in light of educational objectives.
One excuse for ignorance of the law is frequently offered: inapplicability to the academic setting. Not everyone concerned concurs
in this rationalization, however. There seems to be a 'split of au497
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thority" over the issue of whether the law should be involved in the
educational system. On the one hand, some argue that law courts
are a last resort, to be used only when human relations fail, thus
insisting that the law should have no standing in the academic
setting. Others argue that the legal process is fully applicable to the
actions of universities and colleges, thus insisting that the law should
be allowed to check power exercised by universities and colleges.
The question of why law should be considered in the problems
of the universities at all should be resolved initially (this of course
implies a consideration of the alternative - not resolving the issues). Yet, we know that the courts are beginning to intervene more
frequently in the educational process, and we cannot turn our backs
on that development. Furthermore, we should recognize that the
absence of judicial decisions in this area may be one of the factors
contributing to the hesitancy in seeking solutions to these problems.
This may, however, be a fortunate situation, in that workable legal
theories may be imported without also importing some of the unworkable ones. Whatever instruction the law may offer to the colleges and universities, their problems cannot be considered simply
in formal legal terms, nor in the traditional view of law as an inflexible set of rules.
Whichever position one takes, the fact of ultimate legal
redress exists. And there are some inchoate ideas emerging in the
legal arena to which the academy must pay more than passive obedience. Accordingly, at least two matters must be carefully and urgently considered: the present state of law in relation to the process
of higher education, and the future nature and content of law applicable in the academic institution.
One of the groups in interest, the students, seem to present
claims for priority of attention. In the belief that the role of students
in the institutional framework should be examined immediately, the
American Council on Education and the University of Denver College of Law, with the generous assistance of The Danforth Foundation, convened a three-day conference in Denver, Colorado, May 16
through 18, 1968. The focus and interest of the conference was:
"Legal Aspects of Student-Institutional Relationships."
The conference sessions were divided as follows. Following
an overview of "Campus Freedom and Order" by Dr. Logan Wilson,
President of the American Council on Education, Professor William
M. Beaney, Department of Politics, Princeton University and Visiting Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law, exposed
participants to "Some Applicable Legal Doctrines." Following
Beaney's remarks, Edward Schwartz, President, National Student
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Association, Christopher H. Munch, Associate Dean, University of
Denver College of Law, and Dr. Stephen McClellan, Tulane University, discussed Beaney's observations-amending, expanding, and
limiting them. Professor Terry Lunsford, University of California
at Berkeley, explored the topic "Who Belongs to the University
Community?" The remainder of the conference was organized
around three identifiable roles of students in the university.
Robert B. McKay, Dean, New York University Law School,
outlined some of the problems of "The Student as Private Citizen."
His remarks were discussed by Dr. Stephen Wright, President,
United Negro College Fund, Robert Lutz, student at the University
of Southern California, and Paul Cashman, Vice President, University of Minnesota.
"The Student as Resident" was discussed by Professor William
Van Alstyne, Duke University Law School, to whom comments were
directed by Professor C. Peter Magrath, Brown University, Rachel
Scott, student, Kansas State University, and Professor Roy Lucas,*
University of Alabama. Phillip Monypenny, Professor of Political
Science at the University of Illinois, outlined the problems of "The
Student as Student"; comments were made to his topic by Neal R.
Stamp, University Counsel, Cornell University, Robert Powell, graduate student, Princeton University, and Dean Earle W. Clifford,
Rutgers-The State University. A general topic was introduced by
Professor William Cohen of the University of California Law School,
Los Angeles. He discussed: "Private-Public Legal Aspects of Institutions of Higher Education."
Participants, in addition to those mentioned above, were carefully chosen from among administrators, faculty, and students. Representatives of national educational organizations were also included.
Other participants in the conference, limited to a total of 45 persons,
were:
Glen E. Barnett, Vice President-Student Affairs, University of
Colorado
Henry David, Executive Secretary, National Research Council
Harold L. Enarson, President, Cleveland State University
John W. Gillis, Executive Associate, Association of American
Colleges
Winfred Godwin, Director, Southern Regional Education Board
George F. Knerr, Vice President for Student Personnel, Pace College
John Larsen, Assistant to the President, University of Iowa
John H. Myers, of Williams, Myers and Quiggle, Washington, D.C.

Marvin L. Niehuss, Executive Vice President, University of
Michigan
* Prepared remarks, but did not attend conference.
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Allan Ostar, Executive Director, Association of State Colleges and
Universities
Samuel Proctor, President, Institute for Services to Education
Rev. Patrick H. Ratterman, Vice President, Xavier University
William G. Shannon, American Association of Junior Colleges
Paul F. Sharp, President, Drake University

Edward J. Shoben, Director, Commission on Academic Affairs,
American Council on Education
John Silber, Dean of College of Arts and Sciences, University of
Texas
Otis A. Singletary, Vice President, American Council on Education
Joseph R. Smiley, President, University of Colorado
Richard Strichartz, General Counsel, Wayne State University
Gresham M. Sykes, Professor, University of Denver College of
Law

Ray Trammel, University of Arkansas
Marvin Wachman, President, Lincoln University

Honorable James Wilson, Assistant Attorney General of the State
of Washington

Robert B. Yegge, Dean, University of Denver College of Law
W. David Zimmerman, Vice President, The Danforth Foundation
J. L. Zwingle, Executive Vice President, Association of Governing
Boards of Universities and Colleges

All of the remarks to which reference is above made were prepared prior to the conference. Following the conference, taking
due account of the stimulating discussion during the conference,
each person rewrote his presentation for publication in these pages.
That which follows is the product.
Although only 45 persons attended the conference, it is anticipated that at least five audiences will be reached through the
medium of this Law Journal: The legal profession (judges, practitioners, lawyer-legislators), academic administrators, trustees,
faculty members, and students. We hope and trust that presentation
of the issues and alternative legal solutions in these pages is likely
to have an important influence on the creation of caselaw in matters
reaching the courts, and we hope it will provide a forum for concern, interest, and reexamination by all of the audiences.
The conference herein reported and the papers produced are
not intended to provide a kaleidoscope of the divergent views about
the role of law in the educational setting. However, the conference
was an attempt to expose some of the reasoning of various persons
intensely concerned about the nature of law in the academic setting
and the relationship of educational goals to constitutional and legal
ones. There is no representation that the views here expressed are
complete, correct, or decisive. Yet there is the representation that the
subject of law dealing with student-institutional relationships needs
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constant, continuing examination. It is our hope that these pages
will contribute directly to the urgently needed reexamination of the
appropriate relationship between the student and the institution.
Otis A. Singletary, Vice President
American Council on Education
Robert B. Yegge, Dean
University of Denver College of Law
Editor-Consultants
Washington, D.C.
Denver, Colorado
October 1, 1968

CAMPus FREEDOM AND ORDER
By

LOGAN WILSON*

the groves of academ6 have never been as quiet in
fancy, prior to 1964 it is doubtful that anybody
would have given a second thought to the prospect of "Legal Aspects
of Student-Institutional Relationships" as a topic for a national conference. In mid-1968, just four years later, we find ourselves confronting it as a lively educational concern.
For our opening session, I was first asked to give an overview
on "The Nature of Law and Its Involvement in the Educational
Process." Not being a jurist, I decided that a more meaningful
exercise would be to discuss campus problems of freedom and order.
I have lost credibility in some circles, of course, by being too long
past 30, but there may be an antiquarian interest in hearing from one
whose campus experience includes more than a dozen different colleges and universities, from Austin to Boston, and whose academic
career span equals that of about ten successive generations of undergraduates. That experience includes, incidentally, being relieved in
person as a student editor during my early years, and being hanged
in effigy as a university president during my later years toward the
end of a football season when the home team chalked up eight losses
and one win!
From my present perspective in the nation's capital I still regard
many of our campuses as the choicest of all possible places to be, but
I am deeply troubled by what is happening on and to some of them.
For this reason, I have chosen to discuss campus freedom and order.
Let me begin with the year 1964. Well do I remember the
Council's annual meeting that October in San Francisco. Clark Kerr
was to address us on the question, "Toward a Nationwide System of
Higher Education?" This he did, but events at Berkeley were so
much on his own mind and everybody else's that he gave two talks
instead of one, and his impromptu comments received rapt attention.
None of us realized at the time, of course, that Kerr's performance
was merely one of the first instances of deflected attention from the
main business of higher education to a spreading institutional concern
with problems of law and order.
Since 1965, dozens of American campuses have been torn by
student disquiet, dissension, protest, and even violence. While actual
occurrences have often been distorted in television and press report-

ALTHOUGH
I
fact as in

*President, American Council on Education; B.A., Sam Houston State College, 1926;
M.A., University of Texas, 1927; M.A. 1938, Ph.D. 1939, Harvard University.
Formerly, Chancellor, University of Texas, 1960-61.
502

1968

CAMPUS FREEDOM AND ORDER

ing, there is no gainsaying a widespread mood of rebelliousness.
The National Student Association reports that last year, in a two
month period alone, 477 students were arrested and 1,728 faced disciplinary action as a result of demonstrations.' Even though less
than one percent of the millions of college and university students
and only a small fraction of our campuses have displayed extreme
conflict, the general situation is serious enough to warrant our careful
attention.
In my judgment, some of our difficulties stem from mistaken
notions about what a college or university is supposed to be and do.
I recently gave an address at Michigan State University entitled,
"The Abuses of the University," 2 in which I tried to describe and
assess four common misconceptions.
The first of these is the erroneous idea that a university is intended to be a microcosm. The notion that the campus should replicate in miniature the larger community ignores the fact that a college
or university is a special, rather than a general-purpose, community.
Its focus is on gaining, sharing, and using knowledge. To be sure,
it cannot be isolated from the world around it, but to function properly it must be insulated. Members of the academic community are
not chosen at random, and the involvements of students, teachers,
administrators, trustees, and others must necessarily be complementary

-

"unequal"

if you will

-

for the advancement of higher

learning to be accomplished.
Putting aside rhetoric about academic freedom and institutional
autonomy, I expressed the view at an Illinois conference last fall
that, to remain viable, an institution of higher learning needs to keep
the following checkpoints constantly in view.3
(1) Every academic community must be able to exercise
the functionally necessary controls of its membership of faculty,
staff, and students. Although public policy may legitimately
influence these controls, outside agencies should not be permitted to dictate the entry, retention, or exit of particular individuals.
(2) Consistent with the requirements of accrediting associations and recognized professional groups, each institution
should be responsible for maintaining its own academic standards. With regard to other internal standards, to quote a de1 17 AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, HIGHER EDUCATION AND NATIONAL AFFAIRS

pt. 3, at 4 (Jan. 19, 1968).
2 Address by Logan Wilson, The Abuses of the University, Michigan State University
Commencement, Mar. 10, 1968 (published by the President's Office of Michigan
State University).
3 Address by Logan Wilson, Institutional Autonomy and Heteronomy, Illinois Conference on Higher Education, Monticello, Nov. 1967, in PROCEEDINGS OF ILLINOIS
CONFERENCE ON HIGHER EDUCATION (1967).
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cision from the California Court of Appeals, "[T]he University,
as an academic community, can formulate its own standards,
rewards and punishments to achieve its educational objectives.
... Thus, except for the applicable constitutional limitations,

the relationship between appropriate University rules and laws
of the outside community is entirely coincidental." 4
(3) Conceding the right and the power of outside agencies
to grant or withhold funds, and to influence their allocation,
no institution should be deprived of the kind of discretion required for their most effective internal utilization.
(4) A sufficient degree of autonomy must be maintained
for the institution's trustees, administrators, faculty, and students to exercise distinctive rights and discharge shared responsibilities. Such rights and responsibilities should be respected
both internally and externally.
(5) In the realm of ideas, colleges and universities must
be accorded the functional freedoms necessary for intellectual
enterprise.
To this list of checkpoints for the protection of institutional
autonomy against outside interference with basic functions, I would
add some cautions about the equal importance of safeguarding
against inner onslaughts, under whatever banner. For example, mistaken egalitarian notions that would have all collegial decisions made
on a one man, one vote basis would effectuate what Whitehead has
called "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness." 5 The collective enterprise of higher learning simply cannot function with students, faculty,
administrators, or trustees separately determining their own roles.
Even if this were possible, moreover, it is doubtful that the larger
society would permit, much less support, such a uniquely privileged
institution. As to open interference with the rights of other members
of the same presumed partnership, the American Association of University Professors has said, "Action by individuals or groups to prevent speakers invited to the campus from speaking, to disrupt the
operations of the institution in the course of demonstrations, or to
obstruct and restrain other members of the academic community and
campus visitors by physical force is destructive of the pursuit of learning and of a free society. All components of the academic community
are under a strong obligation to protect its processes from these
tactics." 6
4 Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463,

476 (1967).
A. N. WHITEHEAD, THE AIMS OF EDUCATION (1929).
6Resolution adopted by Council Meeting of the American Association of University
Professors, Oct. 29, 1967.
5
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If college and university communities are to continue to enjoy
the freedom and independence historically accorded them, then it
should be obvious that their members not only must have high standards of conduct but also must live up to them. When they fail to
do so, and the police and the courts are drawn upon to maintain order
and settle disputes, then autonomy is already giving way to heteronomy - and the institution is indeed becoming a microcosm of the
larger community.
In my Michigan address,7 I also dealt with mistaken conceptions
of the university as a welfare agency directed primarily toward the
solution of all sorts of social problems and of the university as a
retreat for persons who would "enjoy life in a kind of secular sanctuary where they have many rights but few duties." These ideas are
not particularly relevant here, and hence I shall pass on to another
erroneous notion that is pertinent - namely, the university as an
arena.
I believe that an institution of higher education cannot survive
being transmogrified into a battleground or an arena. In the past
year or so, I have been alarmed to note the intimidation and violence
that small minorities of extreme activists have been able to get away
with on some of our campuses while the majority of the faculty and
student body stood by as passive spectators, either unwilling or unable to join forces with defenders of institutional integrity, who have
in some instances themselves been made the main scapegoats or victims of revolutionary endeavor.
Even where there have been no organized disruptions and obstructions, it is disturbing to note that some members of the academic
community are lining up as adversaries, seeking to impose their wills
on others through collective bargaining, power groupings, denigration of legitimized leadership, flouting of duly constituted authority,
and other tactics hitherto alien to the collegiate environment.
Midst all this turmoil, I certainly would not advocate an uncritical defense of the status quo as a countermeasure; few if any of
our colleges and universities do not stand in need of some reform.
Not only in the United States but also around the world, students
are voicing new needs and new demands. Neither a deaf, authoritarian ear nor a crackdown with severe rules and regulations is, in my
judgment, a proper response.
I would agree with University of Wisconsin Professor of Psychiatry, Dr. S. L. Halleck, who recently said: "Students can no longer
be taken for granted. It does not matter that a great majority of students remain largely content, conservative and apathetic. A determined minority of restless college students have forced us to examine
7 Address by Logan Wilson, supra note 2.
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and sometimes change institutions, rules and values which were once
considered inviolate.""

Reviewing current commentaries on student unrest, Dr. Halleck
goes on to list 15 different explanations. He mentions the critical
hypothesis, the permissiveness hypothesis, the responsibility hypothesis, the affluence hypothesis, and the family pathology hypothesis.
The 10 others include such matters as the war in Vietnam, deterioration in the quality of life, political hopelessness, civil rights, scientism, and so on.
In view of the variety of disturbed states of mind among young
persons on the campus, it is no wonder that the focal point of demonstrations shifts from one concern to another. It should not surprise
us either that revolutionaries can readily agitate the discontented and
resentful into using the campus as a staging area for attack against
what is rather indiscriminately known as "The Establishment." Even
the most benign forms of local authority may thus be identified with
whatever is disliked about existing circumstances in the outside
world, and all sorts of causes are seized upon as excuses to disrupt
order on the campus.
While this goes on, a lot of time is wasted, as one academician
has wryly noted, in "inexpensive moralizing which condemns institutional realities in the name of high principle, and results in irrelevant
prescriptions to imaginary universities with real names.'' Even more
important, however, is the fact that in an environment where law
and order are displaced by anarchy, nobody's conceptions about the
ends of higher education can be realized.
Confronting the realities involves taking into account the fact
that many institutions today are large and heterogeneous aggregations of human beings with competing and sometimes conflicting
purposes. These institutions, like the society that supports them, have
moved from what Henry Maine termed status to contract, and what
Ferdinand Toennies has designated as Gemeinschaft to Geseilschaft.
Their size and heterogeneity, their increased outside involvements,
their enhanced importance, their enmeshment in processes of rapid
social change - these, and other circumstances, give new and enlarged dimensions to the problems of campus freedom and order.
The basic aim of higher education, to be sure, is not to maintain
an orderly operation, but to further wisdom. Yet, for learning to
advance, continuity must exist alongside change, and due regard for
others' rights must counterbalance individual permissiveness in a
8 Address by S.L. Halleck, M.D., Stress and Student Unrest, 23rd National Conference
on Higher Education, Session I, Mar. 4, 1968.
9 Statement by Martin Trow, Professor of Sociology, University of California at
Berkeley.
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context where all members of the academic community are presumed
to share some objectives in common.
An Ivy League president noted some years ago that the fewer
rules and regulations a college or university has for its students, the
better. This observation may have been valid for most places then,
and for some places now, but I suspect that many of our institutions
must face up to the need for more formalization than they once required. This implies a codification of roles, with more specification
of behavior norms, and set procedures for their enforcement. In a
society where contract rather than status has come to establish many
of our standards of social behavior, authority and responsibility need
to be spelled out, and communication channels made explicit.
All of this is quite familiar to those who are trained in law, and
I would anticipate that in the future the governance of higher education will become more legalistic than it has been in the past. Whereas
most of our colleges and universities formerly used lawyers and the
courts largely in their related business transactions, it looks as if they
may become increasingly drawn into other areas of activity. To suggest how far things have already gone in some places, I recently heard
the chancellor of a large and troubled state university remark on the
possibility of starting a police training school to supply officers
specifically prepared to cope with disorder on the campus.
Even though almost any scheme of order may be preferable to
growing disorder that verges at times on anarchy, I must express my
own preference for a minimum, rather than a maximum, use of established agencies of law to resolve intramural difficulties. I have
serious questions, for example, about some of the tactics employed
by the American Civil Liberties Union, not because of any opposition
to their motives but because of the eroding effects such actions have
on the autonomy of colleges and universities. I would agree, however,
that if we cannot put our own houses in order and keep them that
way, others will move in and do it for us - to the ultimate loss of
freedom for students, faculty, administrators, and even trustees.
As President James A. Perkins of Cornell has put it so incisively
in a paper, The University and Due Process:
If we are not to be legislated into total paralysis, there is nothing for it but that each of us goes to work to put the pieces of the
community together again. Students and administrators will have to
stop regarding each other as implacable enemies. For students this
will mean a recognition that they can't have it both ways: they can't
ask for full participation in a community that they are systematically
proceeding to destroy. And before students leap too quickly into
the arms of civil law, they should be reminded that they will have
to live with all the law, not just the parts they like. In such quasi-

political matters as the draft, pornography, and discrimination, stu,
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dents may be subject to laws they don't like at all. He who appeals
to the law for protection must be prepared to obey it.
For administrators it will mean a very hard look at all the
rules and procedures by which their institutions live; quite possibly,
it will also mean limbering up some very stiff attitudes about the
role of students in academic affairs. And for faculty it will mean
not only that they take the time to act as arbiters and to provide the
balancing force, but that they reorder their work and give campus
affairs a higher priority. A community of any kind is strong only
to the extent that its members make the effort required to sustain
and nourish it. We must all be willing to make the effort.' 0
In an unpublished paper," my colleague, Otis A. Singletary, has
suggested that every institution should have a formal mechanism for
making and enforcing regulations concerning student conduct, for
continuously examining and reviewing itself as a social system, and
for making adjustments and changes in the light of experience. He
mentions the strong preference of the academic community for arrangements that bring faculty, students, and administration together,
and I certainly endorse this preference. I agree with him that, although the adversary proceedings of law courts are not appropriate
for the campus setting, there ought to be guarantees of procedural
fairness, more thoughtful attention to sanctions and the handling of
violations, and an altogether new look at the old concepts of in loco
parentis, due process, double jeopardy, and some others that have
been much discussed of late.
Many of you are more competent than I to discuss the legal aspects of student-institutional relationships, and I await with interest
your comments. What you will have to say about applicable legal
doctrines, problems of the student as a private citizen and as a resident, private-public legal aspects of institutions of higher education,
and other topics will be timely, I know. We should remind ourselves,
however, that student-institutional relationships are by no means entirely subsumed under their legal aspects.
A number of leading institutions have already reexamined the
relationship between student conduct and the proper atmosphere of
a college or university. Cornell and Brown are but two examples.
Two years ago an Advisory Committee on Student Conduct was
named at the latter institution to look into such matters as: consideration of the present state of student conduct at Brown; examination
of existing rules and codes; consideration of procedures by which
rules and codes are amended and enforced; consultation with experienced individuals and groups; and to make policy recommendations.
10J. Perkins, The University and Due Process, at 12, Dec. 8, 1967 (reprint of address
by American Council on Education, Washington, D.C.).
11Unpublished staff paper on file at the American Council on Education, Washington,
D.C.
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In addition to sending a questionnaire to 4,000 students, parents,
alumni, and faculty at Brown, the Committee queried deans and student government officials at 37 other institutions. With regard to
the outside responses, I was interested to note that in the largest
number of schools, student conduct regulations were already being
handled by a joint administration-faculty-student board. Most of
these institutions also involve students in decisionmaking and have
procedural safeguards and appeals procedures. After 27 formal meetings, the Brown Committee made its report.'
The report concluded that the University's common interest can
best be identified and pursued through a partnership process, with
students participating in a social system which they help to create
and enforce. As students mature, negative conduct rules should be
diminished, with as much emphasis as possible on counselling and
education. The report further affirms, however, that a university
community cannot function without at least minimal rules intended
to maintain order, and cannot survive without preserving satisfactory
relations with the larger community of which it is a part. Minimum
rules and regulations should be explicit rather than vague, but they
should not be overelaborated or addressed to every conceivable situational nuance. Procedural safeguards are held to be particularly important in the matter of student suspensions and dismissals.
Any institution, the report asserts, must have due regard for the
welfare of its students, the prevailing customs of the college or university community consistent with the ordinances and laws of the
city, state, and nation, and a commonsense, but not slavish, concern
for the institution's outside reputation. The mark of an intelligent
institution, as set forth in this document, is that it preserves and renews itself by reform without inviting revolution.
Although it is virtually impossible for anybody to keep abreast
of what is happening on the nation's 2,500 campuses, my guess is
that appreciable numbers of colleges and universities have gone
through processes similar to those at Brown and Cornell, and that
others are now engaged in studies. My recommendation would be
that student-institutional relationships be kept under continuous study
and review everywhere.
Fortunately for their autonomy, most colleges and universities
have considerable latitude in promulgating their internal rules and
regulations, but they and all their members must also live under the
laws of the society that surrounds and supports them. Membership
in the academic community carries its special rights and obligations,
12 Report of the Advisory Committee on Student Conduct, Community and Partnership:
Student Conduct at Brown University, May 1967 (mimeographed paper on file at
Brown University).
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to be sure, but these do not exempt individuals from observance of
the legal and moral standards prevailing in the larger community.
Our conference will concern itself with the nexus between law and
student-institutional relationships, and I am confident that it will be
an important step toward eliminating some of the uncertainties and
resolving some of the difficulties now troubling American higher
education. Members of the legal profession and of the academic
profession - not to mention students - should all benefit from what
I believe is bound to be a very significant symposium. I merely hope
that my remarks here have helped set the stage for the important
substantive contributions yet to come.

STUDENTS, HIGHER EDUCATION,

AND THE LAW
By WILLIAM M. BEANEY*
"Law never is, but is always about to be."
-Cardozo'
'[Clertainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of
man. . . .We do not realize how large a part of our la.w is open
to reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of the public
mind."
2
-Holmes

AMERICAN colleges and universities are clearly not exempt from
-

the currents of thought and action now generally affecting our

political and social institutions. Traditional values

and customary

relationships are being reexamined and frequently attacked, and
private and public organizations are being compelled to take a fresh
look at existing practices and accepted purposes. The one certainty

is that significant changes in the internal and external relations of
institutions of higher learning will continue to take place.3 The tasks
confronting those who share responsibility for the viability and improvement of higher education are to winnow constructive proposals

from potentially harmful ones, to provide realistic definitions of
the roles and functions of all participants in the life of universities,
and to create an internal ordering and spirit which furthers the
achievement of agreed goals.
The specific purpose of this article is to describe some of the
ways in which present and emerging legal principles and procedures
may affect the internal ordering of colleges and universities, focusing
on those elements relevant to the range of problems presented by the
claims of undergraduate and graduate students to a larger and, in
some respects, different role in the academic and social life of these

institutions. Student claims thus far advanced have at least these main
objectives: to gain a greater share in the making of decisions involving goals, programs, and academic style; to win a much larger,
perhaps even dominant, share in decisions involving policies, rules,
and regulations governing students' lives and social activities both
of Politics, Princeton University; A.B., Harvard University, 1940; LL.B.
19,47, Ph.D. 1951, University of Michigan. Visiting Professor of Law, University of
Denver College of Law, 1968-69.
'B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 126 (1921).
2Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 466 (1897).
3The larger implications of student involvement in political affairs are examined in
*Professor

STUDENT POLITICS (S. Lipset ed. 1967).
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on and off campuses; to achieve virtually unlimited freedom to express ideas and advocate or oppose various causes; and finally,
to secure improved disciplinary procedures in which students play a
larger role.4
The following brief survey of leading concepts and principles
of law relevant to the resolution of these claims should not be misconstrued. While courts have spoken with respect to some of the
problems arising from student-institutional relationships, they have
in the past shown great deference to university decisions. At least
one claim, perhaps the most critical of the pressing issues, seems illsuited for judicial resolution. That claim is to a greater share in
university decisionmaking and will, of course, engage the attention
of faculties, state legislatures, and trustees of private institutions, but
it is unlikely to be resolved by the courts. Yet, it is clear that to the
extent that courts evolve and apply doctrines which improve the
status of students and provide greater recognition and protection
for their rights, their claim to participate in decisionmaking is enhanced. 5 It is also clear that most institutions, frequently in response
to student requests, will redefine students' rights and responsibilities
without regard for the existing or emerging requirements of the
formal legal system. Most will seek to improve relations between
students, faculty, and administration in order to better achieve their
educational objectives, without pedantic attention to the relatively
few limitations on their wide discretion in determining control of
university affairs imposed by the formal legal order. This and other
conference papers examine some of the critical issues that may be
presented to the courts and legislatures, particularly if the universities
fail to evolve satisfactory solutions of their own. To the extent that
reasonable solutions are provided by the universities, however, the
occasions for successful judicial intervention will diminish.
The possible value of law, in helping to shape solutions and in
providing useful lessons drawn from experiences in parallel social
situations, arises from its agelong concern with the defining of relationships in a wide variety of individual and associative contexts,
its adaption to changes through the redefining of relationships, its
handling of troublesome cases, and its concern for both the maintenance and proper exercise of legitimate authority. It must be recognized, however, that law in itself contains no panaceas; it offers
4Obviously, more extreme claims have been, and are being, advanced by student
spokesmen. However, the listed claims seem to me to be the principal ones that
receive support from the most substantial number of students.

5 Participation in decisionmaking is clearly the students' main objective, but the elevation in status as a member of the university community implicit in that goal is furthered by judicial or administration actions recognizing free speech, privacy, and other
student claims.
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more or less effective solutions to human problems, depending on
the skill and judgment of those who shape it.' Neither legislatures
nor courts are competent to run universities. Yet, if our educational
institutions become distressed and pressures for solutions become
severe, legislatures may intervene. Although unskilled in university
administration, even courts, which are specialists in determining
justice between men, may in proper cases act to ensure that justice
between students and institutions is done. The correct conclusion
to be drawn is that the universities should establish an internal order
that takes into account the legitimate claims of students. That order
should embody a spirit of justice and fairness, resulting from a
recognition that rights and obligations of students should be defined
after long and thoughtful consultations and deliberation. It would be
a disastrous mistake if student claims were to be casually dismissed
simply because the law at present provides no compulsion to act
differently, and because the student has been traditionally regarded
as the innocent ward of a beneficent, all-wise, and all-powerful
parent.
I. In Loco Parentis AND

RELATED DOCTRINES

Institutions of higher learning owe their existence and their
powers to the decision by politically organized society that they fulfill
one or more vital social functions. Public institutions are creations
of state legislatures; those regarded as private institutions are also
recipients of grants from the legislature in the form of charters. For
understandable reasons, these delegations of power by legislatures are
general; they set forth the educational objectives, establish a governing board, and state the principal powers that the institution may
exercise. For the most part, these grants or charters show little or no
concern with the relations between students and their mentors.
Whatever the traditions of medieval European universities or the
traditions and practices in other parts of the world, American institutions have assumed that their power - administered through governing boards and officers acting under their authority - to control
the academic program is unlimited, and that there are few if any
limits on their power to control the noncurricular activities of students. The relatively small body of caselaw involving student
6 Some

scholars consider law a value-neutral technique of social control. See W.
LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN GHANA (1966). The positivists regard
morals and law as wholly separate, while the sociological school is concerned largely
with the social interests advanced or protected by law. Others feel that law and
moral considerations are necessarily intertwined. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAW (1964). All would agree, however, that the quality of law and its effectiveness
depends on intelligent decisions as to what law can and cannot accomplish, careful
attention in formulating its substance, and appropriate choice of procedures for
carrying it into effect.
HARVEY,
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challenges to expulsions or to refusals to grant degrees represents a
very small number of isolated attacks on the system by offended
individuals. The prevailing social attitudes in the United States seem
clearly to have reinforced the conceptions of the university-student
relationships held by most institutions - one in which the student
has few privileges, even fewer rights, and substantial obligations.
The university, by contrast, is seen as a benevolent, dominating
master, free to dictate the terms and conditions governing the lives
of students during their period of residence.
Courts have used various legal formulae in justifying an essentially "hands-off" policy toward institutions of higher learning,
both public and private. The basic attitude has been a compound of
deference to the expertise of the educator, fear that judicial interference in behalf of students might pose dangers to the well-being
of institutions, and perhaps a subconscious feeling of aversion
towards students and parents who failed to conform.
The doctrine of in loco parentis developed from the judicial
reaction in the 19th century to criminal and civil actions by parents
against private tutors and teachers who were responsible for the
imposition of physical punishment on their students. 7 Just as the
parent could punish his children, said the courts, so also could the
surrogate parent - the tutor or schoolmaster. Much later, the Restatement of Torts (1934) referred to the in loco parentispower of private
schools as being delegated by the parents, but quite unrealistically
described it as limited by the specific terms in each parent's delegation of this power.8 In public schools and colleges, the in loco parentis
power was described by courts as analogous to that of parents, but
with a foundation in law independent of specific parental instructions. While Gott v. Berea College1" is frequently cited as the
authority for in loco parentis, cases of earlier vintage can be found,
and the doctrine and variants have served courts into the present era.
Supplemented by a 1934 decision of the United States Supreme Court,
holding that attendance at public universities was a privilege and not
a right," the judicial attitude has clearly been opposed to intensive
review of institutional decisions.
7 See references in Note, Private Government on the Campus -

Judicial Review of
University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362, 1368 (1963). This is a valuable, wellreasoned article whose scope is much broader than the title suggests. The most recent
effort at a comprehensive legal analysis is a section Academic Freedom of Students in
Developments in the Law -Academic
Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1128-59
(1968).
8 Note, Private Government on the Campus- Judicial Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362, 1368 & n.24 (1963).
9Id.

10 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913).
11Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
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Many courts have chosen not to rely on in loco parentis,
recognizing that this legal relic of an earlier and simpler era provides an inadequate foundation for describing the rights and duties
of participants in increasingly complex university affairs. Admittedly,
no single legal concept can provide answers to a myriad of specific
issues, but the effort to formulate a general principle underlying
student-institutional relations may have great significance in shaping
the attitudes of institutional officers or students and, more importantly, will tend to influence the style and process of actual
governance. Some courts have relied upon the existence of a contract,
express or implied, between a student and the institution. This contract incorporates the rules and other provisions in the catalogs and
various other school documents, including the catchall right proclaimed in some regulations "to expel a student for any reason
deemed sufficient," which reason need not be revealed. 2 Other
courts have attributed a large and virtually unrestrained institutional
power over students either to custom or to legislative or charter
provisions, or simply to the functional needs of the institution.'
Whatever the legal formula relied on by the courts, the result has
been, with a few recent exceptions, to uphold institutional authority
and to regard the power to discipline the student, including the
drastic act of expulsion, as largely beyond judicial control.
Several related developments have contributed to, and will continue to shape, a changing, more receptive attitude of the courts
toward those challenging institutional treatment of students. One is
the pervasive thrust in our society to achieve equal rights for all
disadvantaged groups. Increasingly, the courts have been forced to
examine the realities of a variety of real-life social situations. A
second development is a wider acceptance of the right of dissenters
and advocates of various causes to a fuller freedom of expression
under the first amendment. A third is a tendency to examine more
critically the behavior of powerful private associations whose actions
may adversely affect their own members and the wider society.' 4
The public-private distinction, while it remains one of great significance in law, is less readily resorted to as a shorthand answer to
those who accuse private associations of wrongdoing. Finally, there
is an upsurge in the demand for wider sharing and participation in
Note, supra note 8, at 1377-79.
Id. at 1368-69.
14 See Developments in the Law- Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations,
76 HFAv. L. REV. 983 (1963), which should be compared in its findings with the
earlier seminal analysis by Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for
Profit, 43 HARV. L REV. 993 (1930). The growth of judicial intervention has been
substantial.
12
13
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the processes of decisionmaking, and a readiness to challenge existing
allocations of power.
Two recent cases may be cited to illustrate the changing attitudes of courts. Both involve public institutions, but their lessons are
no less significant for private universities. Dixon v. Alabama,' a
federal court case, involved the dismissal from a state college of
several Negro students who had participated in racial protest demonstrations. The specific ground for holding the expulsions unlawful
was a denial of due process of law resulting from the failure to give
the students notice of the charges and a hearing. In reversing the
lower court, the court of appeals judge commented that it was not
enough to say, as had the district court, that "It~he right to attend
a public college or university is not in and of itself a constitutional
right."' 6 In a recent state case, Goldberg v. Regents of the University
of California,7 the court upheld the dismissal from a state university
of students charged with the deliberate public use of foul language.
The court severely attacked the in loco parentis doctrine and the
notion that attendance at a public institution was a privilege, not a
right. "Rather," said the court, "attendance at publicly financed
institutions of higher education should be regarded [as] a benefit
'1 8
somewhat analogous to that of public employment.
In Goldberg, the university's disciplinary action was viewed as
"a proper exercise of its inherent general powers to maintain order
on the campus and to exclude therefrom those who are detrimental
to its well being ...,19 The court held it reasonable for the institution to enforce a rule essential to order and propriety as a necessary
condition for carrying out the functions of the university. While
neither of these decisions reflects an eagerness by the judiciary to
undertake a sustained scrutiny of the internal order of universities,
they do suggest that institutions should examine their rules and regulations to determine if they are relevant to the achievement of legitimate educational purposes. They also imply a willingness on the
part of the courts to intervene when an institution acts arbitrarily.
While prophecy in law as in other matters is risky, one can
anticipate a gradual reformulation in law of the relationship of the
university to its students. A recent suggestion is that the institution
15 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
16 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 945, 950 (M.D. Ala. 1960).
17248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
1857 Cal. Rptr. at 470. "[T~he better approach," said the court, is "that state universities
should no longer stand in loco parentis in relation to their students." (Footnote
omitted). Id. At one time the courts, regarding public employment as a privilege,
permitted dismissals for any cause. This is no longer permitted. See K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.13 (Supp. 1965).
19 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 473 (1967).
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should be regarded as a fiduciary in its relation with students."0
Another suggestion is that a differently ordered set of principles
arising from implied contract principles might be set forth by the
courts with greater emphasis on the rights of students. 2 Whatever
the form of legal resolution, it is probably true that the realities of
student-institutional relations worked out within the academic community will greatly influence the attitude of the judges. While it is
impossible to eliminate the odd or unforeseen case, reasonable rules
affecting students that appear appropriate and necessary for achieving the purposes of the institution, particularly those devised with
some form of student consultation and participation which are applied
through fair procedures, are unlikely to appear arbitrary to the
courts.
II.

THE STANDARDS OF EQUALITY AND FAIRNESS

In many of the specific controversies arising from the imposition of disciplinary penalties, it may be claimed that the individual
was denied due process of law or the equal protection of the laws.
In both the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States
Constitution, due process guaranties appear, the former a limitation
on actions of the national government, the latter directed at the
states. Originating in English law as an historic admonition that
citizens were to be dealt with according to "the law of the land" or
"due process of law," these clauses have had a wondrous history
in American law. They were used at times by the courts to invalidate
social legislation, but in recent decades they serve as an important
limitation on all governmental procedures by which any person may
suffer a loss or serious disadvantage.2 In addition, the due process
clause in the fourteenth amendment has been interpreted over the
years by the United States Supreme Court to impose virtually all of
the rights and guaranties of the Bill of Rights as limitations on the
states. With the abandonment of the principle that attendance at an
institution of higher learning is a privilege and not a right, it now
20 Goldman, The University and the Liberty of its Students-

A Fiduciary Theory, 54
Ky. L.J. 643 (1966). "All the elements of a fiduciary relation are present in the
student-university relationship," he concludes. "It is no small trust- no small display
of confidence to place oneself under the educational mentorship of a particular
university." Id. at 671. While a fiduciary theory would protect against arbitrary
acts of suspension or expulsion, it hardly fits student demands for sharing in university decisions. The latter type of issue, however, is unlikely to get into courts, and
will have to be resolved at each institution in the way that most political issues are
settled - by discussion and negotiation.
21Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1145-47
(1968).
2 For a general survey of the growth of due process see E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST

GOVERNMENT (1948). The march of due process and equal protection doctrines in
the United States Supreme Court is recorded in the volumes of the Annual Survey
of American Law and the annual November issues of the Harvard Law Review. The
volume of relevant literature is overwhelming.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 45

serves as a barrier against arbitrary institutional actions which impose
penalties on students.
The equal protection clause is found only in the fourteenth
amendment and is ostensibly a limitation on state acts that discriminate or use classifications that have no rational basis. The most
dramatic employment of the clause is seen in the series of cases
outlawing discrimination in schools, libraries, and other public facilities. We should note the special emphasis on the central importance of education in our society in the leading case, Brown v. Board
of Education,3 as a clue to the potential application of the equal
protection clause to higher education.
Although both guaranties appear to be directed solely at governmental action, some recent decisions reveal a judicial willingness to
regard certain forms of private activities as sufficiently affected by,
or related to, public action to be treated as governmental action in
law. 24 It is by no means clear that private colleges and universities
will be included by the courts in its quasi-public category. Except
for those private institutions with an announced religious or other
special orientation, however, inclusion of private educational institutions that receive various public benefits and have a number of
ties with state authority would be consistent with visible tendencies
25
in the law.
A second source of potential expansion exists in the very recent
agreement of a majority of the Supreme Court to give meaning to
the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment, which empowers Congress to implement the positive provisions of the amendment.2" Thus Congress, under pressure from constituents, might
progressively enlarge the meaning of both due process and equal
protection through legislation outlawing educational practices viewed
as discriminatory or unfair. Again, it would appear that there is a
sufficient nexus between "private" institutions and public relationships (benefits, support, etc.) to justify their inclusion in such
legislation.
Whether or not the courts choose to treat private institutions as
public, it is conceivable that due process and equal protection conceptions may be read into the contractual or status relationships of
student and university. Even if the courts treat private institutions
23 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Note that the Court relied on the fifth amendment due process

clause in forbidding segregation in the District of Columbia schools. Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
24 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), is the latest of the leading cases holding that
'private" action may under certain circumstances be viewed as state action, thus
making the equal protection clause (and the due process clause) applicable.
25 See Developments in the Law- Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. R-Ev. 1045, 1056-64
(1968), for an analysis of this possibility.
26 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
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as largely exempt from the application of these guaranties, it is
hardly realistic to assume that private institutions would be willing to
provide rules and procedures that meet substantially lower standards
of equality and fairness in dealing with students than those required
of public institutions. For all these reasons, it seems desirable to
make no distinction between private and public institutions, with
the notable exception of any school relying on its announced religious orientation to justify a special admission policy and rules
and regulations that reflect its sectarian concerns.
What are the possible applications of due process and equal
protection to the relations of students and universities? Clearly, equal
protection could be applied to prevent any demonstrable discrimination in admissions or declinations that lacked a rational basis. Racially
motivated policies are clearly outlawed, and any form of discrimination based on nonrational characteristics are suspect.
Rules pertaining to academic and noncurricular matters must
be reasonably related to institutional objectives. They must to the
fullest possible extent provide meaningful standards to guide students in their academic and other activities and should be enforced
through clearly stated and fairly administered procedures. Admittedly, this is a readily declared principle, but serious problems arise in
its real-life application. While this is not the place to deal with the
range of specific issues which are the concern of other conference
papers, the relevance of due process and equal protection conceptions to the formulation and application of academic and other rules
should be made as clear as possible. Courts are unlikely to welcome
challenges to the content or enforcement of rules directly concerned
with academic matters for the obvious reason that universities are
far more qualified than courts to determine appropriate academic
standards and to apply them to students. In addition, the courts
would certainly recognize the in terrorem effect of the mere possibility of lawsuits on the teaching process, as well as the terrible
burden a plethora of cases brought by disgruntled students would
place on the courts. When one moves from issues arising solely from
judgments regarding the quality of student academic performance
to those involving judgments and penalties for failure to comply
with academic requirements which have a factually determinable
basis, the potentiality of eventual court review is somewhat stronger.
Lack of clearly defined consequences for lateness of submitting work
and failure to clarify rules concerning the attribution of sources
on student papers might cause difficulties. Lack of consistency in
rulings of expulsion for failure to make normal academic progress
might also provide opportunities for judicial review. It is the excessive
vagueness or ambiguity of the rules concerning academic require-
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ments, or the obvious inconsistency in their application, that may
give rise to lawsuits. Greater attention to these problems by faculty
and administrators should largely eliminate any danger of judicial
interference.
The more difficult questions arise from institutional rules and
regulations governing noncurricular activities, both on and off the
campus. An especially vulnerable type of rule is the overly general
catchall, such as "failure to behave as a gentleman," or "as an X
Institution student is expected to behave," or "as a responsible member of the university community," or the ultimate in arbitrary rulemaking, permitting severance for any reason, which need not be
revealed. Clearly, rules to be valid must bear a reasonable relation
to the educational purposes of the institution.2 7 Interferences with
a student's right to enjoy first amendment and other constitutional
guaranties can, of course, be challenged by direct invocation of the
relevant constitutional provision. Punishment for participation in
lawful though unpopular activities, or for expression of unorthodox
ideas, clearly denies constitutional rights. An educational institution
obviously must create and maintain conditions conducive to the
achievement of its educational goals, but query whether many institutions may have assumed an excessively large responsibility for
the ordering of the personal lives of students in the light of drastically
changed social attitudes and values.
The significance of due process and equal protection is made
most clear with respect to the procedures used in imposing sanctions
on students for violation of rules and regulations.2 " On this subject,
judges may well conclude that they, not the educators, are the experts. Due process and equal protection require adequate notice and
a fair hearing. Courts recognize, however, that just as a formal administrative hearing of a governmental agency does not call for all
the specific safeguards of the criminal trial, notice and hearing in
student disciplinary matters may not necessarily require all of the
features of a formal administrative hearing. At the least, the student must be informed of the charge against him in sufficient time
to prepare adequately for the hearing. He should have an opportunity to present witnesses on his behalf and to question witnesses
against him. It has been recommended that a student should have
the assistance of at least an advisor, if not counsel. 9 There should
27

That seems to be one of the commands derived from the Goldberg case. Admittedly
it is a very general standard, but it can be used to nullify unnecessary rules.
28 For a good, brief survey including the latest decisions see Developments in the Law
-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1134-43 (1968).
29
joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, 53 A.A.U.P. BULL. 365 (1967).
One may well speculate on whether the use of 'advisors" will meet due process
requirements.
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be a summary record and an opportunity for appeal. Obviously, the
spirit with which these procedures are used are of vital importance;
a mere formal observance is insufficient. An institution, large or
small, which insists on using highly truncated and informal methods
in dealing with serious disciplinary problems is inviting judicial
intervention. The obvious thrust of legal developments in recent
decades has been toward increased judicial scrutiny of procedures
used in reaching decisions that adversely affect vital interests of
individuals and groups. Government and its instrumentalities, and,
in ever greater degree, private associations as well, are compelled
to observe the rules of reasonableness and fairness in the procedures
they employ.
A very recent decision of the United States Supreme Court
expresses vividly the changed attitude of courts toward the importance
of procedural guarantees. In the case of In re Gault,30 the Court
declared unconstitutional several procedures (or lack thereof) characteristic of juvenile proceedings in all our states. In effect, the Court
is unwilling to see young offenders deprived of safeguards regarded
as essential in adult criminal proceedings. The justification for informal procedures and lack of procedural safeguards - that the
interests of juveniles would be adequately protected by the juvenile
court judge and other officials, and that the purpose of helping, not
punishing, offenders would be advanced thereby-proved illusory
31
in practice.
III.

THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

In 1890, two Boston attorneys, Louis S. Brandeis and his partner
Samuel Warren, argued in a law review article that a private legal
remedy should be available to those injured by newspapers and others
who intrude into the personal lives of Americans. 32 As a Supreme
Court Associate Justice, Brandeis urged in vain that the fourth
amendment guarantee should be extended to new forms of invasion
of the home - wiretapping in this case - because the framers of
the Constitution had sought through the amendment "to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations." 33 To accomplish this protection, the framers had conferred "the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men."3 4 Although this seemed
30 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
31

The justification frequently offered for highly informal, irregular institutional disciplinary procedures is the desire to help, not punish, students, and therefore any
semblance of an adversary proceeding should be avoided.

32 Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
33 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).

34 Id.
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mere rhetoric at the time, the law has hesitatingly, but inevitably,
moved in the direction Brandeis proposed. Privacy is recognized in
many states as a private right protected by suit, and the fourth
amendment provides increasing protection against intrusive actions
by both state and federal governments. The right to privacy was held
to be guaranteed by the Constitution in a 1965 Supreme Court decision
invalidating a Connecticut anticontraceptive law. 5 Essentially, it is a
broad and expanding protection to the dignity and personality of
individuals and groups against various forms of unreasonable intrusive behavior.8 6
The relevance of this legal right to student-institutional relations
should be obvious. As a citizen, a student enjoys the constitutional
right to privacy. As a student, he may be asked to give essential
information relevant to his educational program, but he should not
be subjected to intrusive queries about personal affairs, nor should he
be used as a subject in surveys or experiments without his informed
consent. While residing in university dormitory facilities, a student
may be required to submit to periodic fire and health inspections of
his quarters, and to have them entered to prevent harm to persons or
property, or when necessary to maintain order, but students should
be able to enjoy security from casual and prying entries. Similarly,
the right to privacy requires each institution to maintain the confidentiality of student records from unjustified queries. There may
be administrative difficulties to overcome in making information
available to a student's prospective employer and others with a
legitimate interest in his qualifications while denying them to those
with no such interest, but the task is hardly insuperable, and the
gain both to student privacy and to mutual confidence in studentinstutional relationships is substantial.
IV.

FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS

The first amendment guaranties of freedom of speech, religion,
press, assembly, and that prohibiting an establishment of religion
have assumed ever greater significance in the past 30 years. When
the United States Supreme Court in 1937 abandoned its previous
role as a censor of social and economic legislation and implementing administrative action, it assumed a new set of functions by
protecting dissenting individuals and groups expressing unpopular
causes against repressive official action.' Many of the most important
35 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
36 See A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967), for a full account of the development of this right.
37 See H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT (1967),

judicial decisions.

for a survey of post 1937
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recent cases have involved demonstrations, sit-ins, and other forms
of protest by those seeking desegregated public and private facilities
of various kinds. Both state and national governmental actions are
limited by first amendment guaranties. In the light of the discussion
above, it is unlikely that private institutions would be permitted to
deny or improperly limit the first amendment rights of students,
except to the extent that colleges and universities with a sectarian
religious orientation may impose special requirements with respect to
religious matters.
The courts have stated on many occasions that the first amendment rights are not unlimited. Government representatives may set
reasonable conditions for the time, place, and manner of exercising
these rights, and a university is similarly justified in setting reasonable
regulations to protect academic objectives and to maintain order on
campus."' Nevertheless, students would seem to have a right to form
associations on campus for any lawful purpose. 9 Since students enjoy
all the constitutional rights of other citizens, it is difficult to see how
a university can restrict off-campus student activities involving the
lawful exercise of apparent first amendment rights. The unpopularity
or irrationality of student expression provides no justification for
suppression or penalty. On the other hand, active participation in
causes will not justify a student's failure to discharge his academic
objectives.
It would be extremely unfortunate if institutions of higher learning, having successfully fought so many battles with legislatures and
trustees in the name of academic freedom for the faculty, should fail
to recognize that freedom for students to express ideas without fear
of penalty is also essential to a free academic community. Obviously,
students may not always exhibit a full sense of responsibility in their
zeal to express ideas, but that is hardly a sufficient reason to stifle
their expression.
CONCLUSION

The changing and often painful relations between students and
institutions of higher learning suggest that some lessons may be
drawn from the experience of the legal system in dealing with
problems that arise in defining other social relationships. It is also
suggested that, although the courts are moving cautiously in rede38

The rules must provide reasonably clear guidance and must not be applied in such a
way that innocent speech is inhibited. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
S This should be qualified by adding that formal university "sanction" or 'approval"
might be withheld from some dangerous or undesirable associations that had a lawful
purpose. Nevertheless, the right to associate seems to have a firm constitutional basis.
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). In Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516
(1960), the Supreme Court protected against the compelled disclosure of the membership list of an unpopular association.
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fining the status of students, reliance on the doctrine of in loco
parentis is no longer tenable. Similarly, courts in the future will be
less willing to use express or implied contract principles to justify
virtually unlimited control over students, including the ultimate
sanction- expulsion. It is suggested that both public and private
institutions should take into account this changing attitude of courts,
although in practice many have already recognized a substantially
changed status of students and have adopted policies and procedures
constituting a new internal ordering of university life.
Rules spelling out student academic and noncurricular obligations should be as precise and informative as possible. Due process
of law and equal protection of law standards, which indicate the
desirability of this precision, also require reasonable consistency in the
interpretation and application of rules. Given the heightened concern
of courts for procedural rights and regularity, it is imperative that
institutions adopt procedures calculated to give adequate notice and
afford a fair hearing in all disciplinary cases, for, apart from the
intrinsic worth of proper procedural safeguards, omissions or illconceived steps are likely to invite judicial scrutiny. It has been noted
that the use of procedures in juvenile proceedings that failed to meet
the Constitutional standards required for adults charged with criminal
offences has met with disapproval by the courts.
The emergence of a right to privacy, a legal concept of great
potentiality, suggests the wisdom of a reexamination of administrative
practices that may offend the dignity and invade the privacy of
students. Finally, the expansion of first amendment rights by the
courts in the past 30 years, and the attention which the courts are
willing to give to claims of minorities and dissident individuals,
should warn colleges and universities to avoid policies and practices
that overtly or indirectly curtail students' exercise of first amendment
rights of speech, press, and assembly.

COMMENT
By

EDWARD SCHWARrZ*

F

OR the past two years, many of the people at this conference have
been meeting almost bimonthly to rehash a set of familiar issues
concerning student rights. We acknowledged at these meetings our
general agreement on the nature of due process; we recounted the
latest instance of the elimination of a campus speaker ban; we debated whether student political organizing should remain free from
administrative control; we took a peek at the rising incidence of spying on the campus; and, in general, we patted ourselves on the back
and agreed that higher education is making progress in these areas.
Now we meet again to reenact the same ritual. Judging from
the list of panelists and the familiar panoply of faces in the audience,
I greatly fear that this is all that we will accomplish. In the fall of
1966, some of us on the drafting commission for the joint Statement
on Rights and Freedoms of Students warned that the discussion of
educational problems had to encompass much more than questions of
rights, and that students had gone far beyond those questions. We
were told, "You're right, but not now." We acquiesced, went along
with the context in which the Statement was framed, and waited for
the new discussion. The joint Statement has been ratified by all
participating groups; the conversation has not changed.
I am not here primarily to discuss legal rights of students, but
to suggest the reasons why the debate over legal rights is a substitute
for a consideration of the real issues which we should be considering.
I have done this before, but I feel a special urgency in doing so now.
This will be my last presentation to an educational conference as
President of the National Student Association. While I have no
doubt that my successor will continue the work which we have
started, I feel a special responsibility to make my parting shot an
extensive one. I have dealt with you reasonably in the past, but my
attempts to be reasonable have not evoked the debate which I had
intended. We now have witnessed over 30 major confrontations in
the past month - a phenomenon which we predicted. You must
understand that these uprisings will continue until, and unless, you
begin to face up to the new issues.
New issue number one - student power. Can students control
their own affairs, influence curricular decisions, and participate in
policy formulation basic to university life? I have yet to hear any
serious answers to these questions. Contrary to the view that your
*President, United States National Student Association; A.B., Oberlin College, 1965.
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organizations are more "liberal" than their constituencies, the
campuses are way ahead of most of you in conducting this discussion.
New issue number two - the shape of the curriculum. This includes grading policies, teacher-student relationships, the state of the
disciplines, freshman orientation, and freshman year programs. We
skirt these issues in these gatherings, but, again, have rarely dealt
with them in other than a perfunctory manner.
New issue number three - the relationship between the university and society. The Students for a Democratic Society have been
leading battles in this area during the past year, but you can expect
that the National Student Association will join the fray next fall.
For whom, and for what reason, should university research be conducted? Where do universities invest their money? What relationships exist between universities and local police forces? I have yet
to hear anyone here challenge the political stance of much of higher
education. How many disruptions will it take to bring those questions to your attention?
These are the themes which animate student activity in 1968
and which get to the heart of the problems currently facing higher
education. These are the themes of the conference that must be
held. Yet, conferences which are being held ignore them. Even when
only because some of you
a new topic bursts to the surface -if
cannot hold back what is on your minds- it emerges in a useless
context. Questions of spy systems on campuses are discussed solely in
terms of the right to privacy, rarely in terms of what it means for a
university to cooperate with police forces. Students who question
university investments in war research are informed of the university's "right" to invest resources in such research, rather than of the
rationale of the institution for doing so. Issues involving university
ownership of slum tenements in the ghettos are considered in terms
of the student's "competence" to pose such questions. Whenever a
new area is raised, you try to fit it into an old framework which is
entirely inadequate to the problem.
What I must ask is, "Why?" Why are you afraid to engage in
an honest discourse of the issues which are exploding on the campus?
Why is there a two or three year gap between the introduction of a
question on 50 campuses and its serious consideration at the conferences? I want to devote some time to answering my own questions,
both in relation to student rights in general, and to student legal
rights in particular.
Most of you approach social questions in the framework of what
I would call procedural liberalism. Procedural liberalism posits a
kind of billiard ball view of society by which individuals are granted
the freedom to act autonomously, so long as they do not "destroy the
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rights of others." The two critical tasks of procedural liberalism are
the construction of definitions of individual freedom and the creation of mechanisms to protect these autonomous beings from one
another. As long as we can say that man is "free," then we need not
worry about the ways in which he uses his freedom, the ways in
which he accepts the "rules of the game" which protect his freedom,
or the ways in which his institutions promote his welfare.
The central treatises in defense of mass education spring very
much from these premises. Clark Kerr's The Uses of the University,1
for example, exalts the multiversity on grounds that it provides a
number of options for individual fulfillment and that its procedures
enable an accommodation between the conflicting forces acting upon
the institution. If the options remain varied, and the university president remains a skillful mediator, then the multiversity will remain a
wholesome environment for growth. The gravest threats to its
existence, by these theories, arise when an agency of the public attempts to close an option or restrict a freedom, or when a group
within the university no longer accepts the "rules of the game" as
being sufficient to guarantee the success of a political objective.
As Kerr learned, and as others should learn as well, guarantees
of individual freedom and political order are insufficient. Men may
desire an expanding relationship between one another, a sense of
community within their environment which transcends questions of
freedom and order. Two lovers do not create courts to handle their
quarrels - if they worry first about how to protect themselves from
one another, they cease to love. The problem in mass life involves
the creation of a lover's relationship between people. When such a
relationship does not exist, modern man feels atomized, cut off,
alone, alienated. No number of options in the supermarket, or procedures for his protection, can compensate for his internal sense
of loss.
The three "new issues" which I suggested are directly related to
this general problem of mass society and mass universities - the
problem of creating community within our institutions. Student
power, as a battle cry, asks that students be accepted in an entirely
new relationship with administrators and faculty, and that the doctrines which relegate students to a limited "role" be replaced by a
framework which shows greater respect for students as people. The
drive for educational innovation- particularly that part of the drive
which challenges faculty teaching, grading, and the processes of the
classroom - is really asking that professors take as much interest
in their students as people as they do in their disciplines as subjects.
The challenges raised concerning the university's relationship to
1

C. KERR, THE UsEs

OF THE UNIVERSITY

(1963).

DENVER LAW J0URNAL

VOL. 45

society subject the institutions to criteria of humaneness: Is the university racist? Is it militarist?
I suspect that an important part of administrative resistance to
serious consideration of the questions stems from their failure to
grasp the context in which they are raised. After all, communitarian
literature is uncommon to the American political experience, even
though working class and ghetto community life has been important
to its development. College presidents are more schooled in Locke
than Rousseau, and in Locke, the man and his work are more important than the relationships between men. To college presidents,
students are not subjects, they are objects - beings who must be
processed, nurtured, and "prepared" for life. As Buber noted, one
does not develop a healthy relationship with an object. The student
who tries to move from "I-it" to "I-thou" with other members of
the academic community often learns that his elders are not prepared
to accept him on that basis, nor prepared to view him in that way.
Similarly, the procedural liberal who fancies himself to be "on
the student's side" often fails to grasp what students are telling him.
To be sure, the number of occasions upon which the liberal must defend student freedom does make him an ally, since higher education
debases both student liberty and student community. Yet the liberal
is equipped with neither the theoretical framework nor, in some
cases, the personal resources to cope with student questions about
community relationships. He often seems more impressed with the
manner in which the student case is argued than in the case itself,
and, in recent times, he is more interested in the process and aftermath of a protest than in its substance. I have been asked several
times in the past few weeks to state my reactions to building seizures.
At no time have I been asked whether universities should engage in
secret research for the war in Vietnam. In short, the procedural
liberal is trying to construct better rules for an old game, when the
students are trying to change the nature of the game itself.
Even in making judgments on the process of the campus as it
is, the procedural liberal finds himself ill served by his theories.
His "rules of the game" dictate that everyone remain a gentleman,
regardless of his real political position. Being "reasonable" may be
a luxury which only those who possess power can afford, but the
procedural liberal would counsel temperance to the powerless as well.
Occasionally, he has a blind faith that administrators will respond
to the "reasonable" style, a faith which only occasionally is justified.
Even when administrators do not respond, the procedural liberal
will contend that preservation of the appropriate process is more important than the attainment of a political goal.
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It is this kind of concern, I suspect, which motivated the convocation of this conference. On the surface, of course, it appears
that we are assembled here because we have a genuine interest in the
university and the law on its own terms. The fact that most of you
are either lawyers or procedural liberals in education reinforces this
impression. Yet I cannot approach this conference out of the context of the American Council on Education's principal document on
students and the law issued thus far - James Perkins' The University
and Due Process.2 The Perkins paper is not a legal document; it
is a political statement. It does not deal primarily with due process.
It does deal with all the reasons why students should not use the
courts to achieve their objectives, why the courts are "inappropriate"
to the rules of the educational game.
Having read Perkins' treatise, I can only conclude that your real
interest lies in determining "how far students will go" in using the
courts, and how far the courts will go in limiting your ability to
govern your universities. There was little of this nervous interest in
the law ten years ago, when all the decisions seemed to justify administrative hegemony over institutional affairs. It is only now that
the courts appear to be in favor of students that this conference has
been called. The law becomes important to you only when it limits
your power.
Perhaps I exaggerate, but the Perkins paper suggests that I do
not. The document itself is a classic example of procedural liberalism - it conjures up a chamber of horrors involving incompetent
judges rendering decisions on students' grades, personal behavior,
and a multitude of other matters. It pleads for a respect for the
autonomy of the university - at a time when universities are willingly embracing the Department of Defense, the Federal Narcotics
Bureau, and the neighborhood police force. Its whole tone says "Gentlemen, please, surely we can handle these matters on our own,
in a 'reasonable' fashion." No, I find it difficult to trust your concern for the law when you print treatises urging students not to use
the instruments of law as part of their strategy.
The real irony of Perkins' arguments is that they presuppose the
existence of a coherent strategy to build student legal rights in the
same way that the NAACP developed a strategy of court tests to win
civil rights for Negroes. Frankly, there is no such strategy. Most
of the significant cases in student rights - Green v. Howard University,' for example - emerged as a result of university dismissal
of students for a protest which had nothing to do with "rights."
2
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The protest may have tested the university's procedures, but its
purpose was to ask the administration to refuse to provide class rank
to draft boards. Once expelled, the students certainly do go to court
-to
gain readmittance! Characteristically, the procedural liberals
focus upon the court case, questioning whether students should have
gone to court, and then, questioning what the court said. The original
reasons for the protest are forgotten. The recent conflict at the
University of Denver serves as another example of this, since most
of us here are familiar with those events. Thirty-nine students staged
a sit-in at an administration building. The University chancellor
made himself a national hero by expelling them on the spot. Later,
he realized that expulsion without a hearing violates due process,
so he reversed the expulsions to let the hearing process run its course.
The Appeals Committee recommended probation, but the chancellor
proceeded with his original decision and expelled the students. Since
the entire procedure is open to question, the students will go to court.
I am led to believe that the university now awaits this challenge with
some eagerness, while all parties to the dispute have become amateur
lawyers.
Yet, why did these 39 students sit-in in the first place? What
were the conditions on the campus which led them to use that particular form of protest? What were their demands? What had been
the administration's response to these demands earlier in the year?
What were the kinds of students who sat in? What were the real
issues, as opposed to the immediate issues, surrounding the sit-in and
expulsions?
I sense the answers to these questions, having been in touch with
the leaders of the sit-in at several points during the year. For the
past two years, these students have been trying to awaken the apathetic student body of the University of Denver to the existence of a
war in Vietnam and a crisis in our cities. They have also been trying
to encourage the University administration to increase student power
and to reevaluate its curriculum. In both tasks, they have met with
resistance. Consequently, the sit-in emerged as a product of frustration, a last ditch attempt to arouse the University before this group
of activists graduated.
Of course, the chancellor of the University of Denver is now a
hero for expelling the students. From my standpoint, however, the
chancellor emerges as a paradigm of the educational villain - the
kind of man who worries more about the serenity of his campus than
about its intellectual and social vitality. Why wasn't this chancellor
as concerned as these student activists that the undergraduate population has capsulated itself against confronting the central social
questions of the day? Doesn't he find it somewhat strange that a
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university setting should be an excuse to evade issues rather than to
explore them? If he does, he gave no sign of his concern to the
activists. Yet he did show his concern when these students disrupted
the process of order.
It is clear that the procedural liberal loses himself in a tangle of
irrelevancies. His framework makes it impossible for him to grasp
the dimensions of student questions on campus- he tries to put
these questions in a context which cannot explain them. When students become frustrated with the lack of response accorded to their
protests and demands, then the procedural liberal spends time studying whether the form of the protest was "appropriate." When the
students go to court, the procedural liberal writes treatises explaining
why this was a bad move. Finally, he loses a few court cases and
convinces himself that he really is interested in the law and the university in its own right - even calls a conference to discuss it. In the
end, I suppose, we all become lawyers.
The questions which we are raising are too serious to be obscured in this manner. This year the conference focuses on the university and the law. Next year, I understand that there are several
gatherings planned on handling disruptions - conferences which
will deal with little more than tactical questions. Will you then try
to convince us that you are interested in conflict resolution on the
campus as an intellectual issue in its own right, and that commissioning the Rand Corporation to apply techniques of counterinsurgency
to universities is a logical extension of that interest? Will you argue,
as you argue now on the law, that your appreciation of game theory
reflects your immediate priority - maintaining order in your institutions - and that the more basic issues will have to wait upon the
resolution of that problem? How long can you deceive yourselves?
The point is that students are protesting the kind of mentality
which approaches educational questions in this manner, which views
the procedures of the university as overriding its substance, which
constructs avenues of freedom without channels for community,
which blinds itself to the relationships within the university and between the university and other institutions. Your response merely
imitates the conditions which students protest, merely proves the
point of their protest - that you are more interested in the protection
of yourselves, the efficient functioning of your campuses, and your
power to govern them than you are in creating healthier ties between
the people of the campus, between yourselves and the students. You
laughed when Mario Savio said, "Never trust anyone over thirty."
Yet his comment stemmed from the premises upon which procedural
liberalism operates - that people cannot afford to trust one another,
they can only afford to shield themselves and keep their distance.
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In the coming year, you will be met with a new round of campus
protests - no doubt as serious, if not more serious, than those which
you faced this spring. Some of you will become skillful counterinsurgents, others of you will learn how to use the police, and a few
of you may lose your jobs. Nevertheless, however adept you become
in handling tactics, the protests will not end until you become adept
at accepting change.
As a first step in that direction, I urge you to revise the ways in
which you view change and the ways in which you approach the
changes which are being asked of you. I have tried to help by outlining a few of the new concerns. Yet, if my analysis is valid, then
your intellectual agreement with my arguments will be insufficient.
What will be necessary is almost a psychic shift, by which you begin
to view the people and the dynamics of your institutions through
different emotional glasses. If and when you do so, you will begin
to feel, as well as understand, why I argue now that a conference on
the university and the law is irrelevant to what we should be discussing. Until you do so, you will always wonder why these conferences never seem to solve the problems, why they never seem to
get at what is on our minds. Yet, once you do so, the bimonthly
ritual of student rights' conferences will not continue. I believe you
won't stand for them either.

COMMENT
By CHRISTOPHER H. MUNCH*
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ROFESSOR Beaney's careful and well-ordered analysis of the
current semantic approaches to legal nomenclature of some aspects of student-institutional relationships provides a useful perspective of recognized procedures and underlying philosophies in the
field. These procedures and categorizations may not have been intended for application directly within the student-institutional relationships arena and are, perhaps, not adequate to delineate solutions
to many of the problems important to the students and currently
facing the governing bodies of educational institutions. If we are
truly examining the framework of institutional governments - or
more candidly, governing powers- then it may be fair to point out
that the courts will be of assistance to the parties solely at the periphery of the arena by influencing the distribution or redistribution
or the governing power. The courts appear to have been, at least
until now, understandably reluctant to intrude upon areas of academic
standards and educational tranquility.' Their apparent aloofness in
this field cannot all be attributed to the conservatism and tendency
of the law to follow social changes with appropriate legal adaptations. Many courts feel that the academic and administrative leaders
in the present structure of educational administration are most concerned with this problem and also have the greatest competency to
solve it.' There also appears to be some discernable areas of studentinstitutional friction which are not amenable to resolution by way
of judicial proceedings.'
Professor Beaney and many other writers in the field have described in some detail the difficulties facing a student or an educational administrator who attempts to seek a workable solution to
conflicts within this area by primary reference to and reliance on the
traditional legal categorizations of the past. Just as the institution
of marriage comes into being through the medium of an innocent
looking contract, once the status is created, it far overshadows the
contractual considerations in disposition of problems arising in the
*Associate Dean and Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; B.S.,
United States Military Academy, 1943; J.D., University of Illinois, 1951.
1 H. DRAPER, BERKELEY: THE NEw STUDENT REVOLT 188-99 (1965).
Blackwell v.. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Burnside
v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966); Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp.
396 (N.D. Fla. 1963).
3 Steier v. New York State Educ. Conun'r, 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959) ; Johnson, The
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husband-wife relationship. It is quite natural, then, to find modem
writers and scholars who address their attentions to the area under
examination adopting a different basis for the framework of their
approach and concentrating more heavily upon the element of status
of the college or university and of the student, and the aspect of
rights and duties which should exist within this framework.
Professor Alvin L. Goldman, in a most scholarly and admirable
article,' has proposed a view of the problems arising in the studentinstitutional arena from the basis of a fiduciary status that is relatively modern, relatively flexible, and of reasonably wide currency
on today's legal scene. A literal application of the theory, however,
may raise some difficulties, not only in understanding and amending
present practices, but also in extending any adjustments of present
practices to achieve a realization of the proper goals, both of the
institution and of the student.
The underpinnings of the rationale for imposing fiduciary responsibility on an educational institution are that the student places
in the institution that measure of confidence one might find in a
lawyer-client, confessor-penitent, or doctor-patient relationship, as
well as the view that the institution is in a position of nearly total
dominance over the student. Exceptions to these assumptions may
occur too frequently to justify classifying them as general assumptions.
The fiduciary theory has some original roots in the law of
trusts,6 and thus, understandably, the institution - cast in the role
of trustee - would be held to one of the highest standards of conduct known in law. While no one would quarrel with the desirability
of educational institutions striving to meet that kind of standard
(and it does not appear to be a violent presumption to suppose that
the majority of our educational institutions are in fact striving to
meet that standard), the theory has a necessary corollary which
should be given some objective and serious thought before the theory
is embraced in its entirety. Because of the exceptionally high standard
of conduct placed upon the fiduciary (for excellent reasons in a
pure trust situation), there is necessarily very little responsibility,
if any at all, placed upon the beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship - in our frame of reference, the student. At that impressive
milestone of a person's life, when he enters upon the pursuit of
higher education, it would seem that the development of a sense of
responsibility for his actions would be of significant importance,
not only to the student and to the institution attempting to provide
5 Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its Students -
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avenues of intellectual pursuit, but even to that nebulous body society - to which both parties may be in some way accountable.
This premise must enjoy some credence in the minds of those in
student status, for more and more of them appear not only to be
seeking but actually demanding broader and more awesome responsibilities. To the extent that the fiduciary theory might be construed
to diminish the accountability and responsibility of the student in
the student-institutional context, the theory might be subject to
legitimate criticism.
The major tenet of the fiduciary theory, either from the stance
of reposing confidence in the student or the assumption of substantial dominance by the university, carries with it a cardinal adjective
change. It shifts to the university the burden of justifying in detail,
in a legally oriented and artificially formal structure, the actions of
the university in every case in which they might be challenged, no
matter how informal or capricious the challenge might be. It is
this aspect of the fiduciary theory that might be highly impractical
and the one which should be seriously and critically examined before
that theory is treated with approbation. This does not mean that the
theory is without merit in many situations. Perhaps one should look
to the rather consistent teachings of the physical sciences and, in
recent years, to the empirical research of the serious social scientist
which would seem to indicate an action-reaction situation. By using
this action-reaction framework, despite its initial appearance of being
a drastic oversimplification, one may nevertheless approach solutions
to student-institutional frictions from a common, justifiable, and
democratically fair basis. It is certainly not unknown in societies
and in their legal filaments that one who receives a benefit incurs
under ordinary circumstances, either expressly or by implication, a
corresponding obligation. The corollary of this premise, of course,
is that one who finds himself the recipient of an obligation can and
should expect a corresponding benefit. Translated into the institutional-student framework, when a student seeks an institution, he
is certainly conscious of the fact that there are certain benefits
flowing from his admission to the academic environment. Consequently, with these benefits in mind, he must be held to an awareness
that there are also certain obligations which he undertakes as the
price of admission. One seldom finds the benefit without the obligations. Let us examine, then, the scheme of life in the university
which affects the student, and view it from the benefit-obligation
focus.
At the very outset, one is faced with the question of whether
there exists any "right" to an education at all. The proposition is
certainly not well-settled in court decisions at this time, but the
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"right" may at least be an incipient or emerging one. The right appears to be firmly established at the primary-secondary level, but it
is not so clearly established at the college level. If it is not yet established, should it be?
While some courts may feel disinclined to strike out confidently
in this area, at least one court has addressed a peripheral question
and has outlined the obligation of a parent with sufficient means to
provide an education beyond high school to a child who may no
longer be a minor.7 If this parental duty is nurtured in the future
and grows into a societal one, then it must necessarily follow that
every student will acquire a "right" to an education beyond the high
school level. If this does occur, what will be the reasonable limitations of this "right" with respect to a specific institution? The attitude of the courts, at least in 1968, would appear to stop short of
preempting the lonely and sometimes tedious value judgments which
a particular college or university admissions committee has traditionally made. Despite the fact that sophisticated and statistically
appealing nationally standardized test scores are available, it seems
unlikely that the courts will intercede in the intellectual and aptitude
areas in determining the "right" of admission to a given university.8
A somewhat different aspect of the "right" to admission has
not been so forbidding to judicial intervention. Where rejections
by the university have been based upon refusal to comply with minor
physical standards such as vaccinations, the courts have intervened.'
If a trend is discernable in this area of the imperfect "right" to admission, it would appear to be toward a liberalization and a more
critical view with respect to exclusionary admission standards. Elements of capriciousness on the part of the university will probably
be questioned more frequently and legitimately by the students and perhaps the courts - at the very outset of the benefit-obligation
relationship.
While we are considering the view of this problem from the
perspective of admissions, we should also consider the initial obligation which may arise from a holding out by the university of particular esoteric capabilities in the sense that it may offer opportunities to students that cannot be offered by other institutions. If this
benefit is offered to a prospective student, is there then a concomitant obligation to meet the expectation? That is, does the institutional
obligation extend to the standards of quality in the providing of
experiences which are promised at least by implication? If this kind
7
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of obligation does arise, can it be changed after the student has provided the university whatever benefits may flow from his matriculation?
By the same token, if the university, in advance of matriculation, imposes obligations on the student, ostensibly in exchange for
promised benefits, must the sanctions used to impose the obligations
be fair? This question raises the specter of "due process," that
popular and stylish phrase not necessarily susceptible to a definition
of uniform applicability even in the federal courts.10 Although
Dixon set out a rather neat summary of procedural due process in
the student-institutional arena, other cases cast doubt as to the universality of application of particular criteria. A five- or six-point list
may not be nearly so important as whether the procedure adopted is
essentially fair in a given instance. This fairness should be evaluated
by the type and magnitude of the benefit and the corresponding
type and magnitude of the obligation in the individual confrontation.
Once the admission stage is passed, what of the benefit-obligation flow in the actual operation of university life - its classes,
courses, curriculum, and offerings? If the university holds itself
out through its catalog as providing certain subjects, experiences, or
interchanges with outstanding professors, has the student a right
to demand the performance advertised by the university? May the
student question the quality of the method or the person to whom
he is exposed? One of the classic situations encountered in this particular benefit-obligation situation is that of a university "billing"
a professor of national reputation as the teacher of a given course.
If this is done, has the student a right to see this professor more than
once a week in a lecture hall filled with many other students? Does
he have the right to engage in dialogue with him in order to benefit
from intellectual experiences with a man of this caliber? Furthermore,
does he have the right to have a grade determined by the professor,
or does the professor have a right to delegate grading to someone
who has not taught or even been present in the class? While this
may be a sensitive example in some circles, I think it graphically
illustrates the presence of a benefit-obligation equation. This equation may not be capable of easy categorization under the more
familiar labels of "due process," "equal protection," or ''contract,"
but there seem to be aspects - with a legal flavor - present in the
minds of the students and similar aspects which should be present in
the minds of the administrators of the institution.
A final area of inquiry with respect to the benefit-obligation
aspects of the student in his relationship to the institution should be
10
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the dismissal procedures and the awarding of the degree. These two
considerations clearly involve the question of benefits or rights, armd
in this area the courts have not been universally reluctant to intervene. When they have intervened, they have traditionally limited
their inquiry to the question of capriciousness and arbitrariness, or
whether or not the dismissal or withholding of the degree has been
for academic reasons, and if so, whether or not conclusions with
respect to academic failure were arrived at under a fair process.11
In this area the benefit-obligation approach may again provide a
more coherent basis for analysis of student-institutional problems
more easily appreciated by both the institutions and the students.
The labels of due process, fiduciary relationship, contract, right
of privacy, and equal protection will long be with us. The problems,
however, do not seem to lie tranquilly within these distinct categories.
From its inception, the student-institutional status raises certain obligations and promises certain benefits on the part of both parties.
How these come about comprises the real gist of the legal aspects of
student-institutional relationships. Why not resolve them on that
basis?
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N essence, Professor Beaney has taken the position that courts are
loathe to intervene in educational matters, save in those instances
wherein administrative action, whether in a curricular or extracurricular area, is manifestly arbitrary or capricious. He also points out,
however, that the courts are not disposed toward abrogation of their
responsibility to protect the constitutionally guaranteed rights of
citizens, and institutional identification of a citizen as a "student"
does not place him outside the law. Indeed, individuals do not discard their mantle of constitutional protection upon matriculation to
the university, contrary to the belief held by some university officials.
In fact, courts will render no special cognition of where an individual
is when he has been wronged. Their only concern is with a just and
equitable disposition.
In discussing the question of public versus state action, Professor
Beaney has called attention to the developing trend of private inititutions moving closer to the full restraints imposed on state instrumentalities. Three cases in point clearly support this contention.
In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,' the United States Supreme Court held that, owing to the very "largeness" of government,
no readily applicable formula may be fashioned to indicate when a
case falls within the purview of private as opposed to state action.
Citing the Burton decision, Judge J. Skelly Wright, in Guillo-ry
v. Administrators of Tulane University,2 granted the motion for summary judgment by a Negro plaintiff who was refused admission to
Tulane University and held that the university, a private institution,
was subject to the restrictions of the fourteenth amendment. However, the judgment was subsequently vacated on the grounds that the
degree, not just the existence, of state action determined the applicability of fourteenth amendment restrictions on private institutions.3 On new trial of the degree issue, the court held that there
was insufficient state involvement in the operation of the university
to bring it within the privileges and proscriptions of the fourteenth
amendment. 4 In Evans v. Newton,5 the Supreme Court held that the
*Director, Counseling and Testing Center, Tulane University; B.A., College of
Wooster, 1961; M.Ed., Ohio University, 1963; Ph.D., Michigan State University,
1967.
1365 U.S. 715 (1961).
2 203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962).
q 207 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. La.), affd per curiam, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962).

4212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962).
5 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
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equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment applied to the
administration of a park, even though private trustees had been appointed by a state court.
Although other sources point to an expanded concept of state
action, 6 a significant distinction still remains between public and
private institutions of higher education. It will not suffice for us to
assume that both public and private institutions will provide equitable
rules and procedures for the measurement of student welfare and
conduct. Much to the discredit of higher education, the vestiges of
Anthony v. Syracuse University7 live on in the hearts of many private
college administrators. In that case, a female student was summarily
and arbitrarily dismissed from the university, without notice or a
statement of charges, under a claimed right of the university officials
to do so. Although the consequences of such action seem imminent
to the legal scholar, it is unrealistic to assume that administrators at
private institutions will rush to align their procedural policies with
those of public institutions. A cursory survey of the American history
of higher education documents the sanctity of private education, and
the strength of this steadfast orientation does not lie within a sectarian affiliation between institution and church. The source of institutional identification, rather than ecclesiastical philosophy, is
the issue.
A great number of private institutions, rather than simply those,
as Professor Beaney remarked, which are "relying on ... announced
religious orientation to justify ... rules and regulations that reflect
... sectarian concerns," S will continue to exercise arbitrary control
over the experiences of students on the basis that their right to do so
is unalterably founded in their private charter. To remain private
means that institutions maintain the freedom to set their own course,
without encumbrance from officials other than those appointed or
selected as trustees of the institution. Indeed, we may speculate that
many private college catalogs will continue to carry the following
admonition: "We reserve the right to suspend or expel students
from X University for any cause and at any time, without giving due
notice or hearing." Such a statement is certain to raise the hair on
the back of many an attorney's neck. To a private college adminis6

See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130
(1964) ; Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963). See generally Silard, A ConstitutionalForecast: Demise
of the "State Action" Limitation on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L.
REV. 855 (1966) ; Robison, The Possibility of a Frontal Assault on the State Action
Concept, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 455 (1966).
7 130 Misc. 249, 223 N.Y.S. 796 (Sup. Ct. 1927), rev'd, 224 App. Div. 487, 231
N.Y.S. 435 (1928).
8 Beaney, Students, Higher Education, and the Law, 45 DENVER L.J. 511, 519 (1968).

1968

COMMENT

trator, however, such a statement may be intrinsic to the operational
philosophy of his institution.'
I agree with Professor Beaney that the trend seems clearly to be
toward an increased erosion of the polarized state versus private
dichotomy. As Goldman has stated, "Itrequires no great expansion
of accepted concepts of constitutional law to find that the guarantees
secured by the fourteenth amendment are applicable in measuring
the legality of the conduct of a private university."' 1 I cannot agree,
however, that it would be realistic or desirable to make no distinction
between private and public institutions. To do so may be legally
convenient, but educationally unsound.
My second point of response is an expansion of Professor
Beaney's brief note on fiduciary relationships. As he has indicated,
the concept that the student-university relationship should be characterized by the law of status rather than the law of contracts is an
emerging one and has given rise to a recognition of fiduciary status.
Specifically, a fiduciary is one whose function is to act for the benefit
of another as to matters relevant to the relation between them. In
civil law, this denotes one in a position of trust. Since schools exist
primarily for the education of their students, it is obvious that professors and administrators act in a fiduciary capacity with reference
to students." Although the law permits a fiduciary relationship to
exist where one party dominates the other," special standards of
conduct have been imposed on the fiduciary.13 The tone of these
standards implies that the highest sense of ethical behavior must
characterize a fiduciary relationship. For example, the fiduciary must
show that the confidence of the relationship was not betrayed, that
he carried out his function conscientiously and in good faith, and that
he has not obtained any undue advantage as a result of the relation14
ship.
Clearly, the elements of a fiduciary relationship may be applied
to the student-university model. By providing instruction and the
promise of a degree, the university sets forth academic tasks which
the student is expected to undertake and discharge to the best of his
9See DeHaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957) ;Robinson v. University of Miami, 100 So.2d 442 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1958). Both cases, involving
administrative officials at private institutions, illustrate the point that private institutions have considerable leeway in determining how and for what reasons a student
may be dismissed from the university.
10 Goldman, The University and the Liberty of its Students- A Fiduciary Theory, 54
Ky. L.J. 643, 650 (1966).
11 Seavy, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HARV. L. REV. 1406, 1407 & n.3
(1957).
12
Roberts v. Parsons, 195 Ky. 274, 242 S.W. 594 '(1922) ; Cranwell v. Oglesby, 299
Mass. 148, 12 N.E.2d 81 (1937).
13 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
14 1d. at 311; In re Cover's Estate, 188 Cal. 133, 204 P. 583 (1922); Neagle v. McMullen, 334 II1. 168, 165 N.E. 605 (1929).
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ability. Assuming that the university is discharging its obligations
in good faith, the student should feel free to repose complete confidence in the integrity of the institution. When the student-university relationship is described by using the concept of fiduciary status,
the frame of reference suddenly becomes one of trust and behavior
founded in good faith. This model, then, places the relationship on
a much higher level than that proferred by either the contract or in
loco parentis theories. It is my hope that administrators will take
cognizance of the fiduciary theory -

and its attendant benefits -

as

they continue to develop relationships with students.
Having added a point of clarification and a point of expansion,
I now close with a point of amendment to Professor Beaney's presentation. A singular legal concept may have great bearing on future
litigation evolving out of the student-university relationship. This
concept is the theory of delegable and nondelegable powers. All too
often, the delegation of authority from the governing board of
trustees to the president, and subdelegation from the president to
various administrative officials, is taken for granted and not submitted to legal analysis. Not all responsibilities are delegable, and
the body of literature in administrative law makes it clear that administrators in institutions of higher education must be aware of
the legal parameters of delegable and nondelegable tasks.
Much of the subdelegation of administrative responsibility
which takes place in public colleges and universities is done by tacit
assumption. Such delegation is well documented within the framework of administrative law, and courts may be disposed to determine
whether they will infer the power of the administrator to subdelegate
authority, despite the absence of a statutory provision expressly permitting the practice.1 5 It has been suggested that administrative
authorities have the power to promulgate binding rules and procedures governing their organization, even in the absence of specific
statutory authorization.' 6 However, administrative authorities at
public universities do not possess legislative power per se. The constitutional separation of the three branches of government and vestment of all legislative power in the legislature is the basis for the
doctrine that the legislature cannot delegate its legislative power to
an administrative authority. Operating with broad discretionary
power, administrators at public colleges and universities are free to
exercise .rulemaking power, to fashion new regulations through a
case-by-case interpretation of applicable statutory standards. Though
critics may disclaim the case-by-case approach, the courts have indicated that restricting administrative authorities to only the rulemak15 Grundstein, Subdelegation of Administrative Authority, 13 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 144
(1945).
16 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.03, at 299 (1958).
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ing approach would make the administrative process inflexible and
incapable of dealing with many of the specialized problems which
arise.17
The rulemaking power delegated to administrative authorities,
however, may not be used in an arbitrary manner. The delegation
is contingent upon the development of adequate standards to guide
the administrative authority. These guidelines for behavior may be
established by the legislature or by the custom and practice of the
particular administrative authority. As a result of inappropriate
guidelines for administrative decisionmaking, several state courts
have invalidated subdelegations of administrative authority.1 " Where
subdelegation of administrative authority is made pursuant to express
statutory provisions, no questions of any great difficulty are presented. 9 In the absence of a provision for delegation, however,
questions of subdelegation frequently constitute the basis of attack
upon an administrative order or regulation which is otherwise free
from any doubt as to the validity of its substance - in short, the act
of subdelegation may involve a deviation from statutory authority.2 0
Thus, the authorizing statutory language must be clear with regard
to the scope of delegated powers for administrative bodies.
The nondelegation issue generally centers on the adequacy of
the standards limiting the granted rulemaking power. There are instances, however, in which the legislature has intended that the instructions given to a single named officer be carried out only by that
officer. Subdelegation of responsibility in this situation would be
inappropriate."1 It is inappropriate to conclude, however, that every
official act calling for the exercise of discretion must be performed
22
by the one named in the statute.
In summarizing this issue of delegable and nondelegable powers
assigned to administrative authorities in public colleges and universities, it must be reemphasized that the governing board of an institution is ultimately responsible for all administrative decisions
made by subordinate officials. The legal implications of this important consideration are made eminently clear by Gellhorn:
[One suspects that the courts might be especially prone to reject
regulations having the force and effect of law and bearing upon the
17

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).

Is State v. Traffic Telephone Workers' Fed'n, 2 N.J. 335, 66 A.2d 616 (1949); Bell
Telephone Co. v. Driscoll, 343 Pa. 109, 21 A.2d 912 (1941).
19 Robertson v. United States ex rel. Baff, 285 F. 911 (D.C. Cr. 1922).
20W. GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 315-16 (1st ed.
1940).
21 Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543 (1887); Dunn v. United States, 238 F. 508
(5th Cir. 1917) ; In re Tod, 12 S.D. 386, 81 N.W. 637 (1900).
22United States ex rel. French v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 326 (1922) ; Hannibal Bridge Co.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 194 (1911).
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rights or conduct of private citizens, when such regulations have
been promulgated without the responsible head's active approval.
Departmental chiefs may be shrewdly advised, therefore, to be
themselves the source of the subordinate legislation which emanates
from their official establishments ....
[Elven where courts have
sanctioned sub-delegation of many important elements of regulatory authority, they have still sometimes hesitated to overlook the
delegation of the actual
final execution of a power conferred upon
23
the department head.
It is incumbent upon governing boards, then, to carefully inter-

pret the statutory language which grants authority to their policies
and procedures. They may find that the responsibilities which may
be subdelegated to administrative officials of the university are severely limited. On the other hand, they may find considerable latitude with respect to the subdelegation of authority. Finally, to be
consistent with the tenets of administrative law, they should develop
appropriate guidelines for administrative decisionmaking by individuals to whom they have subdelegated authority.

23

W. GELLHORN, supra note 20, at 323.

WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE
UNIVERSITY COMMUNITY?
By TERRY F. LUNSFORD*

HE topic assigned to me, when I first came to consider it carefully, reminded me of Ambrose Bierce's definition of hash:
"Nobody knows what hash is."' The simple answer to our question
is similar: No one knows who are members of the university community; neither are we likely to know soon. I will try to explain
briefly why this is so, and what it means to relations between universities and students.
1. THE USES OF "COMMUNITY" IN THE UNIVERSITY
The question posed by the title is obviously not irrelevant in
discourse of this kind. As most of us know, "community" is a wellused word in academ6. It is especially common in certain critical
sections of university catalogs and student handbooks. For example:
33. Basis for Discipline.
The University reserves the right to exclude at any time students

whose conduct is deemed undesirable or prejudicial to the University
community's best interest .... 2
Or:

The rules which are included in this booklet are not static and
to
immutable. They are constantly being evaluated and revised
3
remain responsive to the needs of the University community.

These examples are typical of many others. Behind such references lies a long-standing ideal - the university as a "community of
scholars" - that is cherished by present day academics despite their
institution's size and internal diversity. As one former chancellor at
Berkeley put it: "Our university house has many mansions. Though
the dwellers therein speak in tongues of their specializations, they
belong to a single community of scholarly endeavor." He went on
to add: "Whatever impedes, adulterates, or4 thwarts that endeavor
is a menace to the mission of the community."
Such notions frequently imply that "scholars" and others in the
university do in fact share a substantial measure of agreement on
*Associate Specialist, Center for Research and Development in Higher Education, University of California, Berkeley; A.B. 1951, J.D. 1957, University of Chicago; M.A.
1966, Ph.D. candidate, University of California, Berkeley.
1 A. BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S DicnoNARY 54 (1958).
2University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana Campus, Regulations Applying to All
Undergraduate Students, at 21, Sept. 1967.
3 University of Michigan, Preface to University Regulations, April 17, 1968.
4 Strong, Shared Responsibility, 49 A.A.U.P. BULL. 113 (1963).
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certain central, if rather abstract, values or ideals. One recent version,
for example, lists these ideals as "belief" in
the necessity for order - the order of time, place, and manner...
the life of the mind ...criticism... the emotions... the life of the

spirit... the individual... an ethic of personal honesty... social
the proviresponsibility.., the necessity for value judgments ...
sional nature of all value judgments ...humility and an openness
to change. 5

Unhappily, other observers, from Robert Hutchins to Clark Kerr,
have given a different version of reality in the complex, modern
university. Hutchins sadly saw the modern "community of scholars"
abdicating any pretense at a "Great Conversation" about fundamental
issues of civilization, until its unity lay only in a common concern for
the campus heating plant.' Kerr amended this for California purposes
to a "common grievance over parking," but he kept the descriptive
message the same:
The multiversity is an inconsistent institution. It is not one community but several ....Its edges are fuzzy - it reaches out to
alumni, legislators, farmers, businessmen, who are related to one or
more of these internal communities .... Devoted to equality of
opportunity, it is itself a class society. A community... should
have common interests; in the multiversity, they are quite varied,
. held together by
even conflicting. It is more a mechanism..
7
administrative rules and powered by money.
Empirical research has supported such an impression of diverse and
segmental commitments. Gouldner, in a famous study, found that
even in a modem liberal arts college the "professional" and researchoriented faculty members were also the most "cosmopolitan," oriented
in their loyalties not to any one college or university but to professional goals and to their colleagues in separate academic disciplines. 8
It is of fundamental importance to current campus conflicts that
this relationship between the ideal of the university as a community
and its reality in the experience of its members has become a major,
explicit issue of heated controversy. From their own experience, and
from the descriptions of commentators no less distinguished than
these, many students are now profoundly skeptical of "community"
as a viable label for the large modern campus. At best, they see its
use as an earnest, anachronistic appeal for return to a time that never
was, when all interests among students, faculty, and the society
could be reconciled without covert or open conflict. At worst, they

5W. Martin,
6

The University as a Community, in Berkeley: Center for Research and
Development in Higher Education 5-6 (mimeo at Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley).

See, e.g., R. HUTCHINS, FREEDOM, EDUCATION AND THE FUND: ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES, 1946-1956, at 167-96 (1956).
7C. KERR, THE USES OF THE UNIVERSITY 18-20 (1963). See also Clark, The New
University, AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. XI, at 1-5, May-June, 1968.
8 Gouldner, Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles, 2

AD. Sci. Q. 295-97 (1957).
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suspect that it is calculated ideology, designed to obscure the much
more complex moral and political realities of university life.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS: THE UNIVERSITY As BUREAUCRACY
It is by no means accidental that our question is phrased in the
language of community. But it is instructive that such a term has
rarely entered the usage of the courts in discussing academic life.9
Legally, the university is a charitable corporation (if privately controlled and financed) 10 or an instrumentality of the state (if explicitly
"public" in character).." In either case, the organization and management of its affairs rests largely in the hands of its board of control
(trustees or regents), and is officially executed by administrative
officials.2 Instead of a general "membership," participation in the
university is legally regulated according to a series of specific graded
relations relying mostly on doctrines of contract.
Since our focus here is explicitly on student-institutional relations, I will not dwell long on other groups of members in the
community. However, it is not irrelevant that there are many and
diverse classes of membership. Regents or trustees are one group;
typically they are appointed or elected as the legal members of the
corporation."3 Major administrative officials usually are appointed
by the board and serve at its pleasure. 14 Faculty members generally
are held to be employees on contract.' " A large number of "research
un-faculty" now are employed on most large university campuses, and
these too have employment contracts for specific services, but few
other emoluments of university membership.'" The same may be said
of the nonacademic personnel, the large white-collar and blue-collar
work forces of the major university corporation. Alumni of the
university - its graduates who received its degrees - are another
group often informally considered members. Technically, they have
9 Cf. Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 871, 57 Cal. Rptr.
463, 467 (1967) (using the term "academic community").
10 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
11 Annot., 65 A.L.R. 1394 (1930). The specific legal characterizations of public universities vary by state and institution. See T. BLACKWELL, COLLEGE LAW: A GumE FOR
ADMINISTRATION 237-50 (1961).
12 See, e.g., CAL. CoNsT. art. IX, § 9; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3335.02 (Page 1960).
Public institutions are under a variety of controls by state fiscal agents. See generally
M. Moos & F. ROURKE, THE CAMPUS AND THE STATE (1959); Comment, State Uni-

versities

-Legislative

Control of a ConstitutionalCorporation, 55 MICH. L. REV. 728

(1957).
13 Foley v. Benedict, 122 Tex. 193, 195, 55 S.W. 2d 805, 808 (1932) ; Chambers, Who
governing
Is the University?, 30 J. HIGHER ED. 320, 324 (1959): "This body -the
board, constituting a single artificial person - legally is the university."
14 See Annot., 29 L.R.A. 378, 385 (1895) ; Annot., 140 A.L.R. 1076 (1942).

' 5 Annot, 75 A.L.R. 1352, 1355 (1931).
Unequal Peers: The Situation of Researchers at Berkeley,
AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. XI, at 33-43, May-June, 1968; C. KERR, supra note
7, at 65-67.

16 Kruytbosch & Messinger,
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no continuing rights of university membership, but in practice there
frequently is an office of the alumni association on the campus, and
typically an officer of the campus administration is charged with
"alumni affairs."
Finally, students are widely thought to have a contractual relation with their university. In some instances, students are explicitly
advised that this is so. One university information booklet puts it
this way:
The prevailing legal interpretation regarding the rights and privileges of students is that the student who is admitted to the University
contracts with the University to abide by its rules and regulations.
Failure to live up to this contract is sufficient grounds for dis-

ciplinary action o various degrees
of severity, the most serious of
7
which is dismissal of the student.'

And courts have so held.' 8 On a closer analysis, however, several
commentators have recently noted that a simple contract theory would
seem to be only one kind of theory relevant to students' legal rights
and obligations in the university.
Levine and others have noted that, were courts to apply contract
doctrine in a thoroughgoing way to student discipline cases, they
might well apply rules of construction appropriate to a "contract of
adhesion," wherein one party has far greater bargaining power than
the other and can effectively set standardized contract terms favorable
to itself.' 9 In such cases, the weaker party has little choice in varying
the terms of the agreement; he can only "adhere" to the other's terms
or reject the bargain altogether. Consequently, courts frequently
construe contracts of adhesion - e.g., the standard insurance contract
against the party that dictated their terms, assigning him the
burden of proof as to breach of the contract and as to the meaning
of the terms to be construed. 0 Such a burden might prove extremely
heavy in construing the meaning of some terms in university-student
"contracts," such as a right to expel students "for any reason deemed
1
sufficient."
Other commentators have suggested that the legal relation of
students to their university is not one of contract but one of status 17Senate Committee on Student Discipline, University of Illinois, Undergraduate Student
Discipline at the University of Illinois, at 3, April 1968.
18 Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909)
People ex rel. Cecil v. Bellevue Hosp. Medical College, 60 Hun. 107, 14 N.Y.S. 490
(Sup. Ct. 1891). See 35 COLUM. L. RjEv. 898, 899 (1935).
19 Note, Private Government on the Campus - Judicial Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362, 1377 (1963); Developments in the Law - Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045 (1968).
20 Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion -Some
Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943) ; cf. Carr v. St. John's Univ., 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231
N.Y.S.2d 410, ajfd mem., 12 N.Y.2d 802, 187 N.E.2d 18, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962).
21
See Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 489, 231 N.Y.S. 435, 438 (1928).
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"participation in a pre-established social pattern"2 with broadly
unspecified terms, the indicia of which the courts recognize on the
basis of common knowledge and popular attitudes. Such a theory is
given credence by recent judicial discussions that specify no relation
of students to their university, except that they are subject to rules
made by the university's officials. Two writers in recent years have
suggested that a specific status-relation be specified by the courts that students be considered beneficiaries of a trust imposed upon the
university as fiduciary agent. 23 No court has so far adopted such a
theory. Rather, mention of the university's "trust" in the literature
of law and administration suggests that its beneficiaries are not
properly its students but the general public and its other benefactors.24
Whatever the specific theory invoked, however, the general
reasoning of courts has been the same in many essentials for some
years. Thus, university officials have a duty to make and enforce
rules designed to serve the purposes of the educational institution.
These rules and their enforcement cannot be arbitrary or violate constitutional rights. But "reasonable restrictions on the freedoms of
speech and assembly are recognized in relation to public agencies
[including universities] that have a valid interest in maintaining
good order and proper decorum." 25 What is reasonable and what is
not will be determined in the circumstances of the specific case.
And the courts will not presume that discipline has been irregular;
rather, they will limit the scope of their review on the ground that
"the subtle fixing of... limits [on student freedoms] should, in a
large measure, be left to the educational institution itself." 26
The result in cases of university expulsions for misconduct has
been ad hoc, case-by-case reasoning within very broad and largely
unhelpful doctrines. By careful analogic reasoning from the facts of
particular cases, lawyers may discern limits to the university's power
of exclusion. For example, exclusion or expulsion of a student on the
basis of race is unreasonable, and some elements of due process are
required. 27 Several commentators have recently made this kind of
2

2Note, supra note 19, at 1369.
Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HARv. L. REV. 1406 (1957) ; Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its Students -A
Fiduciary Theory, 54 Ky.
L.J. 643 (1966).
24 Marquette University, Student Handbook, 1967-1968, at 24. It should be noted that
the status of beneficiary is a protected but subordinate one, presuming the trustee's
superior knowledge about the best interests of the beneficiary who is presumed to be
incompetent in this regard. A status such as "citizen" or "member" connotes something
far different, including both status-obligations and status-rights, including a share in
the conduct of an association's (inescapably political) affairs.
2 Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 874, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463,
471 (1967).
20 Id. at 875, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
27
Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
930 (1961).
23
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reasoning.2 8 But it is important to note the difficulty in performing
these lawyer-like tasks. Laymen before the law - including most
university administrators, faculty members, and students - have little
chance of gauging the constitutionality of a disciplinary action before
the fact. Not even a "clear and present danger" test guides their
judgment in this area; the manifold circumstances must be judged
against even less specific standards. In the diverse world of the
modern university, this is no easy task for anyone on the campus.
In sum, the law leaves student rights and obligations largely to
the internal processes of the institution, which is legally a bureaucratic
corporation. The social or institutional character of the university
therefore is critical in determining what those rights and obligations
are and how they are perceived. In that context, the apparent reasonableness and the enforceability of the university's informal norms are
vitally affected by the fact that the university is widely experienced
as something other than a "community," while university officials
continue to insist that it is one.
III.

ACCESS TO UNIVERSITY FAcILITES

As I have mentioned, university membership is relevant to such
questions as, Who may be expelled from membership, and on what
theories? A second set of issues concerns who may be excluded from
using university facilities.
The modern urban university with its multiple functions, its
large and attractive campus, its rooms designed for meetings and
discussions, its pleasant open spaces, and its "audiences" of intelligent
members is a natural focus of attention for outsiders. Its activities
and many of its policies contemplate a regular flow of visitors faculty members and students of sister institutions, parents of enrolled
students, taxpayers or contributors touring "their" campus, customers
at on-campus films, concerts, lectures, and museums.
Most of this flow is invited, encouraged, and welcomed by the
official university structure. I suppose that the intercollegiate football
game is the most obvious example of an activity only distantly related
to intellectual purposes for which universities and whole university
towns are willing to suspend much normal operation, to set up special
traffic flows, and to arrange special relationships between city police
and campus officials for the handling of law-breaking "pranksters."
Other regular campus visitors, such as the nonstudents who participate in the overt political life of the large campus, are more
2 Note, supra note 19; Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making
Powers of Public Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 2 LAw IN TRANsITION Q. 1 (1965).
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controversial. Present concern with the question of who are members
of the university community arises most of all, I suspect, from the
problem that university authorities have in dealing with such campus
disorders as political rallies, protest demonstrations, and symbolic
challenges to campus rules or practices. In reacting to these disturbances, some public officials have chosen to emphasize the presence of nonstudents among the protesters, implying that they are
the principal instigators, or the essential "cadres" of troublemakers,
who basically cause the protests on campus.
Such thinking evidently weighed heavily with the California
legislature when, in 1965 (after the Free Speech Movement at
Berkeley), it enacted a new criminal trespass statute (known locally
as the Mulford Act) applying specifically to state colleges and to the
University. That Act made it a misdemeanor for any person who is
"not a student or officer or employee of a state college or university,
and who is not required by his employment to be on the campus," to
refuse a campus official's request to leave, if it "reasonably appears"
to the official that the person is committing or has entered the campus
for the purpose of committing "any act likely to interfere with the
peaceful conduct" of the university."9
This approach was also followed by University officials during
the Berkeley sit-in of November 1966, which arose over a special
location in the lower lobby of the Student Union assigned to Navy
recruiting officers by the administration. Some five hours after that
incident began, the city police were called in. They consulted with
campus administrators and then arrested only seven persons, all nonstudents, said by police officers to be leaders of the demonstration.
Faculty members and students present told a different story - that
some of those arrested had in fact been far less involved than many
students who were not disciplined at all. A three-day campus "strike"
followed.
In such a context, asking who are members of the university
community becomes tantamount to asking who may be treated summarily. In other words, Who can be ejected from the campus or
arrested for criminal trespass, without having to consider any rights
he may have as a university member? One difficulty with this approach - not a theoretical but an eminently practical difficulty is that typically the nonstudents in question are not simply "outside
agitators" who have come to practice their demagoguery on innocent
and otherwise satisfied community members. Usually, they are former
students. Often, they are also future students, provided their "misconduct," deriving from political and moral convictions, does not
2

CAL. PENAL CODE

§

602.7 (West Supp. 1967).
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make them ineligible for admission. 80 They are, not infrequently,
more authentic members of the community with which the students
identify than most of us who are employed by the university in official capacities.
The Mulford Act, which has not yet been tested in court, raises
a number of constitutional questions. 8 Some of these concern the
meaning and breadth of the standard of "reasonable appearance" as
an official apprehension of "likely" or intended "interference."
Others concern the types of activity most likely to be seen as "interference" (including possible injury to persons or property, but also
speech and assembly) and the high standards that legally must be
applied to prior restraints on such activity. The issue that bears most
directly on our central focus here is that of equal protection of the
laws. The question may fairly be put: Why single out those not enrolled in the university or employed by it for special restrictions
going far beyond the "time, place, and manner" requirements placed
on student expression by the administration? Addressing this issue,
the California Legislative Counsel felt it sufficient to assert:
It is reasonable to establish as a class, persons other than students, officers, or employees of a state college or a state university,
in light of the object of such a classification, namely the preservation
of the peaceful conduct of campus activities of which students,
officers and employees of a campus form an integral
8 2 part, which
cannot be said to be the case with persons generally.
It may well be that the Counsel is correct in supposing that
the courts would accept such a bald and general assumption as selfevidently "reasonable." Time will tell - time, and the facts of the
cases on which the issue is raised. If so, however, much of the reality
of modern university life will have been ignored. Nonstudents from
the areas surrounding such university campuses are a rich source of
talent for campus activities, participation in student musical, artistic,
and literary exploration, and work and enthusiasm for student organizations. Recognizing this, some universities' regulations provide
routinely for a proportion of nonstudent memberships in "recognized student organizations. "'8 It is no longer uncommon for students
at major academic centers to drop their university registration for
several months or a year at a time to earn money, to work in civil
rights causes, or merely to consider their own futures more carefully
30See Heist, Intellect and Commitment: The Faces of Discontent, in ORDER AND FREEDOM ON THE CAMPUS 61-70 (0. Knorr & W. Minter eds. 1965) on the abilities and
intellectual commitments of students in the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley.
31See generally Comment, The University and the Public: The Right of Access by Nonstudents to University Property, in Symposium: Student Rights and Campus Rules, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 132 (1966).
32 Opinion of Legislative Counsel, No. 17766 (Apr. 30, 1965), ASSEMBLY DAILY JOURNAL 3443-48 (May 17, 1965).
3 University of Michigan, University Regulations 5 (1968).
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before continuing formal study. Some educators seem to favor increasing and explicitly valuing such "moratoria" in today's long
train of formalized learning. Many nonstudents are more studious
by far than the average enrolled sophomore and remain deeply
involved in the intellectual and cultural lives of their university.
They are members of its "community" in the best sense of the university tradition.
There are more technical difficulties as well. Is the large university free to treat certain members of the public as trespassers
whenever an administrative official judges that they are "likely to
interfere" with unspecified campus activities? The danger in such
an approach is illustrated by a recent New York case. 4 While
attempting to register their children at a city school, a group of
Negro parents (and one nonparent) were arrested for loitering near
the school grounds, under a statute that forbids anyone to remain
"in or about any school, college or university buildings or grounds
without written permission from the principal, custodian or other
person in charge thereof, or in violation of posted rules or regulations
governing the use thereof .... ." The court noted that the statute had
been enacted to control sex molesters of small children, purveyors of
narcotics, and "idlers and troublemakers in general." The judge found
the attempted registration a "legitimate purpose," even though it led
to a heated dispute with school authorities, and emphasized that the
mothers in question could not be compared to "those unsavory young
men" whom the statute was intended to include. " But the school
authorities and the arresting officers evidently had not seen it that way
until the court's decision.
At the root of much campus mistrust today is the expectation
(widely shared) that university administrators, when in doubt, will
"play it safe" with public opinion and use vague laws or regulations
to err on the side of the established organization against the interests
of individuals or minority groups pressing for change. This tendency
may result from a good-faith belief that the official's first responsibility (legally and morally) is to the organization as it stands, and
that he must safeguard its established interests above all. This is the
viewpoint that the jurisprude Edmond Cahn called "the official perspective. "3 7 He saw it as an occupational disease of those whose
jobs require them to be "processors" of people in systems, a perspective that always takes as first and foremost the needs of the
system itself. Sociologists would say that, where this occurs, the
3

4 People ex rel. Bailey v. Dennis, 208 N.Y.S.2d 522 (New Rochelle City Ct. 1960).
5 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 722-b (McKinney 1955).
36 People ex rel. Bailey v. Dennis, 208 N.Y.S.2d 522 (New Rochelle City Ct. 1960).
3
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Cahn, Law in the Consumer Perspective, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1963).
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organization as such is becoming an end in itself, "displacing its
goals" and the ideals for which it was created.88 In the loosely coordinated institution of higher learning, difficult judgments must
frequently be made about this interplay of the organization's interests and institutional ideals of free thought and criticism. The manifest political implications of those decisions have engendered much
of the recent excitement on our nation's campuses.
Beyond the temptation for abuses in enforcement, however, are
other issues. Does the university invite the general public to its
campus by holding public events there? How public and notorious
are the many uses of the large university campus by members and
outsiders alike? The burgeoning "city of intellect" today is a de facto
place of residence and work for many thousands of persons. 9 Can
its officials summarily exclude those who wish to communicate their
ideas to its inhabitants, or forbid those inhabitants the right to hear
all manner of controversial ideas freely expressed? 40 Is the property
of the university campus "dedicated" to such narrow purposes that
administrators may exclude some speech and expression even though
it is of intense interest to many of those required by their employment
or studies to be on the campus?
In this area again, the law is not clear.4 ' Few cases have been
adjudicated concerning the uses that may be made of university
property specifically, and the applicability of doctrines drawn for
other types of property is very uncertain.42 Again, the courts' choices
of gross analogies, and the effect of test-case facts upon these choices,
will likely determine many an issue as this sphere of law develops.
IV. STA.LITY

AND CHANGE IN THE CAMPUS LEGAL ORDER

Thus, there exists no magic formula, no simple rule of inclusion
and exclusion that will determine reliably who is legitimately on
the campus rather than trespassing or loitering there. As with the
issue of university expulsions, administrators, students, and others
who participate in university life are left largely to the dynamics of
their own daily social relations. At certain critical points, when
students bent on civil disobedience are expelled too summarily, or
when nonstudents intimately involved in campus life are arrested for
38

See, e.g., R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 199 (rev. ed. 1967).
39 This trend is expected to continue. Graubard, University Cities in the Year 2000, 96
40

DAEDALUS 817-22 (1967).
See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) ; Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946)
Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery Wkrs. Local 31, 61 Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d 921,
40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965).

41 Comment, supra note 31.
42 See, e.g., Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885

(1946); Blease, The Civic Center Act and the Freedom of Speech, 2 LAW COMMENTARY 43 (1964).
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campus protest activity, substantial numbers of students and faculty
members in the major universities may be expected to respond with
genuine outrage. Such official actions are widely seen as mere
pretexts, manipulations of the letter of the law for the achievement
of immediate and highly political purposes - the enforcement of
short-run campus order as administrative officials conceive it to be.
Not all of the protesters' actions are condoned, nor is a majority of
the campus always willing to go on strike. But expedient, legalistic
maneuvers themselves tend to arouse sympathies for the demonstrastors. And recent events, such as those at Columbia University,
suggest that there will frequently be strong disagreement on whether
the level and type of disorder in question is so disruptive that it
justifies strong disciplinary action, especially if the issue underlying
the protest is widely seen as legitimate.
Such incidents, more than most others, tend to amplify the sense
of frustration with campus bureaucracy, dissension, and arbitrariness.
For it must not be forgotten that students and nonstudents together
have changed the student's relation to his university dramatically in
the past few years by the very tactics of disturbance, interference,
and challenge to formal authority.
Thus, despite the youthful energies that they engage, most of the
disorders current on our campuses are not merely pranks, not panty
raids, not mere malicious mischief. They involve issues of the most
fundamental importance and difficulty for all of us. Symbolic disorder and rulebreaking are being used openly and explicitly to "get
a hearing" from university and government officials on specific issues.
Morever, it is rare that such disorders have not been effective to
some degree in achieving changes of the kind being sought, after
many futile requests through normal channels have been politely
considered and refused, or merely ignored. The situation cannot be
overemphasized; it is the reason why this conference was held. These
situations also reveal much about the current relationship of law to
the social context of campus life.
A legal order is not just a body of rules, but a social order
involving many informal customs, understandings, and other unspecified but implicitly assumed patterns of cooperation and competition.
In the regular acceptance of these common understandings lies the
"trust" that is the glue of a social system, allowing its members many
mistakes and adjustments without threatening the order as a whole.
This is emphatically the case for any order that aspires to be thought
of as a community. It is these implicit understandings that have been
eroded in the modern university, leaving the official "organization"
chart to stand forth repeatedly as a naked skein of vague, semiarbitrary rules and formalized, impersonal relationships. Where a
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social order lacks such understandings and rules that have a generally
understood meaning, there may still be administration - the hierarchical management of arrangements necessary for the most efficient
production of goods or services. But there is little assurance of a
general sense of community. Instead, the model of private government becomes much more persuasive to participants in the order;
they tend to develop concern for a separation of powers, to become
cautious about trusting the benevolence of official power, and to seek
legal restraints on the exercise of untrammelled administrative
discretion. This, I suggest, is what has occurred to many student
43
and faculty members of the modern university.
CONCLUSION

At Berkeley in 1964, when student activists first transferred the
tactic of principled civil disobedience from the Southern lunchcounters to the university campus, they discovered the first of many
Inonrules" by which our large campuses have been run for many
years. The state laws and state constitutional provisions that were
said to forbid certain kinds of student political expression on campus
proved not to do so when students pressed the issue beyond polite discussion. Instead, students saw revealed the tenuous character of
many administrative judgments about the order necessary for a
university campus. That lesson was not lost when campus conflict
progressed to issues concerning the rights of students and nonstudents before campus disciplinary authorities and the criminal
courts. Coupled with the newly visible (but longstanding) inequalities among status groups in the broader society, these lessons from
campus protest have produced in many young people a whole new
awareness of the relationships between social and legal change.
Courts have reasoned about student obligations by inference
from the needs of individual universities for reasonable order. But
they have begun by logically placing each university as a member of
a class of "educational institutions" having supposedly characteristic
and well-understood purposes in light of which reasonable and necessary rules are typically made and accepted. Against this general
social conception, each student has stood as a weak and rather lonely
figure, trying to enforce a "contract," the terms of which he never
made. Mass action by students (enrolled and unenrolled) has
changed this balance of bargaining power. Consequently, we have
entered a turbulent period of explicit "status politics" in the university, as students press for delineation of status-rights to go with
43

See

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY, REPORT OF THE STUDY COMMISSION

ON UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE, THE CULTURE OF THE UNIVERSITY:
AND EDUCATION (Jan. 15, 1968).

GOVERNANCE

1968

UNIVERSITY COMMUNITY MEMBERS

557

their obligations for social conformity. The changes wrought already
have been great, but the costs have also been great - including major
disruptions for great universities and jail terms, fines, and stunted
careers for many talented and highly moral young people.
The process shows few signs of stopping now; the contending
parties are too far apart on the terms in which a discourse might be
held. Many painful accommodations and compromises remain to be
made, and it can only be hoped that the costs on both sides will soon
lessen. If universities genuinely honor their own autonomy and
value justice as well as order on their campuses, there is good hope
that this will be so.

THE STUDENT AS PRIVATE CITIZEN
ROBERT

B. McKAY*

T

HE Lord Chief Justice of Ireland, before whom an Irish barrister
was vigorously pressing a particular claim, is reputed to have
said, "Do your clients not know the meaning of the phrase volenti
non fit injuria?"' The barrister's quick response was, "My Lord, in
the hills from which my clients come, they speak of little else." In
the hills and vales of New York from which I come we now speak
of little else than matters of student discipline and student conduct,
and the institutional relationship among students, faculty, and administration.
The crisis of identity has never been more intense in American
universities than it is now. Quite abruptly, all the apparently wellestablished roles within the university - from trustee to entering
student - are up for reexamination. It is as if the relationship
among faculty, students, administration, and governing boards had
never been considered in depth. From Berkeley to Columbia (and
everywhere in between), notions accepted without substantial challenge in the entire history of higher education in the United States
lie shattered in the midst of campus unrest, protest, and even open
warfare. Suddenly, the old order has departed.
The ultimate issues are not yet framed with total clarity. Some
students challenge the bigness and impersonality of their universities; others demand a larger share in the decisionmaking process; and
still others, presumably only a few, press their demands simply for
the sake of pressing demands, seeking to bring down the entire
university establishment so that it can be replaced with another not
yet defined.
Although ultimate objectives may not be clear, students are
presumably agreed in their desire to be free from the paternalistic
supervision of student life often provided by universities. However,
it is less clear that they want a completely arm's-length relationship
in which the university would no longer provide academic sanctuary
for youthful excesses for which the outside community might otherwise exact its pound of retribution. When students demand amnesty
from university sanctions and withdrawal of criminal charges as a
condition of return to academic routine, they seem to ask for the
*Dean, New York University School of Law; B.S., University of Kansas, 1940;
LL.B., Yale University, 1947.
11 am indebted to my colleague on this panel, William Van Alstyne, for a translation
-- "He who consents cannot expect relief for injury."
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best of both worlds - academic shelter against the outside community
plus freedom from control by the university community. Few in this
life can long have it both ways. Universities and their student constituents must seek new accommodations that may be different from
what either might choose in their best of all possible worlds.
The present discussion is directed to one aspect of this overreaching problem. The immediate aim is to examine the extent to
which the university should treat its students as private citizens of
the larger community and as adults who have come to the university
as consumers of the educational product marketed there. We must,
therefore, as my late colleague Edmond Cahn might have said, view
it from the "consumer perspective. ' 2 From this inquiry certain consequences will follow that may call for rethinking of traditional
university concepts about the deliberative process within the university community, the rules governing student conduct, and the
procedure for disciplining infractions of that code.
At the outset, it must be conceded that there is no entirely
relevant model for the modern university. The business corporation,
in which the profit motive is understandably central, is not directly
analogous to the educational structure, however corporate its form,
where minimization of financial loss is the most that can be sought.
Yet, the functions of the university - even the public university are also not like those performed by other not-for-profit agencies,
private or governmental. The dispensing of higher education is not
comparable to providing police or fire protection, highway construction, provisions for sanitation, or other functions of government available to all citizens. Nor is higher education like elementary
and secondary education which is thrust upon the willing and the
unwilling alike. However important higher education may now be
as a key to advancement in the modern world, it is still offered
only upon satisfaction of specified conditions of admission and
standards of performance. The student recipient must, in short, prove
himself worthy of the educational benefits he seeks.
From what has been said thus far, one observation is already
obvious: At least as long as university education is not available to
all, reasonable conditions may be imposed upon all members of the
university community. Conversely, the university may not rightfully
regard itself as a surrogate parent with power to decide unilaterally
all questions affecting the student as a member of the university
community.
The discussion that follows, in seeking to identify the extent
to which the student should be regarded as a private citizen, accepts
2

E. CA-IN, THE PREDICAMENT OF DEMOCRATIC MAN 17-42 (1961).
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without argument the following propositions believed to be selfevident or now established beyond substantial doubt.
(1) No rational distinction should be drawn between "public"
and "private" universities. The only area of university-student relations in which the public-private distinction could arguably make a
difference is in the constitutional standard required for rules of
student conduct and disciplinary proceedings where state action
is present. But even then an exceedingly good argument can be
made that, for these purposes at least, private universities cannot
justifiably be excused from the same constitutional standards as those
that must be applied by public universities. 3 In any event, it would
be a cruel hoax on the integrity of the educational process for any
university to take refuge in the public-private distinction in justification of otherwise unsupportable policies.
(2) Longstanding concepts of university-student relations are
no longer sufficient (if ever they were) to justify arbitrary treatment
of students under the paternalistic excuse that the university knows
best and always acts in the best interests of its students. However
conceptualized, whether as in loco parentis,ex contractu, or any other
variant on the same theme, all these theories are now shown to be
inadequate.'
(3) A rational theory of university-student relationship can only
develop from a conception of the university as an instrument of our
modern, complex world. In recognition of the importance of the
university to the needs of society, it has thus far been given a position
of esteem and responsibility. In return for this position of trust and
respect, the university must strive to accomplish in the best fashion
its high purposes; the pursuit of truth, the advancement and transmission of knowledge, and the provision of related community services. The most important single measure of a university's excellence
is the "intellectual growth of its students: their initiation into the
life of the mind, their commitment to the use of reason in the resolution of problems, their development of both technical competence
and intellectual integrity." 5
(4) In the spirit of the above statement of university purposes,
it follows that university discipline should be limited to student mis3 See Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making Powers of Public
Universities, 2 LAW IN TRANSITION Q. 1 (1965) ; Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968);
cf. Dorsen, Racial Discrimination in "Private" Schools, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 39
(1967); Nelkin, Cy Pres and the Fourteenth Amendment: A DiscriminatingLook at
Very Private Schools and Not So Charitable Trusts, 56 GEo. L.J. 272 (1967).
4 The point is fully developed in several of the papers in this symposium.
5
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conduct which distinctly and adversely affects the university community's pursuit of its proper educational purposes.
(5) It is a fundamental postulate of American society that every
quasi-public function or service must be made available under
circumstances that include the maximum freedom consistent with
attainment of permissible objectives. The educational function
should be no less free - indeed, it should be more free. In the university context this means academic freedom for students as well as
faculty. Although academic freedom has long been established for
faculty members, it was somehow not thought essential for students
until recent years.' In the present context academic freedom includes
at least all the elements necessary to free intellectual inquiry - dignified treatment of students as individuals worthy of respect; fair procedures in disciplinary proceedings (academic due process); and
right to privacy in matters of opinion, in places of residence, and in
university records relating to students.
To say that the above propositions should now be regarded as
established should not be taken to mean that the hard questions of
degree are settled. Nevertheless, those difficult issues of more precise
definition need not be resolved now before moving on to other propositions relevant to the present discussion.
One final observation before taking the plunge. The problems
that lie ahead for universities and colleges do not so much involve
questions of law; rather, the issues usually involve hard choices
more than hard law. Let us, then, be about the task of measuring
the difficulties.
I. VIOLATION OF LAW OFF CAMPUS

In the days of academic innocence, now nearly gone, it was
common for universities to regard their role as that of surrogate
parent to their students for all purposes during their stay at the
university. In this view, the university assumed responsibility for
off-campus as well as on-campus student conduct. Some of the
"town-gown" frictions developed when universities sought to reclaim their students from local police, thus providing shelter against
community-imposed sanctions. For this purpose, it made no difference
whether the university sanctions were more or less severe than those
of the civil law. The point was that miscreant students could be
withdrawn into a kind of academic sanctuary, at least for all except
6 For the recent recognition of the importance of student academic freedom see Joint
Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, 53 A.A.U.P. BULL. 365 (1967)
(approved by the Association of American Colleges, the American Association of
University Professors, the National Student Association, and the American Association of Higher Education, among others). See generally Developments in the LawAcademic Freedom, 81 HARY. L. REV. 1045, 1128-59 (1968).
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the most serious offenses. Some students who sought or accepted
such shelter may have become disenchanted when they discovered the
summary procedures by which academic sanctions could be applied.
But the practice had great lasting power, particularly in university
communities where the university tended to dominate the town in
which it was located.
Cornell University provides a convenient illustration where the
practice, now discontinued, was described as follows in the Sindler
Report:
In the past, an informal working relationship between Ithaca
and Cornell has permitted public officials to return students
apprehended for less serious law violations to the University's
jurisdiction, on the expectation that the University will impose,
through its disciplinary procedures, a substitute punishment for
7
court-imposed penalties.

Rejecting the practice as "an undesirable application of the in
loco parentistradition," the report recommended its abolition:
Adherence to the principle of responsible student freedom
and maturity requires, in our judgment, that the University explicitly disentangle itself from acting as a substitute mechanism
for the law when students are charged with law violation by public
officials.
Although well-intentioned and humane in purpose, this
practice retards the development of responsibility and maturity
among students. Once a student is apprehended by the police, the
University's efforts to insulate him from the ordinary consequences
of his act undercut the idea of student freedom and unwittingly
promote a disrespect for law ....
A second consideration of equal importance is that Cornell's
educational purposes make inappropriate any extensive and continuous University assumption of varied law enforcement roles in
its relations with students. Some University involvement in law
enforcement is necessary . .

.

.But, wherever possible, the Uni-

versity should eschew acting as a general law enforcer or as a de
facto "arm" or "agent" of public agencies. The University cannot
reject a role as a community law enforcement agency if it agrees to
substitute its authority for that of civil officials once the latter have
apprehended a student for law violation. 8

The logic of the Sindler Report is unassailable, once it is accepted
that the university's concern with its students does not extend beyond
their activities on campus and those rare cases off campus where their
activities bear directly on the university-student relationship. Where
students cause damage to property or inflict injury on persons, whether in collegiate exuberance or as part of calculated criminality, the
university has no proper concern beyond assuring fair treatment for
7 CORNELL UNIVERSITY, REPORT OF THE UNIVERSITY COMMISSION ON THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF UNIVERSITY REGULATIONS AND LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL LAW

3, 4 (Sept.
8Id.at 3-5.

27,

1967) (Prof. Allan P. Sindler, Chmn).
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the offender and providing assistance in the securing of counsel or
bail where necessary. Of course, if the student misses academic
obligations because he is imprisoned, he may be subject to academic
penalties comparable to those visited upon any other student for
similar noncompliance with educational requirements. But no academic sanction for the criminal act is appropriate unless, in the
remarkable exception, the circumstances of the crime suggest the
possibility of repetition involving the risk of injury to persons or
property within the university community. Realistically, however,
it is hard to conjure up circumstances in which a student with that
risk potential would be left free by the civil authorities. The university should not attempt to second-guess the police and the judicial
authorities as to whether a suspected or convicted wrongdoer can be
safely returned to the general community.
Of course, universities can point out problems in these suggested
procedures. Always fearful of their reputation in the community,
universities tend to be concerned about the presence on their campuses
of persons charged with crime or, worse yet, convicted offenders. In
response to this concern, it must be said that the range of vision is
too narrow which would deny return to the university community of
one who has violated the law and suffered the penalty. The university
must uphold the principle of the open society in which the wrongdoer has an opportunity for rehabilitation.
A few atypical cases can be imagined where student activity off
campus may bear so directly upon the university-student relationship
that a university-imposed sanction might be justifiable. The following
two situations are illustrative:
(1) Where a student uses the university name to falsify its
position, to associate it with a cause not approved by the university,
or in a way to bring serious discredit upon the university, there may
be reason to impose a university sanction. Even here, however, the
university should take such action only in the most extreme cases.
There are, after all, civil remedies available to limit at least the
most aggravated instances of false representation.'
(2) Where a university facility abuts a public street, cases can
be imagined of students interfering with ingress to, and egress from,
university buildings, or otherwise interfering with classes or other
university activities without ever technically entering the campus.
Here, too, the university could ultimately protect its interests through
police action, possibly leading to criminal charges. One can imagine
approval of university action in such narrowly circumscribed circumstances, but the university will ordinarily want to avoid that course
of action.
9

But cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255 (1964).
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VIOLATION OF LAW ON CAMPUS

To say that the university in its role as student disciplinarian
ordinarily should not venture outside its own confines is to discuss
only half the problem. The other half, violation of law on campus,
is not so neatly resolved. Where student action on campus violates
both a university rule and a law of the general community, the university often faces hard choices. It may choose to turn the student
over to the civil authorities for sole punishment. It may hold him for
university discipline alone, including the possibility of counseling
without formal charges. Or it may permit the imposition of sanctions
by both civil and university authorities.
The choices involve use of discretion but ordinarily not questions of law. For example, there is no question of double jeopardy
in the constitutional sense. If the offense contravenes a genuine
university interest, there is no reason to prevent punishment by both
civil authorities and the university. In the case of theft by one student
from another in a residence hall for example, it offends no sense of
fairness to dismiss the wrongdoer from the hall, perhaps even from
the university, and to allow civil prosecution of the crime.
Ordinarily, however, the choices are more difficult. The following questions present the principal difficulties of decision:
(1) To what exent, if any, should the university seek to uncover
student violations of law for prosecution by the civil authorities? It
is tempting to conclude that the university should no more play the
role of substitute policeman than it should the role of substitute
parent. Clearly, a campus pervaded by the Big Brother concept would
be one on which free and open intellectual exchange would languish.
Nevertheless, the university cannot altogether escape its responsibilities to the community by taking the position that the university is a
safe haven from the world outside.
The community ordinarily provides the university a geographical
enclave in which the civil authorities do not intrude to the same
extent as in other parts of the community. Indeed, there is often an
informal understanding that the police will not enter the campus
except upon invitation or in the case of unusual disturbance. In exchange for this quasi-immunity from police surveillance, the university
must have some obligation to report violations of law that would
ordinarily be prosecuted by the civil authorities. Should the university
report only serious crimes that it cannot avoid knowing, or should
it more actively seek out the unlawful activities of its students?
The issue is most acute in the areas of social morality, where many
students rebel against society's restrictions on sexual freedom and the
use of narcotics. Here the university faces a dilemma. Violations
of law are most likely to take place in private places, often in resi-
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dence hall rooms. Unless the university establishes its own underground surveillance system, including a network of spies, or unless
it violates ordinary concepts of residential privacy protected elsewhere by the fourth amendment against the police or by statute
against private landlords, it is likely to know little about the private
lives of its students. On the other hand, if police officials act against
student violations of law on campus not reported by the university,
the community is likely to find in the university's failure to act a
confirmation of its judgment that the university seeks to put itself
and its students above the law.' °
However great the risk of public censure, it is probably preferable for the university to avoid the police role of undercover agent.
This does not mean that the university should not have its own
security force to preserve order on campus and to protect safety and
property. Nor does it mean that student violations of law should not
be reported for civil prosecution. But even here, as discussed below,
there may be cases in which the university can properly choose not
to report minor infractions of law by students.
(2) When, if ever, is it proper for university officials to fail to
report a known violation of law to the civil authorities?The ordinary
citizen in his role as a responsible member of the community should
assume the obligation to report actual or suspected violation of law
known to him where it seriously endangers life, safety, or property
interests. The university community must respond in a manner at
least equally responsible where serious violations of law by students
are known to the university.
Even the most responsible private citizens do not, however,
consider themselves bound to report the minor infractions of law
that are all too visible in daily life - parking offenses, pedestrians
crossing against traffic lights, and an infinite variety of other petty
offenses. In this respect, the role of the university is in part similar
and in part dissimilar. There is undoubtedly a de minimis principle
that excuses a university from having to report every minor infraction
of law by its students. Moreover, where the same act is also an
offense against the university code, the university has an alternative
method of proceeding which is not available to the individual citizen.
It will often be preferable to utilize university procedures as the sole
disciplinary action. No embarrassment need be felt for not reporting
the fact to outside authority.
10The police raids

for narcotics offenders at the Stonybrook campus of the State
University of New York provide a recent example. The predawn invasion of campus
residence halls and the arrest of a number of students was acutely embarrassing to
the administration which was charged with negligent failure to know what it should
have known, and there were dark hints of complicity and coverup. The university's
denials never quite caught up with the original headlines.
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Difficult choices will of course be necessary, but the principle is
rational. The university should report serious violations of law for
external prosecution, but may proceed against other forms of student
conduct under its own rules without reporting such incidents to local
authorities. Or, as previously noted, in a few cases it may be proper
to proceed against a student in both forums.
(3) In what circumstances should the university leave prosecution for violation of law on campus to the exclusive jurisdiction of
civil authorities? It can be argued that every violation of law that
occurs on campus is also a violation of university regulations, express
or implied. In a sense this is true, but it is difficult to believe that
university interests are deeply involved in every infraction of law
that occurs within the geographical limits of the university campus.
Accordingly, the university should impose its discipline only in the
case of violations of law that directly and distinctly threaten identifiable university interests.
III.

PROTESTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS: PRINCIPLE PUT TO THE TEST

To determine whether the above suggested principles make
sense in practice, it may be helpful to test them against the hard
reality of escalating protests and demonstrations from which few
campuses have escaped. The several interrelated issues can be approached in a series of propositions.
(1) Student participation in demonstrations off campus should
not be subject to university discipline except in the two rare cases,
discussed above, where (a) the student deliberately falsifies the
position of the university or outrageously abuses its name, or (b) a
demonstration immediately adjacent to the campus disrupts university
functions.
(2) Orderly and peaceful demonstrations on campus should not
be forbidden unless they interfere with legitimate university functions.
As "blackletter" text, this statement of principle may be thought to
give little guidance, and it is true that such difficult questions as the
following lie immediately beneath the surface of this somewhat bland
pronouncement.
When does a demonstration lose its protected status because it
is no longer peaceful and orderly? A model commonly suggested
depends on the labor cases where a complex body of law has been
developed in definition of permissible and forbidden picketing.
However, the university may not want to insist on the full measure
of rights it might enforce in a court of law. Times of turbulence
and student unrest require special forbearance on the part of university officials in tolerance of demonstrations and protests in oppo-
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sition to university policy. Even when the subject of a protest or
demonstration is not clearly relevant to the educational process or
the university functions, the university should be hospitable to this
kind of expression, even though inconvenience and even some interruption of normal activity may be the price.
What are the "legitimate university functions" entitled to protection from interference? The answer of course is determined by
the understanding of general university purposes. The university
has at least an obligation to assure the safety of individuals, the
protection of property, and continuity of the educational process.
The required level of university tolerance may depend not only on
whether the protest is orderly or disorderly, but also on the place
chosen for the demonstration. Where picketing or other forms of
peaceful protest take place outside university buildings, the university should not interfere except to maintain free passage through
areas where members of the university community have a right to be.
Many universities that might tolerate quiet, out-of-doors demonstrations draw the line in protection of their interior spaces by
refusing to permit picketing, distribution of leaflets, or placing of
notices on bulletin boards inside university buildings; 1 but this
limitation may be unduly restrictive. Picketing, placarding, and
leafleteering in places not inconvenient to the university are also not
likely to be an effective means of communicating a protest. Perhaps
it would not be a strain on campus order to permit peaceful picketing
and other orderly demonstrations in public areas of university buildings, including corridors outside auditoriums and other places set
aside for public meetings. The requirement of orderliness should
remain as before, including now a special injunction against interference with free passage, excessive noise, or the right of the primary
audience to hear and be heard. In short, freedom is a two-way street
in which freedom of protest is protected only so long as it does not
unreasonably interfere with other protected freedoms. In the university context, the protected activities include not only classes,
libraries, and public meetings, but also normal administrative
functions and such service-related activities as health services, recreational activities, and on-campus recruitment.
In determining the permissible limits of protest, the person in
charge, whether professor, administrator, or other university representative, should be given authority to make the initial judgment.
That is, any direction to desist from specified activities or to leave
the premises must be obeyed unless manifestly unlawful or outside the
scope or the authority of the person issuing the order. In the event
Ii

Columbia University, for example, enforced a rule against demonstrations of any
kind in university buildings- at least until late April of 1968.
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of subsequent disciplinary proceedings for failure to comply with
such an order, it is not unreasonable to place the burden of establishing the lack of authority to issue the order in question on the
person charged with noncompliance. Examples of these principles in
practice may be helpful.
(a) Distribution of leaflets, including those without identification as to source, should be permitted in public corridors of
university buildings, and the posting of notices on designated
bulletin boards should not be forbidden. But distribution of
leaflets or posting of notices in the classroom - inherently
disruptive or at least time-consuming activities - should be
within the prohibitive power of the professor in charge. As long
as adequate opportunity is given for distribution of leaflets
outside the class and posting of notices on bulletin boards, this
prohibition is not a serious limitation on a student's freedom,
and it does preserve the order in the classroom.
(b) On-campus recruitment of students for lawful employment is an appropriate adjunct of the educational process.
University participation in the placement process is a service
function which most universities willingly assume in satisfaction
of the wishes of the great majority of their students. If on-campus
recruitment is permitted at all, it should be open on the same
terms to all employers who offer lawful employment and who
submit themselves to reasonable regulations imposed by the
university.
Where on-campus recruitment is permitted, every student
has the right to be interviewed by any legal organization which
desires to recruit at that campus. On the other band, any student
or group of students should be allowed to protest against the
appearance on campus of any organization, provided that the
protest does not interfere with any other student's opportunity
to have such an interview.
Finally, When should the community police force be called on
to the campus to bring order to a chaotic student demonstration?
The argument can rationally be made that as long as the university
has clearly defined what is permitted and what is forbidden and has
done so in consultation with students, a serious transgression of
those defined, rational, and reasonable rules should be met with
strong, affirmative action taken immediately before positions become
entrenched and hardened. However, there are also those who say
that the police should never be called, since we know perfectly well
that such action, even by the best trained police forces, will result in
confrontation and some violence, even though nothing of the kind
was intended.
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The use of police on the campus is a policy question of the
highest order, one that ultimately cannot be predetermined but must
be decided as the unfortunate occasion arises. Yet, this very difficult
question deserves the earnest consideration of every university or
college administrator in order that some guidelines may be formulated. We administrators never know at exactly what juncture we will
have to face this question.
(3) Conduct which exceeds the permissible limits may be met
with academic sanctions ranging in severity from admonition to
expulsion or, in cases of aggravated or persistent violation of defined
rights, with civil arrest and prosecution for trespass, disorderly conduct, or any other appropriate charge. It is generally the practice
within the university community to allow some overstepping of the
line before penalties are imposed. Where abuse of that privilege
is anticipated, persuasion should always be the first step, academic
sanctions the second, and police action a most reluctant last recourse.
The unhappy fact is, however, that academic tragedy may result
from a mistake in either direction, with no way of knowing where
the line should be drawn except when it is too late. Thus, it has
sometimes seemed that excessive permissiveness too long tolerated has
led to violence. Alas, it has also sometimes seemed that repression
too long imposed, or too abruptly instituted, has also led to violence.
CONCLUSION

The student-institutional problems confronting universities and
colleges today are serious ones, worthy of our best attention. I for
one believe that universities have not given them their best attention
until very recently. Whether because of confrontation politics, sit-ins,
or other more forceful actions, we are now listening more carefully
to the things that we should have listened to long ago. The radical
student groups, SDS for example, are probably not going to be satisfied when universities have done all the things that should be done.
Yet, the only reason it seems to me that these student groups have
any success at all with the larger body of students - as clearly they do
- is that the universities have been laggard in attention to these matters of first importance. If universities respond in a meaningful way to
this present challenge, the SDS's of this world will find that their
otherwise explosive issues have been defused. Those groups cannot
bring down universities by themselves. They - the completely disaffected groups - who don't really care about the educational system
or the society in which we live, and who want to destroy "The Establishment," are not going to be won over. We shouldn't even try to
win them over. That is not the issue. What is important is that
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administrators see that there are real issues and respond to them.
To be sure, there are no certain answers. But universities can and
must be more heedful of the legitimate interests of their students
in the search for new accommodations and new modes of fair dealing
in what should be a forward-looking partnership between students
and universities in the educational process.

COMMENT
By

STEPHEN WRUGHT*

I

FIND Dean McKay's paper to be lucidly written in language that
any layman can understand. I also find that I have no really
serious disagreement either with his position or its adequacy in dealing with the subject.
I am painfully aware of the fact that our institutions of higher
learning are being threatened as never before. In addition to the
taking over of buildings and the "kidnaping" of some of the administrators, some institutions have had buildings burned, and other
forms of violence may be imminent. I realize that the predominantly
Negro colleges have been accused of being behind other institutions
in a number of things, but I assure you that they are not behind in
this. Hence, some of us who are involved with predominantly Negro
colleges have been conducting conferences on the problem of campus
disorders. The United Negro College Fund Presidents were called
into session on April 15, 1968, to explore the problem. Dr. Samuel
D. Proctor, president of the Institute for Services to Education, called
a similar meeting a few weeks later for a somewhat different group
of presidents. Trustees, administrative officers, and a few faculties
are searching for all viable approaches for the preservation of the
institutions, and the legal aspect, I think, constitutes only one important possible approach.
I have just a few comments to make on Dean McKay's paper.
First, I thought he dealt a little lightly with forbearance. I have come
to believe that it has been the forbearance of exercising proper sanctions in cases of student disorders on the campus that has gotten the
universities into their deepest trouble.
I think Dean McKay was very correct in reminding us again
of the continuing purposes of the university, and I have heard nothing that has changed my mind about what those continuing purposes
are. If we continue to be guided by these purposes, and I trust we
will, I believe we must give the most serious thought to the effect of
every response we make to the current pressures. I have heard nothing to date that persuades me that a citizen of the university is not
a citizen of two worlds, the larger world and the academic world,
and that when he becomes a citizen of the academic world, that act
*President, United Negro College Fund; B.S., Hampton Institute, 1934; M.A., Howard
University, 1939; Ph.D., New York University, 1943. Past President of Fisk University
and former President of the American Association of Higher Education.
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in and of itself requires on his part some deference to the established
authority, which is, I think, essential for the operation of the university. On this observation, I think I am much closer to Dr. Logan
Wilson's position than I am to Mr. Edward Schwartz's position.
Secondly, I believe that in Latin America, where students already
exercise the power being sought by some of our more radical student
groups, the universities, in the main, have become weaker as a consequence of too much involvement by students in the administration
of those institutions.
Thirdly, I have heard nothing that persuades me that the use
of police power should not be employed promptly but judiciously in
order that neither a militant minority deprives the majority of its
right to the educational processes and services of the university, nor
a majority of the students deprives a minority of its comparable rights.
Dr. Marvin Wachman, president of Lincoln University in Pennsylvania, has suggested that it might be fruitful for universities to
explore, on some really genuine basis, the possibility of arriving at
a separation of powers based not upon rights, but upon the privileges
that an institution of higher learning ought to give as a part of the
educative process to those who constitute the student body. I would
submit that, insofar as the nihilists in the student body are concerned,
this cannot be done.
We have seen enough different cases of campus disorders at the
present time to suggest that some appropriate agency conduct thorough studies of some of the most representative cases for the purposes of determining the various types of groups that are involved
in the disorders, identifying any clear cut constellation of legitimate
complaints on the part of students, discovering the genuine causes
for the explosion, and investigating really effective responses to the
legitimate demands for involvement and participation on the part
of the students. However, to observe these phenomena is not enough.
I think our obligation - I am speaking now primarily of college
administrators - is to make certain that the institution entrusted to
our care is not destroyed by those who are in no sense accountable.
This obligation may very well require that colleges and universities
do the following:
(1) Examine as thoroughly as possible the adequacy of
student involvement and participation in the governance of the
institution, and the foundations of any other legitimate
grievances that students may have.
(2) Take the necessary time to think through alternative
responses to any effort on the part of students to disrupt or
stop the educational activities of an institution.
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(3) Decide who will speak for the institution in such situations, and develop a plan for dealing with the press.
(4) Prepare, in advance, for the use of police should any
situation so require.
(5) Involve faculty as deeply as possible in the planning.

COMMENT
By ROBERT LuTz*

I

AGREE with Dean McKay that the legal concerns are really not
the problems in a discussion of 'The Student as Private Citizen."
But in reaffirming the principles mentioned in Dean McKay's article,
I wish to set forth what I believe to be the broad guidelines of the
legal relationship.
The student should be subject to the laws and rights of the outside community while within the confines of the university campus;
the university should not become a sanctuary for serious violators
of the law. Within the university community itself, there should be
certain privileges and responsibilities which are designed to enable
the institution and its members to pursue the stated educational goals.
Thus, due process should be provided in case of violations, and
hearings should be conducted by student-faculty or all-student judiciaries. When the act of a student violates both university regulations
and the law of the larger community, and the violation is contra
to the specific and legitimate interests of both, then both the university and the civil authorities should have the opportunity to render
punishment. Where problems arise from the conflict of publicprivate interests, the institutional autonomy of the private university
must be tempered in some way by its public responsibility. Furthermore, the university should not be allowed to exercise arbitrary coercive power which may have grave social effects.
With the topic of "The Student as Private Citizen," we are really
concerned with the question of the relationship between the student
and the institution. I will discuss how the existing relationship may
be improved and changed, rather than how it can be solidified and
maintained. I feel that a discussion of constructive action as the
more practical and intelligent course for solving the problems which
beset the university today is more important than pondering ways
of eliminating the "troublemakers" and justifying greater use of
police.
The university today must react to problems and social forces
that are decidedly different than those of the past. The growth and
predominance throughout the nation of large, urban multiversities
with large student populations has affected the traditional studentinstitutional relationship. The student of an urban university is
subjected to the hustle and bustle of the city. Whether he likes it or
*Student participant; A.B., University of Southern California, June 1968. Former
student body Vice President for Academic Affairs at U.S.C.
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not, he is involved with the city, its noises, smells, politics, turmoil,
and problems. He is more concerned, involved, politically aware,
and, with the increasing number and activities of his fellow students,
more politically potent than ever before.
It is generally conceded today that the student is an important
citizen of society, and he has been traditionally recognized as an
important citizen of the tripartite academic community. Realizing
this, the student finds that he does, in fact, have a role to fulfill. He
discovers that he does not have to serve in a preparatory or interim
societal role, that his existence in the university is not merely a preparation for becoming something else upon graduation. Above all, he
discovers that he is a "student," and in the existential sense, that he
does "exist."
Although the student is considered a citizen of the academic
community, he seems in almost all instances to possess only nominal
citizenship. In the preamble to a "Rights and Responsibilities" document, which I recently coauthored with several other students at the
University of Southern California, it is stated that it is "the responsibility of the student to understand the spectrum of viewpoints of an
issue and equally to be actively involved in the solution of the problem that these issues raise." Further, it is also our "concern and our
responsibility to establish the optimal learning environment." With
these appropriate student pronouncements of their responsibilities
in the learning process, and with those student rights of which educators speak when discussing the "academic community," should also
come the opportunity and power to exercise them. This requires
authentic, and not nominal, recognition of student rights and responsibilities of citizenship in the academic community. New procedures must be established to effect changes in the relationship in
order to provide for true citizenship. A rethinking of the traditional
university concepts about deliberative processes within the university
community must take place. The present situation certainly makes
this necessary rethinking and reform difficult, for, as David Riesman
has said, "A characteristic social pattern [is one] in which individuals,
hesitant to reveal feelings they have scarcely voiced to themselves, are
misled about what in effect could be done if they expressed themselves
....The students (feel] that there are many decisions out of their
conceivable control . .." This idea, exaggerated and overgeneralized
in the minds of the students, becomes a belief, and more and more a
reality; the student is thereby conditioned to accept a role of ineffectiveness, which quickly leads to his lethargy and apathy. It is unfortunate that student leaders, administrators, and faculty members have
1 D. RIESMAN, TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC CAMPUS:

HUMAN RELATIONS 8 (1965).
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failed to spot and develop those instances in which participation by
the students might change subsequent events and campus conditions
substantially.
I feel that recent campus disorders at many colleges and universities are the result of the students feeling that they cannot do anything
to effect a change or to make the institution recognize their grievances. We have witnessed in the past few months a desperate "crying-out" to be heard. These recent campus disorders have shown
that any solution to the conflict must be a political one. Such a solution, to be properly and justly determined, necessitates a genuine
dialogue wherein both sides of the controversy can be expressed.
One would presume that realistic dialogue is inherent in an academic
community, but it is not. There is presently a serious lack of communication on most university campuses which motivates many
despondent students to seek other and more volatile forms of expression.
In previous and calmer times, "communication" has taken the
form of sit-ins and nonviolent demonstrations, and the university
and public usually responded. Now, however, these tactics no longer
seem to be effective; they do not adequately convey the students'
grievances to the administrators.
There is a deeply felt belief among students that no one hears
what they are saying. I call this the "I can't get no satisfaction"
syndrome. After attempting, and failing, to work through the "system" by nonviolent protests, the student radical finds it easy to turn
to violence. Violence on the university campus today promotes a
dialogue -a fearful one perhaps, but at least the students are being
heard.
The confrontation tactic will become the norm, rather than the
exception, simply because it has been successful. The consultation
tactic is becoming outmoded because it is no longer effective. It is
possible to deal with unrest and violence legally by expelling students
or by bringing in the police, but that can only be a temporary solution and will not eliminate the problems.
Unless access to the "system" is improved, and student participation in the academic community is sought for and accepted, it
does not seem likely that the student tactic of confrontation and
physical seizure will die. Certain suggestions are therefore appropriate:
(1) The university must work to provide channels for
student dissent so that the nature and source of the dissent can
be discovered.
(2) The university must encourage and, if necessary at
times, coerce the student into working within the "system," while
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at the same time endeavoring to make the "system" responsive
and accessible.
A magnificent teaching opportunity awaits the university administrator, for he can introduce many students to the complexities and
difficulties of change by involving him in the formulation and implementation of his own ideas.
Frequently, the goal of the "angry young man" - the student
activist - is similar to our own. He too is searching and is concerned
about the improvement of himself, our society, and the academic
environment of the university. His methods have been different, but
only because of the ineffectiveness of those available to him.
Essentially, I am suggesting that the university take the offensive
and start its own movement. The administration must initiate the
development of new methods of dealing with the student. It must
allow students the dignity of recognition and participation in certain
aspects of university decisionmaking. It must give students some
new powers for formulating certain policies, discussing such policies
with them, and inducing the faculty to assist. In other words, the
university must shift some of the loci of responsibility to students.
They are the individuals in the university community who are moving, developing new ideas, and feeling the outer and inner forces
of change at the same time.
I conclude with an appropriate quotation concerning the university's crisis, from Alfred E. Cohn's book, Minerva's Progress:
"Restlessness can perhaps be observed nowhere better than in universities.'
"They (the students] are confronted with the need to
make decisions which involve consideration of the very theory of
their existence." 3

2

A.

3

id. at 43.
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COMMENT
By PAUL H.

CASHMAN*

I

FIND the paper by Dean McKay incisive and helpful, and I
think my comments will be in the nature of a supplementary
rather than a differing point of view.
It seems clear that the conflict between the rights of the student
as a private person and the expectations of him in his student role
by the institution are often at the heart of a campus crisis. Dean
McKay correctly suggests the central question: What is the extent to
which the university should treat its students as private citizens? My
own view is that we need to examine some of the assumptions
underlying the decision to treat the student as a student or as a
private citizen. Some of those assumptions are expressed directly by
Dean McKay, and some are implied.
One common assumption is that the university has a stake in
behavior when its "public image" is involved. Note that this is one
of the bases for off-campus behavior control suggested by Dean
McKay. I have serious reservations about judgments based on a
public relations concept of the university. What is good public
relations today is bad public relations tomorrow. A decision to protect the public image can be based on a rather foggy notion of public
response. Even at best, such decisions sometimes appear to violate
sound educational judgment.
An example of a public image decision is the tendency of some
institutions to disapprove the appearance of certain speakers on the
campus. The free speech of a democratic society is critical to its
existence and should not yield to public pressures. A second example
is the off-campus rally which attracts negative attention in the downtown community. In both of these cases, and in many others, it would
be far better to make the decision on educational grounds and to
face the public relations problems as a separate matter. In fact, we
university administrators ought to recognize that we are spending
more time worrying about our public image than interpreting our
point of view to our constituency. We need to educate the community
to our goals and methods- not to alter those methods and goals
in order to preserve an ethereal image.
A second assumption made by universities is that there is a
clearcut distinction between on-campus and off-campus behavior.
I am convinced that such a sharp delineation cannot be made
* Vice President for Student Affairs, University of Minnesota; B.S.L. 1948, M.A. 1950,

Ph.D. 1957, University of Minnesota.
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geographically. To be sure, there is more latitude for judgment about
what does or does not constitute disruption and disturbance on the
campus than sometimes is possible off the campus. I am equally
certain that Dean McKay is quite right in arguing that the student
should not enter a sanctuary from consequences for civil wrongs
when he enters the university.
Clearly, the student should not be free of community sanctions
simply because he is a student. There may, however, be room for
some latitude in timing or method. The reluctance on the part of
police to enter a classroom and arrest a student is an excellent example. But, despite some room for flexibility in application, both
campus and community must exist under the same laws.
What becomes more difficult is the application (or nonapplication) of university expectations off the campus. For instance, universities often formulate rules about hours for students living on campus
which do not equally apply to students living off campus. What we
university administrators appear to do in some cases is to assume
a much stronger role with on-campus students than with those offcampus, as if the role of student is a mantle which he dons and doffs
at the gate. Where we cannot employ a strong role with off-campus
behavior, we sometimes seem to employ the fiction that we are applying standards equally by announcing that all our policies are also applicable off-campus. In my judgment, what is expected of the student
in terms of behavior on the campus should also be expected away
from campus. Conversely, standards which cannot or should not be
applied by the university to off-campus behavior should not be
regulated on-campus. The fictions which are employed may protect
us from the public relations consequences of applying this distinction,
but the practice nevertheless appears to be of questionable educational policy.
There are two criteria which should apply to any suggestion
that the student be subject to special expectations beyond those he
accepts as a citizen. First, is this expectation necessary to the educational community of which he is a part? Second, is this expectation
one which is consistent with the basic rights of any citizen? In general, institutions have not agreed on special expectations of students
by virtue of their membership in the educational community. We
have some broad generalized statements, but too few of them have
been reduced to concrete policy. In this sense, Dean McKay's suggestions about tolerance of dissent are helpful, and in my opinion
should apply on and off the campus. It may well be that faculty
members in some professional areas will want to assert some specific
expectations. Indeed, some colleges and departments do so. My point
is that such expectations, when developed, should apply to the
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student in whatever context he finds himself. My impression is that
we have too many special expectations that cannot stand the test of
the first criterion above, and that we apply those expectations on a
geographical basis to the detriment of whatever principle is involved.
A third assumption which requires attention is that orderly
behavior is a primary goal of university policies. While I should not
like to be described as one advocating disorder as a university goal,
I urge that an orderly campus not be made too great a consideration
in working with students. A university education is, or should be, an
unsettling experience. With that instability ought to come some
changes in the order of things. Thus, a stable campus should give
cause for uneasiness.
Order for its own sake is not desirable. Business office procedures may be orderly, but they may not necessarily produce the best
educational results. We need to stimulate a certain amount of new
procedures and new tensions. I have watched Edmund Williamson,
Dean of Students at the University of Minnesota, do this repeatedly
over the years with gratifying results. I hope our focus on the question of private rights and students' rights will not cause us to try to
develop an orderly arrangement which hides the educational issues.
For example, the argument about whether or not institutions ought
to have any expectations for students beyond those of the society
outside the university can be resolved by an easy formula, yet the
argument itself hides one of the most significant philosophical
questions in higher education, deserving solemn consideration
beyond the cursory solution.
A fourth assumption upon which universities often proceed is
that considerable flexibility must be maintained in dealing with
violations of some university policies, particularly in those areas
where essential university activities are involved. I was glad to see
Dean McKay stress the "overstepping of bounds" allowable in the
academic community. A university ought to be a place where mistakes are possible - and where a new point of departure can be set.
Normally, regulations do not approach the final truth in this world,
and we need to recognize their imperfections. If a university rule
prohibits "disruption of campus events," we need to interpret the
word "disruption" with as much generosity as possible, and we
need to give one who disrupts within the meaning of the term an
opportunity to learn he has done so. I strongly support the assumption that flexibility of interpretation must be maintained; failing to
do so results in a harsh, regulation bound climate in which little true
dialogue can be established among members of the university community.
I do not wish to end my response to Dean McKay's paper with-
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out a consideration of the role of campus police. Historically, the
policeman on the campus was an arm of the university administration, usually the business office, who performed certain administrative
functions. Many campus police departments developed out of an
arrangement where one custodian on the night crew was asked to
watch the buildings. Gradually, he did not do any custodial work,
and he received a badge, a uniform, and perhaps a gun. His function
was to protect the buildings, and he continued to be an arm of plant
services.
This is no longer the case with campus police. More commonly,
good departments see their function as one of serving students by
helping to maintain an educational environment on the campus.
They work to protect dissenters from nondissenters; to keep the
public from intruding into campus events and disrupting them; to
help maintain efficient campus events, and so on. Less than formerly,
they try to protect individual students from the law of the community, although they may enforce law on the campus or community
in order to prevent two sets of police from appearing at the
university.
This is the basic role I see for police- the support of a productive educational environment. This requires special training and
special attitudes. It requires an attention to educational interaction
rather than the protection of property alone. I see signs indicating
that some departments have moved in this direction. What is needed
is educational direction, and such direction will, of itself, end the
notion that campus police are either the special pleader of students
or the arm of the local police on the campus.
Dean McKay has identified in his paper some important insights on the student as a private citizen. My own view is that he
implies - and I think quite correctly - that the university should
set up as few special exceptions as possible for the student. To the
extent allowable in the academic community, the student should be
regarded as a private citizen, and any additional responsibilities
clearly should be identified as necessary for educational considerations. In this way, higher education can maintain a proper role for
its students.

THE STUDENT AS UNIVERSITY RESIDENT
By WILLIAM W.

I. A

VAN ALSTYNE*

PRELIMINARY DISTINCTION THAT FAILS

T

HE articles in this symposium move through a series of topics
each of which considers a different aspect of the relationship
between the student and the university. This division of topics, distinguishing the student as a university resident from the student as
a private citizen, virtually implies that useful legal distinctions can
be drawn according to the capacity in which a student may act and the
place within which the university presumes to assert its authority.
Thus, it may be suggested, while the student remains as a resident
within the campus, he is subject to the plenary authority of the university which may appropriately restrict academic residency to those
agreeable to its rules. Accordingly, on-campus conduct not in conformity with the rules may forfeit the student's residency. On the
other hand, once the student moves away from the campus he acts as
a private citizen bound only by laws applicable to citizens in general. Like other unattached citizens, however, he is no longer subject
to any extraterritorial claims of the university whose jurisdiction is
confined to its own precinct, the campus.
The resident-citizen distinction appears to be fair to the student
and fair to the university as well. It releases the student off the
campus from worry that he is less free than other citizens, and it
releases the university from concern that it is less free than other
property owners. If one readily accepts the campus relationship as
one of ownership and tenancy, moreover, the university's claim of
plenary on-campus authority seems to be entirely reasonable and
wholly straightforward. The essential core of property ownership
consists of the power to exclude and the concomitant authority to
expel those who seek to remain in defiance of the owner's rules or
wishes. Where the property is placed in the hands of trustees who
are given legal authority by the state or a private benefactor to promulgate rules for the general governance of the institution, it is
utterly unremarkable that those who are admitted as academic residents should expect to abide by all campus rules which condition
their residency. No significant legal problem would appear to arise
so long as the rules are confined to the campus itself and so long
* Professor of Law, Duke University.
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as they offend no state law or public policy otherwise applicable
to landholders and educational institutions in general. The university does not attempt to force anyone to attend, and, unlike the
situation in secondary education, the student is not compelled by law
to matriculate. As a free agent who voluntarily applies and may
just as readily abandon the university whenever he feels like it, the
student resident must reasonably expect to conform to the trustees'
regulations while he is on university property.
If the residential relationship of the student is viewed as one
of contract, involving private agreements respecting access to and
use of campus services and facilities, again we seem to reach the
same result. Indeed, the free market contract model of comparison
is especially attractive because it also provides an answer to those
who would criticize the fairness, and not merely the legality, of
campus rules. Within the free market contract model, for instance,
diversity among colleges and their differing sets of rules is expectable and desirable. Competition of colleges offering different academic life styles maximizes consumer satisfaction by providing a
broad range of alternatives capable of responding to the differing
preferences of the students. A given college rule - whether it requires all students to dress alike, whether it forbids social fraternities,
or something else again - requires no special defense; the success
or failure of the college to attract and to hold students against the
competition of the colleges offering different academic life styles
is itself the best and the only secure measure of the wisdom of its
rules. Certainly this seems eminently sensible, at least where the
college formulates its rules only in terms of on-campus conduct
and does not attempt to extort contractual concessions to rules affecting the off-campus citizenship prerogatives of those who enroll
with it. So long as the legal requisites of a contract are satisfied
(e.g., contractual capacity, mutual assent, conscionability of specific
terms), there would seem to be little basis for a lawyer to reproach
the rules regime of any given college.' Were it not primarily for
1 Yet, while there may be some merit still remaining in treating the legal student-

college relation as one of contract (e.g., where in fact the student could select any
of several different kinds of colleges and where the rules or general conditions of
each are well known to him in advance), this view needs far greater judicial supervision than it has received thus far. Typical student cases involving private colleges
have manifested a shocking indifference to a number of considerations which have
tempered the law of contracts even in more commercial fields such as insurance
and sales. See, e.g., University of Miami v. Militana, 184 So. 2d 701 (Dist. Ct. App.
Fla. 1966) ; Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1925) ; Gott v. Berea
College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913); Carr v. St. John's Univ., 17 App. Div.
2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1962) ; Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487,
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certain constitutional protections applicable to students as citizens,
moreover, there would be little amiss were a college to bind its
students contractually to fulfill any number of promises respecting
their off-campus conduct as well.
In both respects - the property analogy and the contract
analogy - the public as well as private universities would thus
appear to possess plenary authority on campus. As Mr. Justice
Holmes observed in rejecting the complaint of a person refused a
permit to speak in the Boston Common and who sought to argue
that the mayor had accordingly violated his freedom of speech:
For the Legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public
speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement
of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a
2
private house to forbid it in his house.
231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928) ;Barker v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr College, 278 Pa. 121, 122
A. 220 (1923).
The rules which a student "contracts" to observe are altogether nonnegotiable,
and there is in fact an absence of bargaining. The majority of "sellers" uniformly
employ a self-serving clause reserving the right to terminate the relation at will
according to standards they unilaterally determine pursuant to a vague "good conduct" rule. Thus, the nonnegotiability of terms is compounded by the real lack of
shopping alternatives, the inequality of the parties in fixing terms, parallel practices
among sellers, and the impotency of individual applicants to affect terms. The
contracts are purely on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Frequently, the student has little

idea of the terms of his contract in advance of matriculating, as he more often

than not becomes enrolled before being presented with any sort of handbook which
states the conditions of his attendance. Occasionally, he does not receive the handbook
at all. Its provisions are typically subject to change at the sole pleasure of the
college. Moreover, the student may be a minor when he enrolls, and while he may
thus avoid the contract based on his own incapacity, he may also be unable to
enforce it until he becomes of age.
One might expect, as a consequence, that the courts would be more inclined
than they have been to interpret vague rules against the university as the draftsman
and stronger party and void those rules which appear to be unconscionable. See,
e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Willard Van Dyke Productions, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 N.Y.2d 301, 189
N.E.2d 693, 239 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1963). See also, Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and
Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 603 (1943) ; Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943);
Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach, 50 VA. L.
REv. 1178 (1964) ; Patterson, Compulsory Contracts in the Crystal Ball, 43 COLUM.
L. REv. 731 (1943); Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L REV. 700 (1939).
Compare UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302.
There are still other considerations which strain the private contract model
of student-college relations, even from the college's perspective. Thus, the "consideration" furnished by the student in the form of tuition and fees frequently defrays
less than one-half of the (average) cost of educating him - a fact which simply
underscores the larger fact that colleges are not commercial, profit-seeking undertakings which deal with students at arm's length. Rather, they may be heavily
subsidized charitable corporations established primarily for the benefit of the
students and administered by trustees. Such a difference in the basic view of the
student-college relationship should incline the courts to look again at the rules
structure to review the decisions of the trustees and their subordinates against a high
standard of fiduciary obligation to the beneficiaries, and not in terms of permissible
clauses in an arm's-length contract. See Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its
Students -A
Fiduciary Theory, 54 Ky. L.J. 643 (1966) ; Seavy, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HARV. L. REV. 1406 (1957).
2
Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511, 39 N.E. 113 (1895), afifd, 167 U.S.
43 (1897).
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Similarly, when the state undertakes to establish a college, it may
be seen to operate in the capacity of a proprietor who is subject
only to the usual rules of law respecting the use of his own property
and not subject to constitutional norms which affect him only when
he, acting in a governmental rather than a proprietary capacity, attempts to regulate private conduct removed from his property.
For all of its hoary tradition, however, the on-campus/offcampus distinction is unsound, and the property or contract analogies
are very insecure as a matter of law." Issues of constitutional law
to one side, the appropriateness of certain rules in an institution presuming to call itself "academic" would still be open to discussion;
surely it is proper to suggest that truly academic institutions serve
special, vital, and limited functions which may be undermined and
disserved by rules which inhibit either academic or nonacademic
freedom either on campus or off campus - rules which are, incidentally, wholly inessential to the orderly operation of a university.
In contemplation of evolved constitutional law, moreover, all such
models are subordinate to constitutional norms whenever the institution is so significantly aided by government that its rulemaking
authority partakes of governmental power.4 Mr. Justice Holmes'
distinction between the state acting in a governmental capacity and
the state acting in a proprietary capacity has been substantially abans See note 1 supra.
4Green v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Commonwealth v.

Brown, 270 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1967), af'd, 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968) ; Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203
F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962), vacated in part, 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962).
Compare University of Miami v. Militana, 184 So. 2d 701 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla.
1966), with Parsons College v. North Cent. Ass'n, 271 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
See also Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (Privately operated restaurant under arm's-length lease with public parking authority
subject to equal protection clause. "Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances
can the non-obvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true
significance."); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 401 (1950)
("When authority derives in part from Government's thumb on the scales, the exercise of that power by private persons becomes closely akin, in some respects, to its
exercise by Government itself."); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505 (1946)
(Privately owned company town subject to fourteenth amendment. "We do not agree
that the corporation's property interests settle the question .... The more an owner,
for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more
do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those
who use it."); Eaton v. Grubb, 329 F.2d 710 '(4th Cir. 1964) (private hospital
receiving federal aid and performing "public function" subject to fourteenth amendment). See generally A. MILLER, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVATE EDUCATION
(1957); Dorsen, Racial Discrimination in "Private" Schools, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV.
39 (1967) ; Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3, 28-36 (1961) ;
Note, Private Government on the Campus -judicial Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362 (1963).
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doned.' Under either of these models - the university as an academic
institution and the university as an instrumentality of government
subject to constitutional restrictions on behalf of personal liberty the 100 percent on-campus/off-campus description of university
jurisdiction will not stand up.
Specific illustrations of constitutional control of the publicly
supported college as landholder, trustee, or contractual promisee
are readily available. A private property holder need not grant permission that his land or buildings be available to students or to
anyone else as a place to hold meetings for discussing public issues,
hearing guest speakers, or assembling to express some grievance
(least of all against the property holder himself), whether or not
such assemblies were orderly, whether or not such meetings did
not conflict with anything else the property holder intended to do
at the time, and whether or not the property holder sometimes allowed such meetings to be held on his property by people whose
ideas or backgrounds he happened to favor. If he elected to lease
the property to a group of persons, moreover, he could readily evict
them in the event they breached a covenant not to hold such meetings.
If the property holder is placed in a position of power through
an exercise of rublic largess (as through the expenditure of tax revenue in the operation of a college or university), however, his authority is hedged by constitutional restraints which protect "the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances," and which forbid him to deny equal protection of such
5See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Lamont v. Postmaster General,
381 U.S. 301 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) ; Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) ("It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of
religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions
upon a benefit or privilege.") ; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) ; Frost
& Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926) ("It would
be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation which, by words
of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by the federal
Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same result is accomplished under
the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the
state threatens otherwise to withhold . . . . It is inconceivable that guarantees embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence.") ; Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961). For
discussions of this subject see Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional
Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321 (1935); Linde, Constitutional Rights in the Public
Sector: Justice Douglas on Liberty in the Welfare State, 40 WASH. L. REV. 10
(1965); O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings
Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 443 (1966); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J.
733 (1964) ; Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); Note, UnconstitutionalConditions, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960).
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rights.' Accordingly, on-campus bans against guest speakers have
been enjoined where the rule supporting the ban was so vague as
to reserve carte blanche censorship to the administration' and where
the university classified speakers as acceptable or unacceptable in
terms of their political affiliations,8 their unrelated conduct before
congressional committees,' or their having been subject to an unadjudicated criminal charge - even one of murder or homosexual
soliciting.1" Where no physical disorder is imminent, where there
is no substantial basis for supposing that the speaker will himself
violate the law or incite others to a violation in the course of his
remarks, where the facilities are otherwise available and other
guest speakers are generally allowed on campus, the student residents
interested in hearing a given speaker on campus may not be
denied. Moreover, peaceful political expression or orderly and
nondisruptive assemblies on campus by students meeting to express
some felt grievance against the college itself is a protected form
6 See authorities cited notes 4, 5 supra. Once it is clear that the property owner's

operation is sufficiently pervaded with governmental presence as to make the Constitution apply, it is appropriate to suggest that one can no more rely on the rightprivilege distinction than can the government itself.
"Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1968) ("known member of the
Communist Party," "known to advocate the overthrow of government" held void for
vagueness). The current speaker regulation in force at the University of Mississippi is
probably vulnerable on the same basis, (see Note, Mississippi's Campus Speaker Ban:
Constitutional Considerations and the Academic Freedom of Students, 38 Miss. L.J.
488 (1967)), as is the Louisiana statute (see 42 TUL. L. REV. 394 (1968)). An antidemonstration rule in South Carolina was also recently held void for vagueness, prior
restraint, and inadequate standards, in Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272
F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967). It is clear that special first amendment concerns require
a degree of clarity, precision, standards, and specificity in this area considerably in
excess of what may be demanded of other types of rules as a matter of due process.
See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (and cases cited
therein) ; Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966). For other discussions of constitutional limitations on speaker control see Pollitt, Campus Censorship: Statute Barring Speakers from State Educational Institutions, 42 N.C.L. REv. 179 (1963) ; Van
Alstyne, Political Speakers at State Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations,
111 U. PA. L. REV. 328 (1963).
8

9

Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946);
Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1962). See also
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) ; DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937).

Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1968) (special regulation of any
speaker having utilized his privilege against self-incrimination before a state or federal
investigating committee, held invalid as an unconstitutional condition upon the use
of the privilege).
10 Student Liberal Fed'n v. Louisiana State Univ., Civil No. 68-300 (E.D. La., Feb. 13,
1968) ; Stacy v. Williams, Civil No. WC 6725 (N.D. Miss., June 30, 1967) (involving a temporary restraining order to enable the speaker to appear, but evidently on
the basis that his contract antedated the speaker's rule rather than on a free speech
or equal protection basis).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 45

of expression.1 1 Nor may the college mute criticism of itself by
forbidding critical student comment in the campus newspaper. 2
In all of these respects, university government is subject to a substantial degree of constraint similar to that which limits the civil
government from which the university derives its powers. As a
campus constituent of that university government, the student does
not forfeit his freedom of speech and cannot be made to barter it
away as a condition of being admitted or of remaining.1"
Additional illustrations might be provided to make the point
that a student cannot be made to leave his rights as a citizen outside
the college's doors. Virtually all colleges today provide at least some
on-campus lodgings for students. Unlike the situation respecting the
private landlord who may contractually reserve a right to enter and
inspect the premises at any time and for reasons satisfactory only
to himself, however, it is exceedingly likely that the fourth amendment's interdiction of "unreasonable searches and seizures" restricts
colleges receiving substantial public support from imposing such
sweeping conditions upon a student's privacy as those which may
be reserved by contract to a private landlord. Random fishing expeditions without warrant and without an excusable emergency, resulting in the seizure of things subsequently introduced in a disciplinary
hearing to provide a basis for expelling the student, are probably
11Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967). See
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966) (classroom wearing of 'Freedom"
buttons protected by first amendment). See also Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131
(1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229 (1963); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943);
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.
1967), cert. granted, 390 U.S. 942 (1968).
But distractingly raucous demonstrations or other modes of expression which
directly disrupt or obstruct authorized activities on campus may appropriately be
punished. Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966) ;
Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.W. Va. 1968); Zanders v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968) ; Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F.
Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968); Jones v. Board of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn.
1968) ; Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463
(1967) ; in re Bacon, 240 Cal. App. 2d 34, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1966). And certain
facilities may probably be closed altogether to demonstrations, without regard to
whether the demonstration would have been orderly. See Cameron v. Johnson, 390
U.S. 611 (1968) ; Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) ; Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 559 (1965).
1See Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967), final
decision postponed on appeal, 394 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1968). See also Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), holding that a teacher may not be fired
because of partially false statements critical of the trustees which appeared in a letter
to the editor published in a regular newspaper and which concerned an issue of general public interest.
13See authorities cited note 5 supra. See also West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943) ; Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613, 618
(M.D. Ala. 1967) ("A state cannot force a college student to forfeit his constitutionally protected right of freedom of expression as a condition to his attending a
state-supported institution.").
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forbidden.14 The fact that the premises, and perhaps the very rooms
themselves, may be owned by the state does not displace the fourth
amendment or eliminate a student-citizen's right to due process
respecting the manner in which evidence used against him has been
seized. The fourteenth amendment makes no broad distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary" state action, and a state
university must continue to observe standards of constitutional fairness even when acting as a proprietor.' 5 Indeed, in the broader
context of social trends, it should shock us to suppose that the right
of privacy might not extend to governmentally owned or operated
residences. Given the trend in housing generally, with an ever
larger fraction of living places either owned by government (as in
public housing) or underwritten by government (as through VA,
FHA, and FNMA), any view which would limit the constitutional
right of privacy to privately owned dwellings would effectively
shrink the right itself, removing it from an ever larger percentage
of the whole population, and seriously subordinating them to the
risks so explicit in George Orwell's 1984. Because of the trend toward
developing ever more on-campus living units for students, we should
be even more concerned as academicians not to act in ways which
unintentionally teach our students that we ourselves are the intruding
Big Brother.
Finally, norms of constitutional law have been applied with
increasing frequency to the procedure, even more than to the substance, of college discipline. Because this subject has been more
thoroughly explored elsewhere than any other subject, 6 I shall
consider it only briefly - but well enough to reiterate the essential
point respecting the inadequacy of contractual and property analogies.
In ordering the reinstatement of university students dismissed
People v. Overton, 51 Misc. 2d 140, 273 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1966) (fourth amendment's
ban against unreasonable search extends to student's school locker, and vice principal
may not grant consent to police search) ; Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy
State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (fourth amendment applied to student's on-campus room, search upheld on "reasonable" cause, dicta imply that fishing
expedition search would taint evidence seized pursuant thereto). See also Camara v.
Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (housing code regulation providing for warrantless administrative searches struck down) ; Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d
260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967) (welfare payments cannot be conditioned on consent to submit to warrantless searches). See generally Note, The Fourth
Amendment and Housing Inspections, 77 YALE L.J. 521 (1968).
15 See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439, 1458-64 (1968).
16 The following text on procedural due process is substantially reproduced from my own
article, Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom, 20 U.
FLA. L. REv. 290 (1968), where references to other writings on the same subject are
provided. (See also Selected Bibliography on Student Rights, appendix to this article.)
I regret the duplication, but could scarcely see any way of avoiding it.
14
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without hearing for alleged participation in off-campus demonstrations, a federal court of appeals observed in 1961:
The precise nature of the private interest involved in this case
is the right to remain at a public institution of higher learning in
which the plaintiffs were students in good standing. It requires no
argument to demonstrate that education is vital and, indeed, basic
to civilized society. Without sufficient education the plaintiffs
would not be able to earn an adequate livelihood, to enjoy life to
the fullest, or to fulfill as completely as possible the duties and
17
responsibilities of good citizens.

In view of the importance of the students' interest which was
placed in jeopardy by the threat to dismiss them, the court required
that such action must not be taken without the institutional observance of certain minimal procedural safeguards which would lessen
the likelihood of errors and prejudice. Subsequent cases have made
clear that the degree of quasi-judicial formality in college disciplinary
proceedings need only be proportioned to the gravity of the offense,
and that no college need fear that every alleged infraction, no matter how minor the penalty, must be determined in a cumbersome
and divisive adversary proceeding. 8 When the consequences attached to the alleged misconduct are very serious to the student's
future, however, an increasing number of procedural requirements
must correspondingly be observed. In the gravest cases (e.g., those
involving expulsion, long-term suspension, widely available recordation of offenses carrying a high degree of popular stigma), the college must probably proceed with at least as much care as is now
required of a juvenile court - especially as so many of its students
are not juveniles and not at all subject to the fading rationale of
in loco parentis.
The proposition that even minors cannot be disciplined in a
manner affecting substantial interests without the observance of procedural due process was specifically affirmed by the Supreme Court
only last year. In prospectively requiring juvenile courts to improve
the judicial nature of their proceedings, the Court declared:
Failure to observe the fundamental requirements of due process
has resulted in instances, which might have been avoided, of unfairness to individuals and inadequate or inaccurate findings of fact and
unfortunate prescriptions of remedy. Due process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom. It is the
basic and essential term in the social compact which defines the
17Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961). See also Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D.
Tenn. 1961).
18 Compare Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961),
with Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959). See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1959); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
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rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the state
may exercise.
In view of this, it would be extraordinary if our Constitution
did not require the procedural regularity and the exercise of care
implied in the phrase "due process." Under our Constitution, the
condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court. 19

The jettisoning of in loco parentis was, it may be suggested,
long overdue in any case. For one thing, the mean age of American
college students is more than 21 years, and there are, in fact, more
students over the age of 30 than younger than the age of 18.20 Even
in Blackstone's time, the doctrine did not apply to persons over 21.21
For another thing, it is unrealistic to assume that relatively impersonal and large-scale institutions can act in each case with the same
degree of solicitous concern as a parent reflects in the intimacy of
his own home. The parent is doubtless restrained in tempering discipline with love and concern which one expects of a father or
mother, while the institution cannot hope to reflect the same intense degree of emotional identification with those in attendance,
no matter how well it may intend to do so. The institution is also
subject to different practical concerns - to keep its eye on reaction
by the local press, disgruntlement among alumni, dissatisfaction
among benefactors, and others whose practical influence combine
to bring about an administrative perspective less loving and more
divided than a mother has for her own son or daughter. It simply
blinks at reality to treat the mother and the college as one and the
same in drawing legal analogies, no matter how frequently one refers
to his alma mater for other purposes. Finally, there is this to be
said: a parent's disciplinary authority does not extend to the power
literally to expel a dependent minor from his own home, but to
lesser penalties only. Yet, the typical sanction imposed by the alleged surrogate parent, a college, is the sanction of expulsion itself
- with all of the serious consequences to the student's future already noted above. As the analogy of in loco parentis is in many
ways false in fact, we need not be surprised nor alarmed that it is
now being discarded." Large-scale collegiate operations, the hetero19In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 19-20, 27-28 (1967).
20U.S.

BUREAU

OF

THE

CENSUS,

DEP'T

OF

COMMERCE,

CURRENT

POPULATION

REPORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 110, POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 12 (1961).
21 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453.
22

See, e.g., Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 286 (D. Colo. 1968) ("We agree with
the students that the doctrine of 'In Loco Parentis' is no longer tenable in a university
community."); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 463, 469 (1967) ("For constitutional purposes, the better approach, as indicated in Dixon, recognizes that state universities should no longer stand in loco
parentis in relation to their students.").
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geneity of their student bodies, the varying ages of their students,
the irreducible impersonality of their operation, and the grave consequences of their disciplinary proceedings, all support the heightened requirements of greater procedural fairplay in their treatment
of alleged violators of their rules. The immediate, practical, and
constitutional result of these phenomena is this: colleges and universities may no longer enforce their rules through sanctions seriously jeopardizing a student's career in the absence of procedures
which are fundamentally fair. The essential elements of fair procedure include (but may not be limited to) the following requirements:
(1) Serious disciplinary action may not be taken in the absence
of published rules which:
(a) are not "so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application" ;23 and
23Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486, 498 (M.D.N.C. 1968). See also Hammond
v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967); Buckley v. Meng,
35 Misc. 2d 467, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1962) ; Soglin v. Kauffman, Opinion
and Order No. 67-C-141 (W.D. Wis., Dec. 11, 1967) (General "misconduct" rule
as applied to demonstrations acknowledged to raise grave first amendment question,
although temporary restraining order withheld pending fuller hearing. "The constitutional requirement of reasonable specificity and narrowness in rule-making in the
First Amendment area has not as yet been suspended in non-university society.").
At the same time, a number of recent federal decisions have not demanded even
ordinary clarity in rules, and some have upheld student suspensions based merely on
a wholly undefined "inherent power." See, e.g., Dunmar v. Ailes, 348 F.2d 51
(D.C. Cir. 1965); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.W. Va. 1968);
Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968) ; Buttny
v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968) ; Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F.
Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal.
App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Morris v. Nowotny, 323 S.W.2d 301
(Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
Despite the opinions in these cases, I cannot believe that they are soundly
reasoned. They are, as Professor William Cohen suggested, highly reminiscent of
A. P. Herbert's hearty spoof in Rex v. Haddock, in which the accused had jumped
into the Thames purely for fun, and in which the Court of Criminal Appeal affirmed
his conviction in spite of the fact that no one could find any statute which he had
violated. The court stated:
Citizens who take it upon themselves to do unusual actions which attract the
attention of the police should be careful to bring these actions into one of
the recognized categories of crimes and offences, for it is intolerable that
the police should be put to the pains of inventing reasons for finding them
undesirable .... It is not for me to say what offence the appellant has committed, but I am satisfied that he has committed some offence, for which he
has been most properly punished.
A. HERBERT, MISLEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 31, 33, 36-37 (4th ed.
1928). (The concurring judge "said that in his opinion, the appellant had done his
trousers no good and the offence was damage to property.")
More seriously, vagueness and ambulatory administrative discretion as well as
lack of notice of rules are constitutionally vicious, even aside from whether or not
an individual had reason to suppose that he might subsequently be punished for his
proposed conduct. The general problem is very well reviewed in Amsterdam, The
Void jor Vagueness Doctrine, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960) ; Collings, Unconstitllional Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 195 (1955).
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(b) do not depend upon the unqualified discretion of a
particular administrator for their application.24
(2) Where the rules are reasonably clear and their application
does not depend upon uncontrolled discretion, a student still may
not be seriously disciplined (as by suspension) unless:
(a) the student charged with an infraction has been furnished with a written statement of the charge adequately in
advance of a hearing to enable him to prepare (e.g., 10 days) ;25
(b) the student thus charged "shall be permitted to inspect
in advance of such hearing any affidavits or exhibits which the
college intends to submit at the hearing";26
(c) the student is "permitted to have counsel present at

the hearing to advise [him]"

;27

(d) the student is "permitted to hear the evidence presented against [him]," or at least the student should be given
Applied in Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C.
1967). See also cases cited note 23 supra.
As a practical guide, colleges should be most clear and confined, and provide
for the least general administrative discretion with respect to rules applied to first
amendment interests (i.e., speech, assembly, petitioning, or association). Vague,
overly broad, or standardless rules in this area are regarded as unconstitutional per se
due to their chilling effect on these preferred freedoms. See, e.g., Zwickler v. Koota,
389 U.S. 241 (1967) ; Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603-04, 608-10
(1966); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 378 U.S. 127 (1964); Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F.
Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1968). Specificity and notice of the rules may also be demanded
under circumstances where the rule requires those subject to it to take some affirmative act, or to avoid conduct which they might reasonably suppose not to be wrongful. See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225'(1957). That is, the more peculiar
the rule in terms of the ordinary expectations of those bound by it, the more necessary are clarity and notice. For the rest, greater flexibility is doubtless constitutionally
permissible. Compare Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939), and Connally v.
General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926), with Nash v. United States, 229
U.S. 373 (1913), and United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1946). A recent attempt
to provide a reasonably clear list of basic regulations at the University of California
is described in 17 AMER. COUNCIL ON EDUC. BULL. No. 8 (1968).
2 Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967) ; Schiff v.
Hannah, 282 F. Supp. 381 (W.D. Mich. 1966) (en banc); Woody v. Bums, 188 So.
2d 56 (Fla. Ct. App. 1960). But see Jones v. Board of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190
(M.D. Tenn. 1968) '(upholding expulsions based on two days notice); Due v.
Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963) (required only that
charges be read to students at the beginning of the disciplinary hearing).
2Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
27 Id. See also Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725
(M.D. Ala. 1968); Goldwyn v. Allen, 281 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1967) ; Madera v.
Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd, 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir.
1967) (on grounds that the hearing was not essentially disciplinary or penal, but more
in the nature of counselling to determine the appropriate school in which petitioner
should be located), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968). But see Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (1967) (Merchant Marine Academy); Dunmars v. Ailes, 348
F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (military academy); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp.
228 (S.D.W. Va. 1968) (suspension upheld, notwithstanding refusal to permit
students to be represented by counsel). See Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D.
Colo. 1968) (counsel permitted); Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190
(M.D. Tenn. 1968) (counsel permitted) ; Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248
Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) (counsel permitted-entire hearing
procedure unusually comprehensive).

24
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the names of the witnesses against him and an oral or written
report on the facts to which each witness testifies ;
(e) the student or his attorney may question at the hearing
any witness who gives evidence against him;29
(f) those who hear the case "shall determine the facts of
30
each case solely on the evidence presented at the hearing" ; 1
(g) "the results and findings of the hearing should be
presented in a report open to the student's inspection";"
(h) "either side may, at its own expense, make a record
of the events at the hearing."3 2
v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 930 (1961); Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn.
1961). See also Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp.
725 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Schiff v. Hannah, 282 F. Supp. 381 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
2Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cr.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 930 (1961) indicated that cross-examination may not be required: "This is not
to imply that a full dress hearing, with the right to cross-examine witnesses, is
required." Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967)
held that a student, but not his counsel, has the right to cross-examine. Yet, in most
recent cases, disciplinary boards permitted cross-examination by student or counsel.
See, e.g., Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725
(M.D. Ala. 1968); Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747
(W.D. La. 1968); Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968); Jones v.
Board of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968); Dickey v. Alabama State Bd.
of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). There appears to be little reason
to forbid so customary a function of counsel, reserving to the hearing board substantial discretion to limit counsel's participation to avoid unreasonable delay, harassment,
or simple grandstanding. None of the cases suggest that formal rules of evidence
need be observed nor is any such requirement suggested by customary practice in
adjudicative administrative hearings.
30 Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 652 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
But see Jones v. Board of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 200 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), which
heavily qualifies this view and, notwithstanding its cautionary language, accepts what
is both a questionable and unnecessary practice. "There is no violation of procedural
due process when a member of a disciplinary body at a university sits on a case after
he has shared with other members information concerning the facts of a particular
incident.... This limited combination by a school administrative body of prosecutorial
and adjudicatory functions is not fundamentally unfair in the absence of a showing
of other circumstances, such as malice or personal interest in the outcome of a case."
It would appear that there may implicitly exist a "personal interest" in the outcome
under such circumstances, as well as an unfair disadvantage to the student in not
knowing what alleged information may thus be privately circulated within the hearing
board.
31Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961); Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649
(W.D. Mo. 1967); Woody v. Burns, 188 So. 2d 56 (Fla. Ct. App. 1960).
32 Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 652 (W.D. Mo. 1967). The
better practice in terms of fairness and economy, at many institutions, is to have a
simple tape recording of the entire proceedings from which a typed transcript can be
prepared if necessary. In addition to the cases previously cited, for illustrations of the
varying degree of procedural due process required by other courts see Woods v.
Wright, 334 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1964), and the marginal due process held to be
sufficient in Wright v. Texas Southern Univ., 277 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Tex. 1967),
ajI'd, 392 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir.
1967); Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963). Essentially no procedural due process was required in Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F.
Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967), on the theory that the university was private and not subject to the fifth or fourteenth amendments. The case is almost surely in error; even
before hearing an appeal on the merits, the court of appeals ordered temporary
reinstatement of the students. Civil No. 1949-67 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 8, 1967).
2Esteban
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These procedural safeguards roughly parallel some of the
standards required by criminal courts in their disposition of offenses
punishable by fine or short term imprisonment. The comparison is
not fortuitous because it is now evident that expulsion or exclusion
from college may, in the long run, disadvantage an individual at
least as much as a single infraction of a criminal statute. There
should be no surprise, therefore, that students are entitled at least
to a similar degree of due process as a suspected pickpocket. Indeed,
the requisites of due process still evolving from federal decisions
are substantially less than standards already recommended by professional educational associations. The Association of American
Colleges (representing administrations of nearly 900 colleges), the
American Association of University Professors (representing about
86,000 full-time faculty at accredited institutions), the National
Student Association, the National Association of Student Personnel
Administrators, the National Association of Women Deans and
Counsellors, and the American Association of Higher Education
have recently approved a Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms
of Students which goes considerably beyond the requirements suggested in court decisions. In respect to procedural due process, the
joint Statement provides:
B. Investigation of Student Conduct
1. Except under extreme emergency circumstances, premises
occupied by students and the personal possessions of students should
not be searched unless appropriate authorization has been obtained.
For premises such as residence halls controlled by the institution,
an appropriate and responsible authority should be designated to
whom application should be made before a search is conducted. The
application should specify the reasons for the search and the objects
or information sought. The student should be present, if possible,
during the search. For premises not controlled by the institution,

the ordinary requirements for lawful search should be followed.

2. Students detected or arrested in the course of serious viola-

tions of institutional regulations, or infractions of ordinary law,

should be informed of their rights. No form of harassment should
be used by institutional representatives to coerce admissions of guilt
or information about conduct of other suspected persons.
C. Status of Student Pending FinalAction

Pending action on the charges, the status of a student should
not be altered, or his right to be present on the campus and to attend

classes suspended, except for reasons relating to his physical or
emotional safety and well-being, or for reasons relating to the safety
and well-being of students, faculty, or university property.

D. Hearing Committee Procedures
When the misconduct may result in serious penalties and if the
student questions the fairness of disciplinary action taken against
him, he should be granted, on request, the privilege of a hearing
before a regularly constituted hearing committee. The following
suggested hearing committee procedures satisfy the requirements
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of procedural due process in situations requiring a high degree of
formality:
1. The hearing committee should include faculty members or
students, or, if regularly included or requested by the accused, both
faculty and student members. No member of the hearing committee
who is otherwise interested in the particular case should sit in judgment during the proceeding.
2. The student should be informed, in writing, of the reasons
for the proposed disciplinary action with sufficient particularity, and
in sufficient time, to insure opportunity to prepare for the hearing.
3. The student appearing before the hearing committee should
have the right to be assisted in his defense by an adviser of his
choice.
4. The burden of proof should rest upon the officials bringing the charge.
5. The student should be given an opportunity to testify and
to present evidence and witnesses. He should have an opportunity
to hear and question adverse witnesses. In no case should the committee consider statements against him unless he has been advised
of their content and of the names of those who made them, and
unless he has been given an opportunity to rebut unfavorable inferences which might otherwise be drawn.
6. All matters upon which the decision may be based must be
introduced into evidence at the proceeding before the hearing committee. The decision should be based solely upon such matters.
Improperly acquired evidence should not be admitted.
7. In the absence of a transcript, there should be both a digest
and a verbatim record, such as a tape recording, of the hearing.
8. The decision of the hearing committee should be final,
subject only to the student's right of appeal to the President or
ultimately to the governing board of the institution.3a
The late (and judicially conservative) Mr. Justice Frankfurter
once observed that "the history of liberty has largely been the history
of observance of procedural safeguards." 4 So it is with students, as
with others.
Somewhat anticlimactically, however, it is necessary to note a
few additional matters in rendering our treatment of student procedural due process with complete accuracy:
(1) The federal cases involving procedural due process for
students have been disposed of by courts below the level of the
United States Supreme Court, and thus their utterances on this subject
are not necessarily the last word. Indeed, a number of federal courts
disagree among themselves respecting the requisite degree of college
due process.35
Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, 53 A.A.U.P. BULL. 365,
368 (1967). See also A.C.L.U., ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OF STUDENTS IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (rev. ed. 1965) (This is an earlier ACLU
statement to which the Joint Statement is indebted.). Comprehensive reports on student
rights and freedoms have also recently been completed at the University of California,
Michigan State University, Cornell University, Brown University, University of Wisconsin, and Swarthmore College.
34
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943). See also Frankfurter's paraphrasing of the same point in Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945).
35 See notes 25-32 supra.
33
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(2) On the other hand, it is reasonable to expect that additional
safeguards may be posed by the courts if it appears that complete
fairness is still not being observed. For instance, it is foreseeable
that random and unannounced searching of student rooms may be
forbidden, that students may not be coerced into admissions of misdeeds, and that some greater degree of cross-sectional representation
on hearing boards may eventually be required."6
(3) A clear distinction will probably continue to be made, however, respecting campus offenses carrying such relatively insubstantial
penalties (e.g., social probation, minor fines, loss of auto privileges)
that formal due process is not demanded and may well be dispensed
with in the interest of administrative convenience.
(4) A distinction will probably continue to be made as well in
instances where students face the prospect of being dropped due to
inadequate grades. It is true, of course, that dismissal for academic
deficiency may be as serious to the student's educational career as
dismissal for disciplinary reasons, but quasi-judicial procedures are
generally inadequate as a means of determining whether, for instance, an essay examination should have been graded as a C rather
than a D. A lay panel may ordinarily lack the competence of secondguessing grades. Only where the student's complaint alleges egregious
and almost willfully biased grading may the college be required to
provide some means of review, and even then the review would
presumably involve a panel of professors familiar with the subject
matter of the examination and who would follow a different procedure than in a disciplinary case.3 7
(5) Finally, disciplinary proceedings are different from counselling proceedings where the student does not stand in jeopardy of a
penalty. So long as the counsellor is required to respect the confidentiality of his relationship and acts without power to impose
punishment, no reason exists to import an adversary or quasi-judicial
procedure which would undermine the counsellor's essential functions.38
The ultimate legality of a college rule, then, clearly cannot be
measured merely by the geography within which it has to operate.
And it is well that this is so, for it also means, of course, that rules
which are otherwise reasonable do not become unreasonable merely
because they may sometimes circumscribe conduct which occurs outside the campus itself. A rule appropriately forbidding plagiarism,
for instance, obviously does not become inappropriate as applied to
36 On the particular point of random searches see text accompanying note 14 supra.
37
See, e.g., Connelly v. University of Vt., 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965). Compare
Woody v. Burns, 188 So. 2d 56 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966).
3See, e.g., Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967) ; Cosme v. Board
of Educ., 50 Misc. 2d 344, 270 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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a student who copies his paper from a reference work in his own
home away from campus. A rule restricting student organizations
from representing that their demonstrations carry the endorsement
of the college itself does not become invalid when applied to a
demonstration held downtown; indeed, the more off campus the
location where such a representation might be made, the more legitimate the rule, due to the greater necessity that the institution shall
not needlessly suffer from some public misunderstanding. The
constitutional emphasis, then, turns not upon distinctions between
students as "citizens" and students as "residents"; it turns, rather,
upon the larger reasonableness of each rule, and the parameters of
'reasonableness" are several, not singular.
II.

DUAL RESIDENCY AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Despite what I have said earlier in this article, for certain significant purposes a student does reside in several communities at
once and is made answerable for his conduct to the law of each
community in turn. His dormitory may have rules affecting his
conduct as a dormitory resident, his college has overlapping rules
which affect him as a resident of the college, the city laws may
overlap both college regulations and dormitory rules, and so on
right on through some federal statutes. A single act of misconduct
may accordingly subject a student to a multiplicity of trials and
punishments, exactly to the extent that the laws of these several
jurisdictions happen to overlap. Thus, a student who rifles the
drawer of a roommate and steals a postal money order may:
(1) be tried by a dormitory council, and if found guilty of violating a rule forbidding theft in the dormitory, he may then be
fined or expelled from the dormitory as otherwise provided by the
dormitory rule;
(2) be tried by the college judicial board, and if found guilty
of violating a rule forbidding theft, he may then be fined, suspended,
expelled, or otherwise disciplined as provided in the college rules;
(3) be tried in the municipal court for theft, and if convicted he
may then be fined or jailed (or both) pursuant to local ordinance;
(4) be tried in the superior court for theft, and if convicted he
may then be fined or jailed (or both) pursuant to state statute;
(5) be tried in federal court for theft, and if convicted he may
then be fined or jailed (or both) pursuant to federal statutes applicable to postal money orders.
We accept this scheme of multiple trials and multiple punishments for a single offense in spite of the constitutional provision
that no person shall "be twice put in jeopardy... for the
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same offense." Our understanding is, rather, that there were five
different offenses in this one event and the student was tried and
punished only once for each offense, even allowing that he performed but a single act and endured an accumulation of five trials
and five punishments.3 9 Since each community has a separate legislative capacity of its own over its own territory, the aggregation of
trials and punishments results without constitutional objection because the student was, while living in one place, a resident of five
communities with each overlapping all the lesser ones within it.
Yet, as we look again at this situation, some parts of the arrangement may lead us to conclude that we have sacrificed the
substance of the double jeopardy clause to the mere form of manipulable laws. As between the municipal and state prosecutions for theft
under identically worded laws (except that the municipal law applies only to theft committed within the town whereas the state
law applies whether or not the theft was committed within a town),
for instance, why do we permit more than one trial to be held?
(Note, of course, that the defendant might first have been acquitted
in the state trial and then convicted in the municipal trial or vice
versa.) What purpose is served, assuming the defendant is convicted
in each trial, by allowing multiple sentences to be imposed and even
consecutively (rather than concurrently) served? Should we have had
even another trial and another prison sentence consecutively added,
had the county board of supervisors also adopted a countywide theft
ordinance?
We recoil from such an endless proliferation of cruel and pointless trials and punishments, I think, instinctively recognizing an
essential unfairness to any person haplessly packed from court to
court.4" We would tend to say, rather, that more than a single trial
and punishment ought not befall a man for a single act unless:
(1) there are clear and distinct interests peculiar to each com39 Overlapping and consecutive state and federal prosecutions have been upheld by the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) ; Bartkus v.
Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) ; United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).

Over-

lapping and consecutive state and municipal prosecutions have also been upheld by
a number of state supreme and inferior federal courts. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel.
Ladd v. Middlebrooks, 270 F. Supp. 295 (E.D. La. 1967) ; State v. Tucker, 137
Wash. 162, 242 P. 363 (1926).

40The problem of multiple state and substate prosecutions for a single act is comprehensively reviewed and smartly challenged in Comment, Constitutional Law: Successive Municipal and State Prosecutions Found Permissible Despite Assumed Application of Double Jeopardy Clause, 1968 DUKE L.J. 362. The footnotes to that Comment collect so much of the professional writing and cases that further documentation
is dispensed with here. The author argues that consecutive state and local prosecutions
within a single state for a single act may violate the double jeopardy clause - a proposition which arguably might extend to penalties imposed by state universities
assuming, however, that the proceeding is in fact quasi-criminal and seeks only to
vindicate public interests already wholly vindicated in some prior state or municipal
penal action.
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munity which seeks separately to impose its own jurisdiction over
the alleged offender; and
(2) these distinctive interests have not in fact been adequately
fulfilled in the trial and punishment process of any of the other
communities previously asserting jurisdiction over the alleged
offender.
In our postal money order theft, for instance, it is difficult to
see any distinctive interest held by the city which is not held equally
by the county, and any held by the county not held equally by the
state. It would seem better that a single prosecution be held under
either the ordinance or the state theft statute (but not under both),
therefore, and that the common interests of these three overlapping
communities in the safety of their residents and protection of their
property be composed in that one proceeding. Similarly, while the
federal government might originally have had in theory a distinctive
interest of its own in protecting postal services as a federal instrumentality, wholly apart from any concern for the safety of persons
or property in any given state, a fair trial has incidentally discharged
the function of the federal statute as well. An additional federal
prosecution would now seem purely cumulative and vindictive, violating the spirit if not the technical form of double jeopardy.4
So, indeed, it may be in the relation of parietal college rules
and state laws, especially where the college has a purely duplicative
rule that quite literally presumes to make an academic offense of
anything forbidden by any local, state, or federal law. Assuming
that a student drives too fast on the interstate highway, for instance,
the hazards for which he is responsible by his conduct are already
policed by the general speeding law he has violated; to the extent
that the college would discourage speedy driving for the very same
reasons, e.g., to protect the lives and safety of others, it has no
interests sufficiently different from those already reflected in the
general speeding law so to warrant its piling on a separate prosecution and punishment. Indeed, where the reckless driving occurred
away from campus, the college itself has no separate community
interest of its own any more than the town has a proper basis for
41

I think double prosecutions for the same offense are so contrary to the spirit
of our free country that they violate even the prevailing view of the Fourteenth Amendment ....
...
Looked at from the standpoint of the individual who is being prosecuted, this notion [of multiple sovereignty] is too subtle for me to grasp.
If double punishment is what is feared, it hurts no less for two "Sovereigns"
to inflict it than for one. If danger to the innocent is emphasized, that danger
is surely no less when the power of State and Federal Governments is
brought to bear on one man in two trials, than when one of these "Sovereigns" proceeds alone.
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 150-51, 155 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
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assuming criminal jurisdiction under municipal ordinances for reckless driving offenses occurring beyond municipal limits. Where the
reckless driving occurs within campus precincts, moreover, all appropriate college concerns may still be adequately fulfilled in the treatment of the alleged offender in the course of his trial in the municipal court. Thus, application of a college rule to offenses committed
on campus might appropriately await the determination of the
municipal court proceedings.
What I mean to propose by this suggestion is a serious, threestep reevaluation of the very great number of college rules which
overlap local, state, and federal laws; rules, for instance, broadly
punishing vandalism, theft, assault, drug use, and alcohol abuse. The
first step requires a review of the college rules to determine whether
they are, in their subject matter and scope of application, justified
in terms of a clearly discernible college purpose not already composed in other laws applicable to the conduct in question; or whether, to the contrary, the college rule merely duplicates what may certainly be appropriate police interests, but interests already covered
in general law. (In this connection, the locus of the offense may be
important. Vandalism of the college library, for instance, specifically
affecting college property, does a kind of damage distinct to the
college itself apart from the shared community concern to deter
criminal behavior.4 2 Vandalism of a downtown shop does not directly injure the college, and the wrongfulness of the act as an
offense to the community is readily punishable under existing local
or state law.)
The second step is to determine whether a college rule which
has an a priori basis to protect the college itself nonetheless ought
not be applied to a given infraction because an overlapping local
or state law has already been applied in such a fashion that the
functions of the college rule have been discharged in the regular,
off-campus proceeding. For instance, the student who allegedly
vandalized the college library may have been arrested, tried, and
acquitted or convicted and punished. If he were acquitted, the college
should surely think carefully about the wisdom of trying him again.
If he were convicted, the college should surely consider carefully
whether the punishment imposed was sufficient even in terms of
42 Arguably, however, the damage "distinct" to the college is civil rather than criminal,
since the criminal aspect is already fully reflected in the general criminal law which
makes vandalism a punishable offense. Thus, the college might appropriately confine
itself to seeking compensation in the same manner as anyone else, through a common
law tort action. Even when the criminal mischief is against the college's own property,
therefore, it is arguable that the college should not necessarily utilize its own quasicriminal processes to duplicate those already brought to bear by the municipal or
state court.
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the college's own interests- making it inappropriate to pursue the
matter further.4"
As to this second step, many colleges have operated in an
utterly different fashion; where college rules and state laws have
overlapped, a number of colleges have established working relations
with the downtown police so that the alleged offender is released
to the college and favored in this regard over nonstudents arrested
under identical circumstances. This, of course, is the seemingly
benevolent edge of in loco parentis, the college acting to favor its
students, shielding them from responsibilities unequally borne by
nonstudents less favored than they. (The benevolence may sometimes be only a "seeming" one, however, for the college, seeking
to maintain the goodwill of the police, may in fact then discipline
the student far more severely than would the court downtown - as
by expelling him and terminating his educational career, rather
than by imposing the fine or brief term in jail that he would have
received downtown.) These arrangements seem to be so doubtful,
both in terms of their legal correctness and in terms of their educational wisdom, however, that they should now be reconsidered. They
are legally doubtful to the extent that the police, by such arrangements, unequally favor those who are fortunate enough to be students. They are educationally doubtful, for some students may
acquire an "elitest" notion of themselves, placing themselves above
other citizens, while others may feel that they are made whipping
boys within the college in order that the college may preserve its
good standing with the town. On both accounts, the practice should
be seriously reviewed.
This does not mean that the college should take no interest
in its students involved with the courts; the fact that the student
may be far from home, in need of counsel, and practically disadvantaged in comparison with a local resident may of course make
it perfectly appropriate for the college to assist him in his difficulty
- short of buying off the police by promising suitably stringent
treatment of its own.
There is, however, a third step in this review. Some off-campus
offenses, not themselves more detrimental to the college than to
the larger community which polices them, may nonetheless raise
appropriate questions for independent review within the collegequestions respecting the continuing safety of the college itself. The
crime of selling narcotics is sometimes committed by persons who
are themselves addicted and who engage in proselytizing others to
4

Since a fine paid into court is neither measured by the damage done nor paid over to
the college, however, I do not mean to imply that the college ought not seek compensation from the student on the same terms that it might seek compensation from
anyone else similarly doing damage. See note 42 supra.
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secure funds to meet their own needs as well as, in some cases, to
lessen their own feelings of guilt by providing themselves with
reassurance that others will also use narcotics. A person tried and
convicted in a regular court of law may, as a youthful first offender,
be given a suspended sentence and then be free to return at
once to college. Yet, the college may need to satisfy itself that the
young man's return to campus will not carry an unreasonable risk
to other students, and the college might therefore wish to make an
independent inquiry to determine the safety of allowing the student
to remain on campus. In short, since the municipal court's exercise
of judicial discretion in the treatment of a given offender need not
have given special attention to distinct college interests, the commission by a student of certain types of crimes may make it appropriate that the college review the circumstances to determine whether
separate protective measures of its own would be warranted.
The shift in emphasis, however, is both real and important.
Colleges would no longer undertake to duplicate general law by
taking their own pound of flesh through expelling every student
convicted of a criminal offense, nor would they seek to undermine the accountability of their residents to regular law by providing
them an academic sanctuary for offenses committed in the larger
community. Rather, they would leave the policing of municipal
concerns to the municipal authorities, assisting their students only
to insure their fair and equal treatment in the regular courts, and
utilizing such information as they otherwise receive about criminal
law violations only to determine whether, in the nature of the
student's conduct and the delay or result reached in the regular
courts, there is some substantial need of the college requiring
separate action by the college to secure its own safety.
III. SOCIAL

REGULATION OF DRESS AND DECORUM

An increasing number of campus controversies are now astir
which scholars may feel to be too foolish for serious consideration,
disputes where the complaint of the students seems trivial and the
concern of the college seems petty. Where the issue is thus one of
determining whether the triviality of the complaint outweighs the
pettiness of the rule, no one is likely to secure anything in which
he can take much pride. Yet, the controversy will not go away, and
even the examination of a small matter may yield principles capable
of more important uses. Thus, it may be worth our time briefly
to take stock of seemingly prankish students who increasingly
affront social regulations on campus by getting out of step: boys
with long hair, girls with short skirts, and other departures of
questioned taste. Cases have been litigated in state and federal courts
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where students, suspended until they conform, have fielded solemn
principles of the Constitution in defense of an inch or two more
of hair or an inch or two less of skirt. Some have tied their beards
to the first amendment, claiming that their hair length expresses a
point of view about society, that it constitutes hirsute advocacy of
more individuality, less conformity, and is, as such, a manifestation
of free speech as much protected from censorship as conventional
political discussion. Others anchor their claim in a larger freedom
of personality, a right to be let alone and to be as one wants to be,
free of regulation which serves no discernible important purpose
and reduces the individual to another conforming cardboard cutout
jigging up and down in a ticky-tacky college.4 4
Those issues litigated with respect to high school students have
generally been resolved against the students,4 5 although a few recent
successes4" in the courts are doubtless being watched somewhat
nervously with the understandable anxiety that there seems to be no
stopping point for the ubiquitous judiciary. Generally, they have
lost in court as a practical matter probably because the courts have
felt that student obstinacy on such slight matters was itself an unreasonable and pertinacious challenge to authority. A federal district
court, it might be said, surely has more important things to do than
consume its time in behalf of beatniks and mods. In defending these
cases, the colleges have likewise fielded high principles, including
the following:
(1) Social regulations are designed to contribute affirmatively
to the atmosphere of serious study and contemplation appropriate
to an institution of higher learning. Each institution is itself the
best judge of the environment most conducive to its educational
undertakings, and its expertise on the inappropriateness of certain
offensive practices surely ought not be second-guessed by judges
having little idea of a given campus situation.
(2) Were courts to intervene against the institution's own best
44 These and other arguments are enthusiastically developed in student writing: Com-

ment, A Student's Right to Govern His Personal Appearance, 17 J. PuB. L. 151
(1968) ; Comment, The Personal Appearance of Students - The Abuse of a Protected
Freedom, 20 ALA. L. REV. 104 (1967).

See also 19 MERCER L. REV. 252 (1968);

37 U. COLO. L. REV. 492 (1965).
45 For cases upholding the school's position, even when there has been virtually no evidence that the offending style in fact caused disruption to the educational routine see
Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1966),
afi'd, 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La.
1967) ; Mitchell v. McCall, 273 Ala. 604, 143 So. 2d 629 (1962) ; Leonard v. School
Comm. of Attleboro, 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965).
46 The most important case involves reinstatement of a public school teacher transferred
out of the school because he continued to sport a well-trimmed beard in defi'nce of
the principal's ban. As the court noted, as an aside, the successful teacher wa- teaching at John Muir High School which had been named after the well-bearded naturalist.
Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 250 Cal. App. 2d 189, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967).
See also Zachry v. Brown, Civil No. 66-719 (N.D. Ala., June 30, 1967).
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judgment, moreover, the implied rebuke to the college would itself
undermine the degree of respect which teachers and administrators
must maintain if they are to function effectively on campus.
(3) Certain modes of dress, like certain modes of speech, are
forbidden simply because they detract from minimum good manners
which even a liberal college may surely expect as a part of its
academic life style. Sometimes it is even clear that a student assumes
some weird appearance simply to see how much he can get away
with. Under such circumstances, a failure to recognize what is genuinely involved may undermine the institution and inadvertently
lead students to a destructive emulation of campus vagrants or
beatniks, impressing them with the audacity of persons who express
contempt for education and leading them into a similarly contemptuous view of life. Just as the high school tough may mislead a
great number of other youngsters by humiliating a teacher with
a crude epithet or two, so can a college be undermined, it may be
feared, by the appearance as well as the actuality of free-wheeling
sex and vagrancy on campus.
As a lawyer, I expect that the courts generally will continue
to keep hands off in this area, even though the sanction a college
may employ to enforce its social regulations continues to be the
tough sanction of suspension until the student alters his offending
style. Though the penalty may seem to hurt a matter of great importance to the student- his ability to complete his education the fact that it can be so easily avoided by yielding on so trivial a
matter as visiting a barber makes it difficult to foresee serious constitutional injunctions issuing from the federal courts.
As an educator, however, I think we may badly misconstrue
the impact of rules which do not so much cultivate a high academic
life style as they frankly communicate to our students a degree of
peevishness, thin-skinned intolerance, and staid prejudice enforced
by supererogatory regulations. There is not only a generation gap,
but a far more disturbing educational gap; the teaching of John
Stuart Mill in the classroom but the preachments of Anthony Coinstock in our rules. Students are quick to note what we sometimes
prefer to deny even to ourselves, because its frank admission would
be so disturbing: it is more usually the case that restrictions such
as those on long hair for men and miniskirts on girls exist because
such styles are merely unsettling to us and not in the least disruptive to the school; they offend our taste, challenge our own
cultural conventions of manliness or, with the girls, lead to stray
thoughts of which we (or at least some of us) were taught to be
ashamed. Indeed, the adamant attitude of a college in pressing so
small a matter so very hard itself creates the confrontation which
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sponsors the only real commotion,47 which frequently martyrs the
nonconforming student and alienates others who are warranted in
resenting institutional police practices. Unless adventures in campus
caparisons reach such exaggerated proportions and unless material
evidence is forthcoming that freakish fashions are actually disrupting
classes or otherwise directly interfering with the academic program
(conditions I do not know to have obtained anywhere as yet), we
may indeed presume too far on the private lives of our students by
regimenting their tastes. The student may reside on campus, of
course, but when was it ever well argued that a community -much
less a free and scholarly one - could properly regiment the dress of
its residents?

IV.

"CRIME AND PUNISHMENT"

"My object all sublime
I shall achieve in time
To make the punishment fit the crime
The punishment fit the crime."
-

The Mikado

We have known for a long time that the sanctions employed
by our regular criminal law - usually fine or jail - are frequently
unimaginative and unduly inflexible. Yet, our general scheme of
sanctions in our colleges is less imaginative by far, as it traditionally
has tended indiscriminately to employ an academic death penalty
as the preferred sanction for offenses which may have little or
nothing in common with each other or with academic fitness. The
"death penalty" in this sense is, of course, expulsion. Its necessary
effect is to terminate the individual's academic status, even though
the offense to which the sanction is tied represents neither academic
failure nor academic misconduct on the student's part.
If the student has failed to perform minimally acceptable academic work, or if he has violated fundamental standards respecting
the integrity of that work (as by plagiarism or cheating), it may
not be inappropriate for the college to reconsider his fitness as a
scholar. If his misbehavior is more essentially in the abuse of some
privilege he entertains as a resident or citizen on campus, however,
surely it may be better to fashion deterrent or corrective sanctions
which adequately respond to that variety of misconduct but which
do not terminate his academic status. Suppose, for instance, that
the college maintains a bowling alley in the student union, and that
47

See 3 HARV. LEGAL COMM. 1 (1966).
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a given student badly abuses the equipment. Is it really appropriate
to regard this as so far reflecting on his scholarship that one should
seriously consider suspending him - action which keeps him not
merely from the recreational facility he has abused but from the
classroom from which he may need further benefit and where he
has not misconducted himself? Shouldn't a suspension of his bowling
privileges, rather than his educational interests, be more responsive?
If the misconduct is aggravated, wouldn't it still be better to require
either that he make monetary restitution for the damage he has
done or, if he lacks funds, that he be obliged to work off the cost
of the repair than to suspend or expel him from the college with
all the crippling effects that these penalties may have?
The suggestion for a more discriminating treatment of disciplinary sanctions, reserving the academic sanction only for academic offenses except in the extraordinary case of residential
misbehavior which is so repeated that its repetition finally requires
removal of the student, can be readily expanded. The student
determined to have violated a rule respecting drinking in the dormitories may surely be adequately rebuked and others adequately
deterred by the temporary suspension of significant social privileges.
One might even be so enlightened as to suggest some counselling
-even
to require it if drinking appears to be a regular problem
for the student. Whatever his offense to the rules and mores of the
dormitory, however, it is difficult to see the wisdom of suspending
him with its necessary effect of withdrawing educational opportunities.
Even in the aggravated "residential" case, e.g., the case of a
student chronically raucous in a dormitory, the offense is more
accurately to others in the dormitory and it may, at most, be more
responsive to evict him merely from that facility than to evict him
from the classrooms as well, where he has committed no offense.
To be sure, the student may endure a degree of hardship in finding
lodgings elsewhere - but not so much as though the university gave
him no opportunity to try as by expelling him.
There is no point in proliferating examples or illustrating still
further varieties of disciplinary responses beyond the tired, harsh,
and inessential preference for suspension or expulsion, but there may
be some point in bringing the matter back to our subject of the
student as resident. To the very extent that a student's offense is
dehors the academic process and is indeed an offense only against
the nonacademic, social, residential aspects of the college com-
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munity, a response not needlessly jeopardizing the student's aca48
demic career should surely be found.
V. CAMPUS DISORDERS

The anticipated conclusion to this article was interrupted as
a result of a massive student vigil which developed in support of
a strike by the nonacademic employees at Duke University. The
ensuing month was wholly occupied by efforts to resolve the dispute,
and the manuscript remained unfinished at the time this symposium
was held in Denver. In the course of the symposium itself, it became even clearer that student interests had expanded well beyond
conventional concerns for student freedom and that a growing
number of universities were more urgently concerned with developing
ways and means to cope with extralegal and illegal direct student
action aimed at two newer objectives: first, modification of programs within the university itself; second, use of the university as
an instrumentality of social change in the outside community.
Major confrontations at a number of universities within the
past 3 years and similar conflicts that must realistically be anticipated elsewhere in the immediate future, surely suggest that some
effort should be made in this symposium to treat these new dimensions of student power. While this issue is not one where a law
professor has any special claim (especially since neither the student
mode of action nor the acconmnodations they seek are typically
grounded in any legal claim), still something useful might be
offered even by way of amateur observation. In lieu of the ordinary
conclusion, and drawing from significantly related sources such
as the Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, as well as from reports made within a number of the universities thus far involved in these confrontations, I would offer the
following suggestions.
The accommodation of extralegal crises on campus seems to
me to involve three stages of concern of which the most important
(and the most neglected) is the first stage: (1) the avoidance of
extralegal conflict; (2) the response to unavoidable conflict; and
(3) provision for the immediate and long term aftermath. Much
as the Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Dis48

The point is further developed in

UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY, REPORT OF THE SEN-

(mimeographed):
"In formulating the recommendations which follow, the Committee first identified
five separate areas of student-university contract: 1) the student as a scholar, 2) the
student as a tenant, 3) the student as a member of a student organization, 4) the
student as an employee, and 5) the student as a customer for goods and services.
Only in the first of these areas can the University appropriately apply its distinctive
disciplinary punishments (such as suspensions and expulsion) .
See also Goldman, The University and The Liberty Of Its Students - A Fiduciary Theory, 54 KY.
L.J. 643 (1966).
ATE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON STUDENT AFFAIRS 5 (Dec. 9, 1966)
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orders concludes that urban rioting resulted almost predictably from
the neglect of persistent community conditions, it also now appears
that a number of riotous student demonstrations might equally never
have materialized but for the neglect of certain institutional conditions. As a matter of enlightened self-interest, large-scale institutions
might at least consider a number of steps open to them, both for their
own merits as well as for the defusing of radical movements.
(1) Careful, systematic, and joint student-administrative-faculty
review of basic institutional practices, policies, and structures, with
immediate attention to any matters which have been the subject of
persistent rumor or complaint. There is doubtless some real basis
for the student view that our large-scale institutions have grown
without any particular direction or philosophy. The absence of any
readily available, responsive, working, representative, and respected
group with influence and concern has surely contributed to the felt
need for dramatic direct action. There is reason to believe that the
special appointment of representative ad hoc bodies granted special
influence may be necessary at least for the short term.
(2) Revitalizing of established means influentially to express
grievances and effect recommendations. Student governments may
have failed in the main because they are correctly perceived as "jockstrap" governments, play parliaments which lack authority, which
are identified by impotence, which turn off the socially estranged
student, and which therefore cannot be expected to serve as a steam
valve which students will use harmlessly to ventilate their concerns.
For student government to "work" it must almost certainly be
granted nontrivial responsibility. A profile of its representatives need
to be included in regular university decisionmaking bodies, both for
the positive inputs they can provide and for the value of their own
informal feedback to the student body.
(3) Revitalization of faculty participation. Faculty senates or
councils must themselves be restored to influential authority with
full participating membership on all major university committees.
Such schemes already exist as a matter of form at many institutions,
of course, and a great deal of the difficulty here is not one of
structure but incentive. It is currently unrealistic to expect significant
faculty service in the policy and planning aspects of large-scale
institutions to the extent that such service proceeds on the faculty
member's own time, receives no tangible recognition, distracts from
publication or teaching, and thus confronts each faculty member
purely as a "sacrifice." In short, incentives must simply be reordered
to include institutional service if essential, competent, and responsible
faculty participation is to be secured.
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(4) Revision of clear and defensible rules on matters of substance and procedure. The typical lack of college rules clearly and
fairly defining permissible and impermissible forms of action, the
use of draconian "good conduct" rules, and the lack of fair and
respected disciplinary procedures doubtless engender some contempt,
a great deal of confusion, and a complete inability to cope with
real conflict when it does arise. The inertia of colleges systematically
to review their rules systems is, in my opinion, more responsible
than any other single factor for the trend toward judicial intervention in student-college relations.
Urgent attention to long-neglected problems, improved communication to identify problems, to dispel rumors, and to benefit
from inputs and feedbacks, the increased sharing of nontrivial
responsibility with a reordering of incentives to make faculty participation useful, and the reformulation of rules to achieve fairness
and credibility are minimal steps easily within the capacity of most
universities to pursue at once. Because of the always present likelihood that an unforeseen confrontation may develop in spite of
these measures, the college should of course make provision for
emergency meetings with student, faculty, administrative, trustee,
and employee organizations on very short notice. Otherwise, misinformation is bound to spread and dramatic direct action is more
likely to materialize to fill the vacuum.
The second level of concern is with the crisis that occurs in
spite of one's best efforts to alleviate grievances and provide orderly
means of change. The management of such crises becomes a matter
of strategy, of course, but fairness and credibility are themselves
the most critical elements of a strategy determined to minimize the
conflict.
(1) Cautious and Firm Initial Reaction. Gross overreaction
to trivial rules' violations has generally resulted in an enlargement
of the crisis by submerging the original issue beneath a newer issue
of brutality and unfairness. An announced willingness promptly to
review the issue sponsored by the ad hoc group, with a request that
it be placed in those decision-sharing bodies regularly established
(as suggested supra), plus firm reference to the need for deliberate
review rather than unconsidered action based solely on unilateral
pressure, and a reference to the consequences of anarchy both in
terms of its inherent inconsistency with the academic process and its
seriousness under fair rules established with participation by the
student body, may give the demonstration pause or at least isolate
it and deprive it of means to secure broad support. Firmness in the
use of principled sanctions must be maintained, however, if the
basic and wholly defensible request for minimum order is to achieve
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respect and credibility. While reasonable persons may disagree, I
have seen little evidence that abusive force can be let go without
the use of sanctions credible enough to indicate that the commitment
to basic order is itself strongly felt and will not be set aside simply
to avoid unpleasantness. Where possible, infractions of the rules
should be noticed and cases processed through established procedures, without more. A sensible rules system will, however, also
provide for interim suspension (subject always to orderly review)
when, in the judgment of the highest administrative officer, the
safety of others or the maintenance of minimum order requires it.
If the personnel resources of the institution are manifestly insufficient to cope with those who would clearly paralyze the institution
unless removed, then it may be reasonable as a last recourse that
the students answer to the law, as may any other citizen, through
the use of an ex parte injunction and requests for assistance from
the police, with a credible followthrough willingness to sign complaints and attend the civil courts.
The third stage, the aftermath, may itself fall into three parts.
The first of these is the followthrough with respect to alleged
rules' violations and infractions of law to determine the appropriate
treatment of each participant and the conditions under which he
may resume his academic career. The second is to review the subject
of the crisis itself, both in terms of the possible merit of the
grievance it sought to dramatize and what it may indicate in terms
of a larger structural inadequacy that gave rise to such disorderly
action. And the third is to review the institution's overall situation
in light of stresses or weaknesses uncovered in the confrontation
which has just transpired. The last is doubtless as important as anything else, if an unfortunate history is not to repeat itself.

APPENDIX
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON STUDENT RIGHTS
BAKKEN, THE LEGAL BASIS FOR COLLEGE STUDENT PERSONNEL WORK

(Student Per-

sonnel Series No. 2, 1961).
BLACKWELL, COLLEGE LAW

(1961).

Baker, Students, Parents and the College: Responsibilities and Prerogatives in GradeReporting, 53 A.A.C. BULL. 325 (1967).
Byse, Procedures in Student Dismissal Proceedings: Law and Policy, in PROCEEDINGS OF
44TH

ANNIV.

CONF.

NAT'L

ASS'N

OF STUDENT

PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATORS

170

(1962).
Byse, The University and Due Process: A Somewhat Different View, in PROCEEDINGS
OF 54TH ANNUAL MEETING OF A.A.U.P. (Apr. 26, 1968).
Commager, The University and Freedom: 'Lehrfreiheit'and 'Lehrnfreiheit,' 34 J. HIGHER
ED. 361 (1963).
Dorsen, Racial Discrimination in "Private" Schools, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 39 (1967).
Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its Students -A
Fiduciary Theory, 54
KY. L.J. 643 (1966).
Hook, Freedom to Learn But Not to Riot, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1965, (Magazine), at 8.
Jacobson, The Expulsion of Students and Due Process of Law, 34 J. HIGHER ED. 250
(1963).
Jacobson, Student and Faculty Due Process, 52 A.A.U.P. BULL. 196 (1966).
Monypenny, Toward a Standard for Student Academic Freedom, 28 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 625 (1963).
Monypenny, University Purpose, Discipline and Due Process, 43 N.D.L. REV. 739
(1967).
Murphy, Educational Freedom in the Courts, 49 A.A.U.P. BULL. 309 (1963).
Parker, Some Legal Implications for Personnel Officers, 24 J. NAT'L ASS'N OF WOMEN
DEANS AND COUNSELORS 198 (1961).

Sanford, Pot Bust at Cornell, THE

NEW REPUBLIC,

April 15, 1967, at 17 (and sequels

available in reprint).
Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HARv. L. REV. 1406 (1957).
Van Alstyne, ProceduralDue Process and State University Students, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
368 (1963).
Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making Powers of Public Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 2 LAW IN TRANSITION Q. 1 (1965).
Williamson, Do Students Have Academic Freedom?, 39 COLLEGE AND UNIV. 466
(1964).
Williamson, Students' Academic Freedom, 44 ED. RECORD 214 '(1963).
Hollander, Student Drug Involvement (1967) (N.S.A., Philadelphia).
Johnson, In Loco Parentis (1962) (N.S.A. Philadelphia).
Perkins, The University and Due Process, Dec. 8, 1967 (address; reprinted by American
Council on Education, Washington, D.C.).
Comment, Due Process and the Dismissal of Students at State-Supported Colleges and
Universities, 3 GA. ST. B.J. 101 (1966).
Comment, Mississippi's Campus Speaker Ban: Constitutional Considerations and the
Academic Freedom of Students, 38 Miss. L.J. 488 (1967).
Comment, The Personal Appearance of Students - The Abuse of a Protected Freedom,
20 ALA. L. REV. 104 (1967).
Comment, ProceduralLimitations on the Expulsion of College and University Students,
10 ST. LouIs U.L.J. 542 (1966).
Comment, School Expulsions and Due Process, 14 KAN.L. REV. 108 (1965).
Comment, The College Student and Due Process in Disciplinary Proceedings, 13 S.D.L.
REV. 87 (1968).
Comment, The Constitutional Rights of Students, 40 PHILLIPPINE L.J. 587 (1965).
Comment, The Constitutional Rights of College Students, 42 TEXAs L. REV. 344 (1964).
Comment, The Right to Dress and Go to School, 37 U. COLO. L. REV. 492 (1965).
Developmental Note, Academic Freedom, 81 I-At.sv. L. REV. 1045, 1128 (1968).

1968

APPENDIX

Legislative Comment, College Disciplinary Proceedings, 18 VAND. L. REV. 819 (1965).
Legislative Note, State's Right to Abrogate First Amendment Guarantees in Regulation
of State University Speaker Programs,42 TUL. L. REv. 394 (1968).
Note, Are the Rights of Students Expanding?, 38 OKLA. B. ASS'N J. 1585 (1967).
Note, Degree of Discretionary Authority Possessed by University Officials in Student
Disciplinary Matters-The Availability of Mandamus, 21 Sw. L.J. 664 (1967).
Note, Due Process in Public Colleges and Universities- Need for Trial-Type Hearings, 13 How. L.J. 414 (1967).

Note, Expulsion of College and Professional Students -

Rights and Remedies, 38

NOTRE DAME LAW. 174 (1963).

Note, Private Government on the Campus -Judicial
Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362 (1963).
Note, The College Student and Due Process in Disciplinary Proceedings, 1962 U. ILL.
L.F. 438.
Statutory Comment, Campus Censorship: Statute Barring Speakers From State Educational Institutions, 42 N.C.L. REV. 179 (1963).
Rights and Campus Rules, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1966) (a colSymposium -Student
lection of five articles plus a comment, working essentially in the context of problems

at Berkeley) ; general bibliography at 177-78.
A.C.L.U., ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OF STUDENTS IN COLLEGES AND

UNIVERSITIES (1961)

(reprinted in 48 A.A.U.P. BULL. 110 (1962)).

A.C.L.U., ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OF STUDENTS IN COLLEGES AND

UNIVERSITIES (rev. ed. 1965).
CORNELL UNIV., REPORT OF THE UNIVERSITY COMMISSION ON THE INTERDEPENDENCE
OF UNIVERSITY REGULATIONS AND LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL LAW (Sept. 27, 1967)

(Prof. Allan P. Sindler, Chmn.).
MICHIGAN STATE UNIV., REPORT OF THE FACULTY COMMITTEE ON STUDENT AFFAIRS
TO THE ACADEMIC COUNSEL, ACADEMIC FREEDOM FOR STUDENTS (Feb. 7, 1967).
NATIONAL STUDENT ASSOCIATION, CODIFICATION OF POLICY (1961).

SWARTHMORE

COLLEGE, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON STUDENT LIFE,

CRITIQUE OF A COLLEGE 399 (Nov. 1967).

UNIVERSITY OF CAL. AT BERKELEY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM TO THE ACADEMIC SENATE (Jan. 5, 1965) (published in Notice of Meeting by
Hutson, Sec'y).
UNIVERSITY OF CAL. AT BERKELEY, REPORT OF THE STUDY COMMISSION ON UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE, THE CULTURE OF THE UNIVERSITY: GOVERNANCE AND EDUCATION

(Jan. 15, 1968).

Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, 53 A.A.U.P. BULL. 365 (1967)
(approved by A.A.U.P., N.S.A., A.A.C., & A.A.H.E.).
Statement on Confidentiality of Student Records, 20 J. LEGAL ED. 229 (1967) (American Council on Education).

Statement on Faculty Responsibility for the Academic Freedom of Students, 50
A.A.U.P. BULL. 254 (1964).
Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities, 52 A.A.U.P. BULL. 375 (1966).
Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 903 (1958).
Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 1274 (1964).
Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 996 (1967).
AM. JUR. 2d Colleges and Universities (1964).
14 C.J.S. Colleges and Universities (1939).

COMMENT

P

By C. PETER MAGRATH*

ROFESSOR William Van Alstyne's paper usefully describes
some of the developing law relevant to university relationships
with students and, quite properly, reveals his own values. I say "quite
properly" because, though we are in the area of courts, judges, and
laws, our personal values as university administrators and teachers,
and the policy decisions we make, are major ingredients in the legal
outcomes. I am sympathetic with many of Professor Van Alstyne's
values and much of the counsel he gives. Many campus social codes
are trivial and foolish, and intellectually and politically unworthy
of the time bestowed on enforcing and resisting them. I confess to
little patience with those who believe that decency and morality
depend upon short hair and long skirts, and I have no more patience
with those who claim that liberty hangs in the balance when a school
administrator moves to enforce such codes. The condition of this
world in the last third of the 20th century and, more parochially,
that of the American university confront us with more important
problems.
I agree, too, with most of what Professor Van Alstyne says on
the subject of procedural safeguards in student disciplinary cases.
Not only is the law becoming increasingly clear as to the minimum
due process requirements that must be met when a student faces the
severe sanction of suspension or expulsion, but a student in residence
is similarly, and in my judgment, properly protected by a concept of
privacy that in part derives from the fourth amendment. Two points
come to mind on this matter - the first a warning, the second a
wistful hope. As Professor Van Alstyne notes, the United States
Supreme Court has not yet passed on a student conduct case. If it
ever does, the case may well be a "bad" one from the standpoint of
university administrators - a case, for example, in which state courts
have affirmed the expulsion of a student editor from a university
for a political editorial excoriating the state legislature. Such a case
could well lead to a broad Supreme Court opinion announcing constitutional constraints applicable to all universities in much the same
way that the law of the criminally accused has been significantly influenced by criminal cases involving Negroes in Southern courts in
which the abuses of justice were flagrant. Universities anxious to
avoid excessively detailed, court imposed legal overlays on their
*Dean. College of Arts and Sciences, and Professor of Political Science, University of
Nebraska; B.A., University of New Hampshire, 1955; Ph.D., Cornell University, 1962.
Formerly, Professor of Political Science at Brown University.
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disciplinary procedures would be well advised to initiate a process
of self-reform.
My second point may strike some as churlish, but I am serious.
Colleges and universities which act in procedurally fair ways and
seek to respect the privacy of their students will be in a stronger
position, both morally and tactically, to isolate those student radicals
who refuse to respect the privacy and the person of deans and presidents. If fourth amendment considerations apply to students, they
presumably apply also to the correspondence and sherry of Grayson
Kirk. It may be premature to ask the American Association of University Professors and the American Civil Liberties Union to draft a
Bill of Rights for deans and presidents, but colleges and universities
which respect the privacy and the individual dignity of their students
will find it easier to demand the same for their administrators and
professors.
Despite my agreement with some of Professor Van Alstyne's
recommendations, I find myself in rather fundamental disagreement
with what I take to be his complete rejection of the private property
and, particularly, the contractual view of the university's relationship
to its students. To be sure, "the 100 percent on-campus/off-campus
description of university jurisdiction will not stand up."' But perhaps if we reduce the percentage to, say, 60 percent, it will. I wholly
agree that universities (and for the sake of convenience we can
bracket the private with the public ones despite certain differences)
are subject to certain constitutional requirements. They must observe
procedural fairness in disciplinary cases that may lead to potentially
severe sanctions; they must respect first amendment freedoms; and
they must not act in racially discriminatory ways. Yet, ultimately,
the university provides an intellectually enriching service for its students on something approaching a contractual basis. It tells the student something like this: if your credentials meet certain standards
we will admit you; if you then satisfactorily complete 32 courses during a residency period of four years, two or three of them in university dormitories subject to certain explicit social rules, we will give
you a baccalaureate degree. The contract is subject to legal and
constitutional limitations, but its contractual features nevertheless
remain. Just as the university must preserve its authority to set academic standards, so too must it retain ultimate authority to deny use
of its facilities - academic, cultural, and residential - to those who,
having been clearly and explicitly warned, reject its basic rules.
Admittedly, a comprehensive contract theory of the studentuniversity relationship in a strictly legal sense is untenable. Prospective students do not bargain with an institution they may wish to
I Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, 45

DENVER L.J. 582, 586 (1968).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 45

attend over a whole spectrum of mutually enforceable terms. Moreover, it is difficult for students to compel a university to deliver the
general educational promises contained in its catalog, though universities which, as a matter of explicit institutional policy, promise to
observe specified procedural safeguards in disciplinary cases can
very probably be legally compelled to observe such procedures. Presumably, too, a student who completed a university's degree requirements and was then arbitrarily denied his degree -because of the
color of his eyes or his skin, or because he verbally attacked the university president as an establishment scoundrel -would have an
actionable case in the courts. What seems to me to be relevant is
that, in a broad sense, a contractual relationship exists between students and their universities. To be sure, the university is a disproportionately "strong" partner in the contract, but this is a natural
consequence of the fact that admission to a university is not an inherent, automatic right open to any person. Undergraduate students
are junior colleagues, not coequal partners, in the educational venture.
These comments may seem abstract, but they are directly relevant
to those student disciplinary cases that arise when students challenge
established university policies through physical obstruction.
My basic position is that, notwithstanding the many rights that
the students ought to be accorded, a qualified contractual view of the
student's relationship to the institution provides a reasonable description of what is involved. The commonsense view was summed up
well in a recent New York Times editorial commenting favorably on
the firm actions taken by the administrations at the University of
Chicago, the University of Denver, and Roosevelt University during
the spring of 1968 to counter lawless trespass by protesting students:
The right to attend a university is a privilege. Those who
abuse that privilege by striking at the freedom of the university
have no just cause for complaint if their misconduct leads to actual
or threatened 2expulsion from the community whose rules they refuse to accept.
Professor Van Alstyne and I agree that many conflicts over dress
and coiffure are foolish, but I wonder if the sartorial examples he
has chosen really go to the heart of the issue. He comments, "Unless
adventures in campus caparisons reach such exaggerated proportions
and unless material evidence is forthcoming that freakish fashions
are actually disrupting classes or otherwise directly interfering with
the academic program.., we may indeed presume too far on the
private lives of our students by regimenting their tastes." 3 It is possible, of course, to take the attitude of the aristocratic English lady
who said that she did not care what people did, so long as they did
2

N.Y. Times, May 18, 1968, at 32, col. 2.
3 Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 606.
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not do it in the streets and frighten the horses. But where does this
leave universities that hope to prevent students from performing
acts of sexual intimacy in the residential units or from smoking
marijuana or consuming alcohol in their rooms? Professor Van Alstyne, speaking as a lawyer, concedes that universities may legally
extract sartorial conformity from students. Therefore, I assume he
would agree that universities can, subject to explicit rules and procedurally fair disciplinary proceedings, attempt to regulate in the
area of drugs, liquor, and sexual relations. Such regulations often
follow the iegal codes of municipalities and states, though it is worth
noting that the precise meaning of the legal code is not always clear.
Professor Van Alstyne is generally unsympathetic to subjecting students to multiple disciplinary sanctions for violating on-campus rules
that duplicate the regulations of public governments. He admits,
however, that certain public rules may also serve certain legitimate
interests of the university. Once again, I share his desire to qualify
as much as possible the double or multiple jeopardy situations. I am
afraid, however, that his rejection of the distinction between the student as resident and the student as citizen and of the qualified contractual analogy may lead to more difficult problems than the ones
he hopes to solve.
If the university cannot function in a contractual relationship
to its students, especially with regard to their on-campus behavior,
and if public laws on such matters as drugs, liquor, and sexual relationships are to be enforced by the police, is this not likely to create
an academically and socially unhealthy atmosphere on the campuses?
The problems raised by the issue of undercover police and police informers on some campuses in recent months suggests the difficulties.
While I too am annoyed at the granting of special dispensations to
students fortunate enough to be in college (and this, in my judgment,
is much more common than their suffering from allegedly cruel
double jeopardy situations), I think it essential to insist that, to a
limited but nevertheless significant extent, the university and its
premises are a sanctuary. It is, if you will, an ivory tower that ought
normally to be offlimits to both political pressures and police intrusions. This policy can only be implemented if universities respect the
general public laws by moving, for example, against students who
illegally possess and consume marijuana. As a matter of fact, it
seems to me that a university can function both realistically and humanely in situations of this kind. When, for example, a student
appears to be a ringleader in selling the substance for gain, the police
authorities can be invited to undertake an investigation that will lead
to criminal prosecution; this need not be done in a manner that violates the presumed offender's constitutional rights. When a student
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is caught experimenting with the substance, it may be far more appropriate to invoke the university's milder disciplinary machinery,
or perhaps even to attempt counselling for a minor first offender.
Finally, let me turn briefly to Professor Van Alstyne's comments
on the subject of crime and punishment. He describes expulsion from
the university as "an academic death penalty" equivalent to the death
penalty in the criminal law.4 I find this analogy unpersuasive. Admittedly, it deprives the penalized student of something valuable. It
is, moreover, a last resort and must not be sought except for the most
serious violation of major university rules. However, it is not any
more a death penalty than expulsion for failing to meet academic
standards. Suspension for one or two semesters, with a procedure by
which a student may reapply for admission by presenting evidence
of his new maturity and his heightened sense of community responsibilities, is, I believe, the most appropriate sanction in most serious

disciplinary violations. Suspension is a lesser part of expulsion, and
the latter is the only sanction that makes all others effective.
Professor Van Alstyne's comment about "unimaginative" university sanctions may be less a reflection on the intellectual qualities
of administrators than on certain practical realities. The hard truth
is that there are scarcely any sanctions available short of the Draconian ones of suspension or expulsion, and my experience is that
they are so severe that they are rarely used. I do not see the denial
of bowling alley privileges at a student union, the imposition of a
physical chore, or the "campusing" of students as very useful alternatives. These proposed sanctions are either impractical or meaningless, as in the recent attempt to punish Linda LeClair of Barnard
College fame by denying her access to a school cafeteria. Campusing
students or denying them social privileges in large and irreducibly
impersonal universities could only be made effective by an army of
enforcers. I fear that the ensuing climate and the constant checking
on the restricted students would indeed be a step toward the 1984
atmosphere that Professor Van Alstyne abhors.
Further, I do not see much promise in his other punishment
alternatives. Certainly, universities must rely heavily on counselling
students who abuse their bodies - whether with drugs, with liquor,
or sexually - but to require it, as Van Alstyne suggests, would be
disastrous. In the first place, persons do not respond positively
to compulsory counselling; the individual must first want it and
thus be receptive to the counsel. Secondly, turning university counselling services into an arm of the disciplinary system would severely
compromise the integrity of the medical and psychiatric staff, who
cannot function effectively if students perceive them as dependent
41d.
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adjuncts of a dean's office. There is more to be said for demanding
monetary restitution of students who damage property, though it
is often hard to assign responsibility, and the sanction has little effect
on wealthy students. Requiring students to work off damages (or
perhaps even other offenses) seems appealing, but many university
offices do not like to use what they call "slave labor." Furthermore,
how does one measure the quality of such work performed under
compulsion? Expulsion from a dormitory may be a viable sanction
in certain situations; yet it is tantamount to allowing a student who
refuses to accept legitimate university rules to be freed of them. I
am not sure that this is the way to develop a sense of responsibility
for the rights of others. In any event, I dissent strongly from Professor Van Alstyne's view that suspension or expulsion is "tired,
harsh, and inessential." 5 It is harsh (especially expulsion), and it
should be used cautiously; but, it is essential, both legally and practically.
I want to end on a more positive note by sketching, very briefly,
another view of the university's legal status. University property is
technically either public or private, but in either instance it performs
essentially public functions. It does so, with regard to students, on
a contractual basis, but that contract is subject to legal and constitutional limitations. Universities, if they are to function as centers
of independent criticism and unregimented teaching and learning,
must be accorded the broad privileges of academic freedom; their
"privateness," in other words, must be secure. Most analogies dealing with human institutions must be used carefully, for the institutions that are analogized usually have differing histories and operate
within unique contexts. Nonetheless, used with care, an analogy can
quicken understanding, serving as a sort of intellectual shorthand
for the detailed inquiry that should follow. In my view, universities
in their legal and political capacity are best understood as public
service corporations with special privileges and special responsibilities. In their relationships to students, particularly on-campus,
they exercise quasi-governmental powers, subject to basic constitutional limitations and to the laws of the jurisdictions in which they
are situated. They must seek to engender respect for the laws which
the public communities cherish, particularly when those laws have
relevance to the special academic purposes of the residential university. In return, the university is privileged to enjoy the benefits of
academic freedom for its scholars, teachers, and students.

5

Id. at 607.
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By

RACHEL SCOTT*

THE last thing

a student militant wants to admit is that his compatriots are themselves more oppressive than the administration.
On the Kansas State University campus, students traditionally have
had a voice in their own affairs. In fact, it is the kind of a voice that
activists on more progressive campuses dream about.
Now, conservatives at Kansas State are acting like dogs-in-themanger with student rights. Recently, students - under the approving
eyes of a comparatively liberal administration - began to exercise
their long acknowledged but seldom exercised right to make decisions. They did so, however, more in the spirit of restraint than
enlightenment. In a bittersweet victory last year, women voted for
"self-limited" hours for junior and senior women. However, they
added a compromise clause that gave each living group power to
modify the rules.
Predictably, 11 of 16 living groups, the sororities, clamped
stringent restrictions on hours in spite of anguish among the liberal
minorities within each group. This might be compared to the United
States Congress passing a sweeping civil rights measure, then allowing each state to modify and interpret the law as it saw fit. Just as
Negroes object to state modification of civil rights bills, so, in this
case, did a minority within each of the 11 sororities. However, the
protests were not loud enough. There was no legitimate channel
for appeal, since the rules were approved by the minority of those
in the living groups and sanctioned by the votes of a majority of
women on campus.
Thus, ironically, while students on other campuses complained
of oppression from the administration, at Kansas State-where
students were given practically free reign to make their own decisions- coeds in sororities opted to self-impose restrictions.
Such issues are seemingly trivial in the turbulence of larger
campus and social concerns. But the student is affected by his environment- whether it be an unhappy family life or an 18-story
dormitory. Those who would agree with such arbitrary restrictions
should realize that creativity is an important part of education. For
some students, creativity is born of a spontaneity that cannot survive
in an atmosphere of strict regulation, built on negative reinforcement. The student who does not conform is always "thrown against
* Student participant, Kansas State University.
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a wall of punishments," effectively dampening the spirit of free
inquiry necessary for learning.
While other students may welcome the security of having decisions made for them, they simultaneously forfeit the chance for
self-determination. How can a student actively participate in the
educational process without, at some point, making important decisions about where he is going with his life? Like Nora in Ibsen's
The Doll's House, the girl who never leaves the shadow of a protector - father, institution, or husband - will never be her own
person. She is her father's daughter, her husband's wife, her son's
mother, but never anything for herself. Perhaps the transitional
period from home to husband - the college years - is the one best
chance for a woman to break the bonds of dependency and find
herself. Such personal decisions are too vital to education to be
denied, whether by students or administrators. This is not meant
to be an argument for a return to administration control of student
life, but it is offered as an example of another breed of parietal
control disguised as democracy.
The student is a member of a special community. As such, he
has traditionally lived under privileged conditions on many campuses.
On the contemporary campus, what were once privileges have now
become liabilities as the campus is pushed by increasing student
mobility and action toward merger with the larger society around it.
And, as this larger society insures its citizens certain basic rights,
inviolate against the will of the majority or minority, so should the
university community recognize certain basic rights for its members.
It is hard to quarrel with democracy. But it should be realized
that democratic decisions do not inevitably reflect wisdom. Student
reformers whose goal is to give students power to make the decisions
that affect their lives should realize that once they have accomplished
that goal, they may be no more satisfied than before with the decisions that are made.

COMMENT
By Roy

LUCAS*

T

HERE have been so many recent articles on legal rights of
students that little remains to be said, at least in regard to the
major issues of procedural due process, free expression, and double
jeopardy.' This Comment, therefore, will not retrace ground already
well covered, but will instead be limited to expansion of several
specific legal and sociological issues of current importance to the
politically active and socially conscious campus resident: (1) the
phenomenon of increasing student unrest, (2) use of the legal process
to protect student expression and organization, and (3) the role of
educators and the legal profession in encouraging expanded free
inquiry on the college campus.
I.

STUDENT UNREST: ITS CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE FUTURE OF HIGHER EDUCATION

The student unrest that is sweeping college campuses in the
United States arises from a fundamental disenchantment with significant deficiencies in American culture. These deficiencies merit
close scrutiny. There is no evidence, for example, that student protests
are instigated by hard-core "communist agitators" intent upon depriving congressional committeemen of their seniority. Nor is there
evidence that protesters seek anarchy for its own sake. Student revolts
are led by students with a variety of political beliefs and have taken
place in countries representing all points on the political spectrum.
Moreover, these revolts have all too frequently occurred because
college bureaucracies were hopelessly delinquent in making promised
2
progressive reforms within their institutions.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Alabama; B.S., University of South Caro-

lina, 1963; J.D., New York University, 1967. The author has recently joined the
staff of The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, N.Y.
1 See, e.g., Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making Powers of
Public Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 2 LAW IN TRANSITION Q.
1 (1965) (probably the most comprehensive leading article) ; Goldman, The University and the Liberty of its Students -A
Fiduciary Theory, 54 KY. L.J. 643 (1966)
(development of fiduciary theory with particular utility for problems at private institutions); Monypenny, University Purpose, Discipline and Due Process, 43 N.D.L.
REV. 739 (1967); Symposium-Student Rights and Campus Rules, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 1-174 (1966). See also Dorsen, Racial Discrimination in "Private" Schools, 9
WM. & MARY L. REV. 39 (1967). For relatively narrow interpretations of student
academic freedom see Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L.
REv. 1045, 1128-56 (1968).
2 For example, the Student Council President at Columbia University recently pointed
out that the university president was "inaccessible to student leaders" and had ignored
for ten months a report "recommending a greater role for faculty members and
students in Columbia's disciplinary machinery." N.Y. Times, May 13, 1968, at 47,
col. 1 (city ed.).
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Accounts of student protests in more or less authoritarian nations
are common. In early April 1968, Brazilian students began demonstrations against inadequate educational facilities and poor cafeteria
food. Police moved in with tanks and heavy armor and several students were killed. 8 Students in Lisbon, demonstrating against the
United States and its involvement in Vietnam, were met with nightsticks and billy clubs reminiscent of Birmingham.4 In Poland, repression at all levels was the government's response to students and faculty members seeking educational reform. When students at Warsaw
University protested against censorship and cultural controls, many
were expelled or were drafted into military service.' The fathers of
some of the students were removed from government positions.6 The
Polish government is considering compulsory military training and
7
required courses in Marxism-Leninism as a remedy for the unrest.
Reports of similar events in East Germany, Greece, Czechoslovakia,
France, Indonesia, Japan, and Italy can be found in the international
press.
In the United States, widespread student unrest stems from
increased American support of the military government in South
Vietnam. Typical student objections are that the military effort perpetuates a totalitarian regime which is unresponsive to the needs of
the Vietnamese people, and that the war effort detracts from needed
social reform within our own country. After students became fairly
active in opposing the war, it is not surprising that their reform
efforts began to concentrate on glaring deficiencies within their own
university or college communities. A brief consideration of several
student complaints is instructive.
3 Washington Post, Apr. 3, 1968, at A3, col. 6.
4 Id., Apr. 5, 1968, at B7, col. 5. Demonstrations in nearby Spain led to the closing of

Madrid University in late March. Students objected to United States military bases in
Spain and the war in Vietnam. N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1968, at 7, col. 1 (city ed.).
5
See N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1968, at 4, col. 4 (city ed.) ; id., Mar. 31, 1968, at 1,
col. 7. In numerous instances within the United States, students have been forced
into military service because they participated in demonstrations to protest the war
in Vietnam. See Wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. 16, 372 F.2d 817 '(2d Cir. 1967)
(local draft board cannot induct student demonstrators who had allegedly interfered
with induction processes while protesting the war in Vietnam). The identical issue is
presently before the Supreme Court. Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. 11, 390
F.2d 100 (loth Cir.), cert. granted, 391 U.S. 912 (1968).
8
N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1968, at 1, col. 2 (city ed.).
7
1d., Apr. 27, 1968, at 3, col. 5 (city ed.). Compulsory military training in tax supported colleges within the United States was upheld in Hamilton v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934). Although Hamilton has never been overruled,
the decision has been seriously questioned. See School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 251 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). Compulsory ROTC, however,
is a continuing source of discontent for students and was one of the causes of
student demonstrations at Tuskegee Institute this spring. N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1968, at
30, col. 7 (city ed.).
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Student demonstrations in the United States have generally been
preceded by efforts to effect change through negotiation. Topheavy
college bureaucracies react with notorious lack of speed, however,
and students are all too frequently ignored in the hope that their
complaints will evaporate. But students are continuing to press for
change, and it is unlikely that they will diminish their pressure.8
A particularly strong student grievance is that contemporary
higher education is almost wholly irrelevant to the social, political,
and economic issues which the students will face as citizens and
voters. A relevant education would presumably give more course
emphasis to race relations, urban problems, employment problems,
welfare issues, and contemporary foreign policy.
A second student grievance is that colleges impose too many
unduly restrictive rules which are not pertinent to a student's education. These include rules requiring ROTC training,'0 restricting
campus speakers," regulating student organizations,'" and impinging
upon student privacy in dormitories or off-campus residences.'8 Since
8 The literature of student involvement is also increasing. In particular, see STUDENT
POLITICS (S. Lipset ed. 1967), and Symposium -Students
and Politics, J. AM.
AcAD. ARTS & SCI. (Winter 1968), for comprehensive coverage of student "'activism'"
both in the United States and abroad.
9 This is a grievance of students who see modern education as little more than a
sorting process for entrance into the technological, commercial, dehumanized society
which they reject. These students urge educational reform as a step toward overall
societal changes. See, e.g., Rossman, The Movement and Educational Reform, 36
AM. SCHOLAR 594 (1967). Some student objections are discussed elsewhere in a
parallel context. See Henry, Education for Stupidity, io N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS
No. 9, at 20 (May 9, 1968). Space limitations in this Comment preclude a detailed
analysis of this important topic.
10 See note 7 supra.
1 See Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1968) (North Carolina
speaker-ban statute and regulations held unconstitutionally vague; the State did not
appeal) ; Van Alstyne, Political Speakers at State Universities: Some Constitutional
Considerations, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 328 (1963); and Pollitt, Campus Censorship:
Statute Barring Speakers from State Educational Institutions, 42 N.C.L. REV. 179
(1963), discuss the constitutional issues raised by speaker-ban statutes and practices.
Compare 42 TUL. L. REv. 394 (1968), with Comment, Mississippi's Campus Speaker
Ban: Constitutional Considerations and the Academic Freedom of Students, 38 Miss.
L.J. 488 (1967).
12 For example, the Human Rights Forum, a student organization at Auburn University,
was granted a charter by the student government on the condition that it not invite
outside speakers. At both Auburn University and the University of Alabama, the
student government determines which student organizations will receive charters.
Approval is not a matter of course but may be delayed or denied when unpopular
student groups seek recognition. These practices are patently invalid under prior
restraint decisions. See, e.g., Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957) ;
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290
(1951) ; cf. Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C.
1967). See generally Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.

648 (1955).

13See Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D.
Ala. 1968), holding that college administrators could search dormitories without
prior authorization from an independent officer or magistrate and with less than
the fourth amendment's requirement of probable cause. See also Englehart v. Serena,
300 S.W. 268 (Mo. 1927); People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 229 N.E.2d 596,
283 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967).
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students view campus rules from the "consumer perspective," they
cannot fail to notice that they are subjected to the condescending
dehumanization of being cared for on the assumption that they cannot
care for themselves. At the same time, students see they would not be
so regulated had they failed to meet college entrance requirements! 14
A third major focus of student discontent is that universities
seldom provide outlets for student opinion in making rules, disciplining students, or determining policies which affect students. Administrators are rarely active in educational reform. Consequently,
students and some members of the faculty are frequently the only
members of the academic community conversant with new trends and
experimental activity. Yet, these individuals are least likely to have
a voice in charting the institution's future course.
Today's campus resident, who must ultimately spend the major
portion of his later life in the 1980's and 1990's, understandably prefers that his institution and teachers frame their policies with a view
toward the future, rather than the past or present. But universities
have a vested interest in avoiding the wrath of conservative alumni
and, where the institution is public, the legislators. Administrators,
moreover, are not greatly affected by failure to make needed reforms.
Inertia avoids effort, satisfies alumni, and promotes an illusion of
security. It can lead to criticism from students and faculty, but these
individuals are precisely those with the least authority and are,
therefore, the most easily ignored. Consequently, it is only the rare
progressive institution that grants students a fair share of decisionmaking.
II. USE OF THE LEGAL PROCESS TO PROTECT
STUDENT EXPRESSION AND ORGANIZATION

The proliferation of student litigation, demonstrations, seizures,
and expulsions points out the need to analyze the framework of free
expression within which the student complaints are being aired. To
the student, it is important to know the probable limits of protection
afforded him by the first amendment so that he may fully exercise
14 For

example, a nonstudent could presumably engage in peaceful picketing along a
college campus street without fear of reprisal from police or college authorities.
See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) ; Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946). At least one institution, however, does flatly prohibit "use
of the campus area for picketing" by "any person not a member of the University
community .
Policy on Picketing and Assembly: University of Alabama (spring
1968).
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his rights of expression and assembly.' " It is equally important to the
continued well-being of the university that administrators be fully
cognizant of their legal responsibilities to permit free expression so
that embarrassing litigation will be avoided.
Although resident-administration conflicts over expression are
ancient, the entrance of the judiciary into this area is relatively recent.' 6 This Comment will be limited to a brief analysis of the most
recent litigation and to a projection of future issues.' The context,
of course, is that of regulation of student and speaker activity at taxsupported institutions.' 8
A. Student Petitions and Assemblies
1. The Student Petition
A common method of presenting student grievances is by petition,
letter, or pamphlet, listing particular issues and requesting specific
15 The full range of procedural due process protections has yet to be extended to
students facing possible expulsion from a college or university. It can be strongly
argued, however, that expulsion is a substantial penalty more damaging to the
student than a short prison term or a large fine. An expelled student may be denied
admission to another institution, thereby depriving him of a college degree with its
glowing financial future.
Unless advances are made in extending procedural safeguards to students, it is
unlikely that their substantive rights will flourish to the degree otherwise possible
and desirable in the academic setting. A college or university should be a training
ground for democratic fairness and should be the last American institution to flee
from the Bill of Rights.
For further discussion of the issues presently being raised in the area of procedural due process see Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, 45 DENVER
L.J. 582 (1968).
18 Oddly enough, the most recent Supreme Court case involving a student against his
institution was Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934), discussed in note 7 supra.
17 At this point, the author must acknowledge that his viewpoints may be colored by
having participated as counsel for student litigants in several pending cases. E.g.,
Counsel for National Student Association as Amicus Curiae in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966), aff'd
mem. by an equally divided court, 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967) (en banc),
cert. granted, 390 U.S. 942 (1968); Counsel for National Student Association,
Alabama Conf. AAUP, Alabama Civil Liberties Union, and U.S. Student Press
Association in Alabama State Bd. of Educ. v. Dickey, 394 F.2d 490 (1968),
postponing final decision on appeal from 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967);
Counsel for National Student Association in De Veaux v. Tuskegee Institute, Civil
No. 758-E (M.D. Ala., Apr. 25, 1968); Cocounsel for Petitioner in Johnson v.
Board of Trustees, Civil No. EC6828 (N.D. Miss., May 28, 1968).
18 Arguments can be devised to apply first amendment standards to a private college,
but a full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Comment. The most
recent and pertinent Supreme Court cases are: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409 (1968), revg 379 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967); Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) ; Louisiana Financial Assistance Comm'n v. Poindexter, 389 U.S. 571 (1968), aff'g per curium 275
F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1967) ; Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) ; Brown v.
Pennsylvania, 392 F.2d 120 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968).
Several cases in the lower courts offer more specific support: E.g., Eaton v. Grubbs,
329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323
F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964) ; De Veaux v. Tuskegee Institute, Civil No. 758-E (M.D. Ala., Apr. 25, 1968) ; cf. Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962), vacated in part, 212
F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962). See generally Dorsen, supra note 1; cf. analysis in
Note, Uncle Tom's Multi-Cabin Subdivision - Constitutional Restrictions on Racial
Discrimination by Developers, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 314 (1968).
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reforms. The first amendment clearly protects, in some way, "the
right.., to petition... for a redress of grievances," and there is little
justification for contending that a college may legitimately restrict a
student's unfettered exercise of this right. Complications arise, however, when students publicize their petitions, carry them into the classroom, color them with false, mistaken, or intrusive innuendoes, or
use them to harass or annoy busy men within the university hierarchy.
At some point, the institution will allege, the right to petition must
yield to the right to carry on institutional business in an orderly
manner, and indeed it must.
Such recent Supreme Court cases as Pickering v. Board of Educa-

tion,"9 St. Amant v. Thompson,"0 Time, Inc. v. Hill,2' Garrison v.
Louisiana,2 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,2 3 indicate that a college
official could not recover damages from a citizen for derogatory
statements made about the official unless made with "actual malice,"
that is, with knowledge that the statement "was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not."12' The overriding first
amendment value of open discussion of public issues probably provides the same protection for a student criticizing a college official as
it does for a nonstudent. Certainly, the public interest in exposing
a false college image or the clay feet of a college official is identical
to that in discussing any other issue. Moreover, a student may be in a
1

391 U.S. 563 (1968). Pickering differs from the subsequently cited cases in that
it concerned the dismissal of a public high school teacher for making critical and
partially false statements concerning operations of the local board of education. Any
critical distinction between statements made by the employees of a public official
and nonemployees, however, was solidly rejected by a near-unanimous Court in
Pickering. Justice Marshall, writing for a majority of eight, said:
In sum, we hold that, in a case such as this, absent proof of false
statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher's exercise of his
right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis
for his dismissal from public employment.
Id. at 574 (footnote omitted).
The importance of Pickering to the student resident is that it prevents his dismissal when he is also an employee of the institution, provided he is in a lower
echelon position, as students normally are. Moreover, Pickering must necessarily
apply with greater force to members of the school community who are not employees
for example, students.
Two other cases were remanded for reconsideration in light of principles enunciated in Pickering: Watts v. Seward School Bd., 421 P.2d 586 (Alas. 1967),
vacated and remanded, 391 U.S. 592 (1968); and Puentes v. Board of Educ.,
18 N.Y.2d 906, 223 N.E.2d 45, 276 N.Y.S.2d 638, vacated and remanded, 88 S. Ct.
2271 (1968). But see Meehan v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
20 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
21 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
22379 U.S. 64 (1964).
23 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
24

Id. at 279-80, quoted in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 728 (1968).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 45

better position than other citizens to expose the inadequacies within
25
his academic community.

Nonetheless, the few decisions extant concerning student criticism of college officials have accorded the student an incredibly
narrow range within which he can criticize.2 6 Steier v. New York
State Education Commissioner,17 for example, upheld a student's
expulsion for writing a series of caustic, critical letters to the college
president.2" Chief Judge Clark's dissent presents a more appropriate
view.'9 In Jones v. Board of Education,3 0 the district court upheld
the expulsion of a student whose chief misconduct was to call the
college president "Super Tom" and other officials "Uncle Toms."
These terms, while not flattering, are no more than sarcastic and
certainly are not defamatory. Finally, one of the students readmitted
in De Veaux v. Tuskegee Institute3 l was later expelled because he
called a member of the board of trustees a "honkie." The student
would certainly have no remedy at the present stage of Alabama
A slightly different standard from that of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan may be
applicable when a student breaches a confidential relationship in exposing a college
official.
It is possible to conceive of some positions in public employment in which
the need for confidentiality is so great that even completely correct public
statements might furnish a permissible ground for dismissal. Likewise,
positions in public employment in which the relationship between superior
and subordinate is of such a personal and intimate nature that certain
forms of public criticism of the superior by the subordinate would seriously undermine the effectiveness of the working relationship between
them can also be imagined. We intimate no views as to how we would
resolve any specific instances of such situations, but merely note that significantly different considerations would be involved in such cases.
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570n.3 (1968). Relationships such
as professor-student assistant, college dean-student assistant, judge-law clerk may be
of the kind envisioned by the Court.
2
6But see Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967),
which invalidated a college rule prohibiting student newspaper editors from criticizing the state legislature or governor.
27 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 966 '(1960).
28 It should be noted, of course, that Steier was decided five years before New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan.
29
Steier's several letters, on which the college's action is purportedly based,
show perhaps an obstinate and overstated sense of indignation against
student discrimination, but nothing indecent, delinquent, or criminal and
nothing (I submit) calling for discipline and expulsion, rather than
patient response.
271 F.2d at 22. See also Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d
867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967), holding that indecent student petitions (in particular, one four-letter word repeatedly mentioned in the court's opinion) are not to
be judged by technical standards of "obscenity" but rather by whether display of
the word tends to thwart pursuit of the institution's educational goals. Goldberg
involved students who certainly offended the court's sense of propriety and that
of a large segment of the populous, but it is doubtful whether a student's interest
in not being expelled should turn on whether or not he conforms to cultural taboos.
Perhaps Goldberg is another ill-starred decision which will meet its proper fate on
appeal.
30 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
31 Civil No. 758-E (M.D. Ala., Apr. 25, 1968) (temporary restraining order issued
requiring that all students who had been expelled be readmitted pending hearings
in accordance with procedural due process).
25
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justice, however, if the trustee had called him "nigger." It is fair to
conclude from these decisions that expansion of the student's right
to criticize and petition his administration must await further clarifi32
cation in the courts.
2. The Student Demonstration
A further form of student expression is the peaceful demonstration or picket line, supplemented by the use of handbills, posters, and,
occasionally, extemporaneous student orations on the evils of society
in general and universities in particular. There can be no question
that a university campus is an appropriate setting for student expression in the form of peaceful picketing. 33 Certainly, a university
holds a lesser claim to immunity from demonstrations than does a
court house,3 4 a private shopping center, 3 5 a company town, 6 or a
state capitol building. 7
Students cannot, of course, claim an unbridled right to picket any
time, any place, and in any manner they choose. While narrow limitations may be permissible in many situations, the development of the
Some clarification of the student's right to express himself on the campus and in
the classroom may result from Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966), af d mem. by an equally divided court,
383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967) (en banc), cert. granted, 390 U.S. 942 (1968).
Tinker involved high school students who were expelled for violating a regulation
against wearing black armbands on school premises to mourn the dead in Vietnam.
The district court held simply that any "reasonable" school regulation was valid,
even if it curtailed student expression.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the National Student Association, as Amicus
Curiae, has briefed the proposition that lower courts are applying unduly narrow
standards and has asked for a reaffirmation of the clear and present danger test to
certain controversies between a college student and his institution, relying on the
authority of West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633, 639
(1943). With one exception- Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F.
lower federal courts have evaded Barnette and
Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967) -the
applied standards of "reasonableness" or a "balancing test" such as can be read into
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), and Kbnigsberg v. State Bar of Cal.,
366 U.S. 36 (1961) (Kbnigsberg II).
33See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1045
(1968):
Unlike jails, public universities are perhaps the archetypical example of
a public facility dedicated to inquiry and discussion; hence demonstrations
over either matters of general social or political concern or specific campus
grievances may not be barred completely from the public university ....
Id. at 1131.
34Compare Cox v. Lousiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), with Cameron v. Johnson, 390
U.S. 611 (1968).
35See Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308 (1968).
36See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
37See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). But see Adderley v. Florida,
385 U.S. 39 (1966), in which a bare majority upheld criminal trespass convictions
of students who held a demonstration outside a jail to protest the confinement of
one of their fellows. However, a university can hardly claim the necessity for the
physical security of penal institutions. Students, unlike prisoners, may "escape" at
will.
32
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law regarding student picketing has hardly begun.3 8 The Cameron,"'
Cox,4 ° and Edwards41 decisions indicate that narrowly drawn restrictions on demonstrations are valid, provided they protect legitimate
and substantial state interests. Thus, these cases would support the
inference that a college may completely prohibit picketing at outrageous times and places, i.e., within normally crowded hallways or
dormitories (particularly late at night), within administration buildings, or within classrooms when classes are in session. However,
there could be no such blanket prohibition on the use of sidewalks
or parade grounds. The sole decision specifically directed to the
issue of campus demonstrations, Hammond v. South Carolina State
College,4 2 takes this approach. In Hammond, students challenged
a college regulation requiring advance administration approval of all
campus demonstrations. The district court found the regulation to
be an invalid prior restraint on first amendment rights because it did
not limit its scope to regulating events creating a clear and present
43
danger of riot or disorder.
Student distribution of handbills on campus frequently accompanies demonstrations. The Supreme Court has consistently held that
a city cannot ban distribution of noncommercial handbills on public
streets. 4 Although the state may outlaw commercial leaflets 45 and
commercial solicitations generally,46 it may not restrict distribution
of leaflets carrying messages of political or social significance.4 7 A
college campus is arguably even more appropriate for picketing and
distribution of handbills than a busy public street, since the institution
is supposedly dedicated to the concept of free inquiry. Accordingly,
cases such as Talley v. California4" will probably apply with even
38 For a relatively restrictive view of the student's right to demonstrate see Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1130-32 (1968).
See generally, on demonstrations, Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v.
Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Note, Regulation of Demonstrations, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1773 (1967).
39
Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
40
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
41 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
4272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967).
43 Id. at 950. The court in Hammond relied principally on Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516 (1945), and distinguished Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), as
involving much greater state interests in security.
4See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141 (1943) ; Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) ; Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 147 (1939).
45
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
46 Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
4' Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
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greater force to protect a student leafleteer corps from charges of
littering4 9 or annoying.5"
Audience hostility is a problem unlikely to arise in the comparatively sophisticated setting of campus demonstrations. However,
the racist violence by University of Mississippi students during the
enrollment of James Meredith, the "liberal" student violence against
Alabamian evangelist George Wallace's appearance at Dartmouth
College in 1967, and the frequent reports that contemporary student
radicals often deny the right of free expression to those who disagree
with them indicate that a brief summary of the Supreme Court's
position on audience hostility as a possible limitation on free speech
is appropriate.
A number of Supreme Court decisions repeatedly state that the
right to speak or to demonstrate cannot be curtailed because of the
cool reception or angry reaction accorded the speaker. Most recently,
in Brown v. Louisiana,51 Mr. Justice Fortas reaffirmed this proposition:
Participants in an orderly demonstration in a public place are not

chargeable with the danger, unprovoked except by the fact of the
constitutionally protected demonstration
itself, that their critics might
52

react with disorder or violence.
Justice Fortas than cited a number of cases indicating the frequency
with which the Court has been called upon to reaffirm the point,5"
which, however, has been ignored with disheartening regularity by
the lower courts.54 There can be no doubt that school officials would
ask the state militia and national guard to protect students from the
theft of their property, yet the same officials are rarely outraged by
the attempted "theft" of the liberty of expression.
49

Although the possibility of littering cannot justify a prohibition on handbills, the
first amendment presumably does not forbid an ordinance against littering itself.
The recent draft card burning cases stand at least for this point. United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
5 The charge that the state has an interest in protecting the recipients of the leaflets
from annoyance is frequently made and is as frequently rejected on the ground
that the state may not broadly determine what forms of speech may or may not
annoy its citizens, at least its adult citizens. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946) ; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) ;cf. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965). But cf. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 297 N.Y.
339, 79 N.E.2d 433 (1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 886 (1949).
51383 U.S. 131 (1966).
2
5 Id. at 133n.1.
53
See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551-52 (1965); Wright v. Georgia, 373
U.S. 284, 293 (1963). The Court recently agreed to review another case raising the
question of whether a peaceful demonstrator's breach of peace conviction can be based
on threat of violence posed by bystanders. Gregory v. City of Chicago, 391 U.S. 964,
granting cert. to 39 111. 2d 47, 233 N.E.2d 422 (1968).
54
See, e.g., Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cit. 1968)
Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa
1966).
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Another issue raised in numerous recent student demonstration
cases is the outer limits of the freedom accorded speech mixed with
conduct. Not surprisingly, lower courts have upheld the expulsion
of students who overran college buildings, took over the chancellor's
offices, and smoked his expensive cigars.5 5 Zanders v. Louisiana State
Board of Education,56 for example, upheld the expulsion of students
who seized campus facilities and stayed overnight in the school auditorium. Similarly, Buttny v. Smiley5" upheld the expulsion of students
who effectively prevented recruiting by the Central Intelligence
Agency on the University of Colorado campus. While these cases are
in accord with recent analogous decisions by the Supreme Court,5 8 they
leave open the possibility of the university imposing sanctions less
severe than expulsion.5 9 Moreover, where college officials themselves
have contributed to disruptive conditions by systematically depriving
students of their first amendment rights, a court could refuse to
uphold expulsion until the officials have cleansed themselves of their
own misconduct.
A final problem associated with student expression and conduct
is that of civil disobedience. In its narrowest terms, civil disobedience
is the intentional violation of valid law. From a judge's standpoint,
under this definition, condoning civil disobedience may seem to be an
abdication of judicial responsibility. However, a broader definition
of the term would encompass the violation of questionable law in
order to test its ultimate constitutional validity. Viewed in this light,
judges possess the power to formulate legal doctrines which accommodate occasional technical violations of law when substantial justification is apparent, thereby "legalizing" the disobedience.
Although moral justification of civil disobedience is a value
judgment elevating the ends over the means, one should not automatically shrink from this conclusion. It must be admitted that there
are conceivable situations - i.e., severing the vocal cords of Adolf
Hitler or curtailing the brutalities of Stalin - in which the desirability, necessity, and moral justification of certain acts of civil disobedience would evoke very substantial agreement. Of course, acts of
student civil disobedience arise in less dramatic settings. Assume, for
example, that a college president is a hopeless incompetent who turns
55 For the most part, colleges have not expelled students who occupied their buildings.

Moreover, few of the recent expulsions have reached the courts.
56 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968).
57 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968).
58
See, e.g., Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968) ; Zwicker v. Boll, 391 U.S. 353
(1968) (per curiam).
59 A college clearly could not expel a nonstudent who occupied its institutional headquarters, but the college could seek monetary damages and injunctive relief against
the intruder. Accordingly, when a college is faced with a takeover, it could employ
the weapon of injunction rather than the severe penalty of expulsion.
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a deaf ear to student and faculty suggestions for improvement of the
institution. From a moral standpoint, one cannot say that a student
would be unjustified in creating maximum publicity in order to expose
the president in hopes of obtaining more valuable leadership and
furthering long-range institutional improvement. Even a degree of
disobedience that risks expulsion from the institution should not, at
least from the student's moral standpoint, be categorically condemned.
These observations are made simply to note what has been and
will continue to be the arguments in favor of student demonstrations
and sit-ins that exceed the bounds of the first amendment. There is
ample moral and philosophical justification for these acts. At many
institutions, students have been able to achieve reforms only by disobedience - their one, sure-fire method of securing attention and
publicizing the misconduct of college officials. The tragedy of this
is not that students violate rules and defy college officials, but that
too many colleges have become rigid, bureaucratic corporations
engaged in dehumanizing students and manufacturing graduates.
One cannot place the total blame, or even most of it, on students; it
must be shared by the institutions. There is much truth in the commonsense observation that students who are young adults would not
take over a college without reason. In examining these reasons, one
can find much of substance and value for the future of higher
education.
B. Student Organizations
Although as yet unlitigated, problems of student political organizations may become critical as colleges attempt to maintain closer
surveillance over the activities of student groups."' To the student,
the organization is a means of magnifying his educational experiences
by joining with others to participate in, and change, campus life.
However, the college sees an active student group as posing a potential threat to its unquestioned campus authority and infallibility. The
group may conduct demonstrations; it may criticize the administration; it may invite controversial speakers; and it may imperil legislative appropriations. As a result, the college may choose to establish
a variety of regulations, beginning with the requirement that all
student organizations obtain institutional charters to be issued only
after a complete investigation of projected membership, activities,
and financial status. It may also require that the group be sponsored
60 Problems of student social organizations are not within the ambit of this discussion.
There have been decisions, however, to the effect that a college may exclude or
closely regulate social fraternities to protect the academic environment from the
debilitating effects of undue emphasis on social, as opposed to intellectual, activity.
See, e.g., Waugh v. Board of Trustees, 237 U.S. 589 (1915) ; Sigma Chi Fraternity
v. Regents, 258 F. Supp. 515 (D. Colo. 1966) ; Webb v. State Univ. of New York,
125 F. Supp. 910 (N.D.N.Y. 1954).
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or advised by a faculty member, and that the group either not invite
outside speakers 6 or clear all speakers with the administration,
preferably several weeks in advance.62 This done, the college will
be in an excellent position to observe and, to an extent, regulate any
student organization which might cause "trouble."
From the constitutional perspective, the possible restraints on
student political organizations present a variety of complex and
undecided questions. The "freedom of association" cases do not
provide an immediate solution,6 3 since they would indicate that a
student group may be required to prove a likelihood that chartering,
membership registration, and faculty sponsorship create a burden on
free association which outweighs the institution's general interest in
ensuring that organizations contribute to the academic environment.
Cases such as NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,6 4 Bates v. City of
Little Rock, 65 Shelton v. Tucker, 66 and NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Flowers6 7 provide an uncertain quantum of guidance. While the
first NAACP decision refused to permit compulsory disclosure of
membership lists, the decision was specifically based upon "the likelihood of a substantial restraint upon the exercise by petitioner's members of their right to freedom of association." 6 8 Bates involved a city's
effort to couple a license tax on organizations with compulsory disclosure of membership. While the Court found "no relevant correlation" between the city's taxing power and its alleged interest in
learning of an organization's membership, a university's general
interest in regulating the lives of its students may present a more
compelling justification for membership disclosure than found in
NAACP and Bates. If students are to withhold their membership lists
as a matter of principle, or to avoid suspected misuse, they will have
to establish that disclosure has had a "chilling effect" on the organization's growth, or that the institution has occasionally misused the
lists. However, a student group might also prevail if it could persuade a court that the institution has insufficient justification for
61See note 12 supra.
62 The University of Alabama, for example, requires that the administration be petitioned two weeks in advance of any student group meeting at which an outside
speaker is scheduled to appear.
63 For a general discussion of freedom of association see Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 2n.4 (1964).
64357 U.S.449 (1958).
65361 U.S. 516 (1960).
6364 U.S. 479 (1960).

67 377 U.S. 288 (1964). Additional pertinent cases are: Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539

(1963); NAACP v. Button,

371 U.S. 415

(1963); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961):
Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961).
68 357 U.S. at 462.
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maintaining membership files in light of the obvious possibilities of
abuse alone.
C. Student Publications:The CensoredStudent Press
Additional outlets of expression for the student resident include
campus newspapers, literary journals, and, to a lesser degree, student
yearbooks. A student newspaper is a particularly suitable vehicle
for discussion of specialized topics of concern to students.
If student newspapers were organized as private corporations
operated by voluntary student contributions, there would be few
legal difficulties. Presumably, such decisions as New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan,6" Mills v. Alabama,"° and, in some cases, Redrup v.
New York"1 would define the narrow scope of permissible institutional or state regulation. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, for
example, recognized "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open." 72 While these cases delineate the exceedingly narrow
scope remaining for government censorship, the context of a student
newspaper is different. It rests within a unique category hitherto
untouched by litigation, with one pending exception.7" Student
editors at public institutions are, in a sense, state employees engaged
in "state action." Administration supervisors and censors are also
state employees acting by virtue of state authority. Furthermore, the
editor holds a position of "privilege" '7 4 whereby he receives the
"benefit" of using "state property" - the student press. The student
paper may also be viewed as a part of an institution's educational
mechanisms. It can serve as a training ground in which journalism
students present material of educational value to the student body.
A few of the issues in this area have been temporarily resolved
by the recent case of Dickey v. Alabama State Board of Education.7"
Dickey was the editorial page editor for the student newspaper at
69376 U.S. 254 (1964).
70 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
71 386 U.S. 767 (1967).

Compare Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).

72 376 U.S. at 270.

7 Alabama State Bd. of Educ. v. Dickey, 394 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1968), postponing
decision on appeal from 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967). The Fifth Circuit
decision postpones final determination of the controversy until Dickey has returned
to Troy State University from which he had been expelled for misconduct as student
editor. The Court suggested that the case might otherwise be moot, since Dickey
is currently a student at Auburn University.
74For an excellent discussion of the "right-privilege" problem in constitutional law
see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968). See also French, Unconstitutional Conditions:
An Analysis, 50 GEo. L.J. 234 (1961). The most pertinent recent cases include:
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S.
511 (1967) ;Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) ; Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963).
75273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
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Troy State University in Alabama. As such, he was subject to a
college rule "that there could be no editorials written in the school
paper which were critical of the Governor of the State of Alabama
or the Alabama Legislature. The rule did not prohibit editorials or
articles of a laudatory nature . . . ," In the spring of 1967, Dickey
proposed to write an editorial in his normal slot which implied that
various state legislators held an unduly narrow view of the concept
of academic feedom.7 7 Dickey's faculty advisor invoked the rule and
ordered Dickey to print a substitute article on another topic of major
student concern, "Raising Dogs in North Carolina." 78 Dickey refused
and printed instead a blank column headlined with the original
article's title and crossed with the word "CENSORED." After a
fair hearing, the college expelled Dickey for refusing to obey the
advisor's order to print the material on "Dogs." Dickey then obtained
an order from the federal district court reinstating him, although he
ultimately decided to enroll in another institution. In sum, the district
court held Dickey's expulsion invalid because it was made pursuant
to an unreasonable rule which bore no relation to maintaining order
and discipline on the campus.79 The court also held that the college
could not establish a student newspaper and then subject it to arbitrary
censorship backed with threats of expulsion, although the court did
suggest that Dickey could have been removed as editor.
Ample precedent lends support to several aspects of the Dickey
opinion. The academic freedom cases suggest a prohibition of college
practices which inhibit or prevent free inquiry. 0 Barnette, the flag
salute decision, 8 ' suggests a broad first amendment principle against
the imposition by state officials of political orthodoxy, and several
Fifth Circuit student disciplinary cases hold that school officials
"cannot infringe on their students' free and unrestricted expression
...where the exercise of such rights.., does not materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline
in the operation of the school." 8 It is apparent from Dickey that the
challenged regulation inhibited free inquiry in discussion of governmental activities, that it constituted an officially imposed form of
orthodoxy by limiting inquiry to praise, and that there was no evi76273 F. Supp. at 616.
7 The college conceded that Dickey's proposed article was "well-written and in good
taste." 273 F. Supp. at 617. A copy of the article is printed in 273 F. Supp. at
617n.3.
7 273 F. Supp. at 616.
79 273 F. Supp. at 618.
80

See, e.g., Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967) ; Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967) ; Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
81
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
82 Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966). See, e.g., Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 1966).
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dence that censorship of this character was required to maintain law
and order on the campus. These observations, however, provide only
a partial answer, for Dickey could have distributed leaflets, made
speeches, written letters to the editor, demonstrated, and engaged in
unlimited forms of expression. The college only asked that his
editorial privileges be limited to the broad sphere beyond criticism
of the state governor or legislature. Yet this request carves the
heart out of the first amendment and severely limits defense of academic freedom. As Justice Jackson so eloquently stated in Barnette:
"[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much.
That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance
is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing
3
order."
Finally, the fact that Dickey used the school newspaper as his
vehicle of expression presents no conclusive argument against his
right to express himself. Significantly, it was he, not the faculty
advisor, who in reality controlled the editorial page, though subject
to the noncriticism rule. Dickey's argument, then, was that of unconstitutional conditions, that the college could not qualify his status as
editor with the condition that he either praise the state government
or not discuss it at all. His argument is supported by cases holding
that the government cannot condition public employment in a way
which indirectly curtails first amendment freedoms,8 4 and that the
use of such public facilities as auditoriums and lecture halls cannot
be reserved only for persons with acceptable beliefs. 5 These conclusions speak to both issues raised by Dickey: first, that expulsion is
unquestionably beyond the college's power; and second, that the
college cannot remove the student as editor under these circumstances.
Further resolution of the Dickey case must await action at the
appellate level, but even that determination will undoubtedly leave
unsolved perplexing problems: (1) Do minority students, who are
compelled to pay an activity fee which partially supports the student
press, have a claim to substantially equal space for their viewpoints
in editorial or letters-to-the-editor columns? 6 (2) Can a student
8 319 U.S. at 642.
8 See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563

(1968); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) ; Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) ; ci.
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
8See Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885
(1946); East Meadow Community Concerts Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 18 N.Y.2d
129, 219 N.E.2d 172, 272 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1966), reajf'd after remand, 19 N.Y.2d
605, 224 N.E.2d 888, 278 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1967) (per curiam) ; Egan v. MJoore, 20
App. Div. 2d 150, 245 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1963), affid mem., 14 N.Y.2d 775, 199
N.E.2d 842, 250 N.Y.S.2d 809 (1964).
86See the provocative analysis in Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1641 (1967). See also Avins v. Rutgers, 385 F.2d
151 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).
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editor impose a regime of censorship over the paper? (3) When can
a student editorial board remove an editor? (4) Does the standard of
New York Times Co. or some lesser standard apply to misreporting
by student editors? (5) What principles apply when student newspapers venture into the use of profanity? (6) Can the college in any
way limit the field of a paper's inquiry? (7) Can minority students,
as in labor cases, claim a partial refund of student fees when the
paper advocates principles which the minority deplores?
D. Speakers and Speaker Bans
The problems associated with campus speaker bans and subtle
prior restraints on speakers are numerous and complex. 7 Constitutional issues might arise if a university should choose to bar all outside
speakers, specific individuals, or specific classes of individuals.
Requiring that campus sponsors of a proposed speaker furnish the
institution advance notice of the speaker's appearance or supply the
college with a copy of his proposed remarks, prior remarks, or even
a history of his activities over the last 10 years could also raise constitutional questions." However, most institutions need not necessarily feel restricted, since appellate-level court decisions outlawing
the various types of speaker regulations are few outside of New
York"9 and California.9 Yet, it is in the South and Midwest where
speaker bans are most likely to flourish."
From the viewpoint of the student resident who seeks to expand
his horizons, speaker issues are critical. Individuals with expertise
in the multitude of national issues cannot be kept in ready supply on
8

7 See authorities cited note 11 supra.

8 For Supreme Court guidelines in this area of prior restraint, see authorities cited
note 12 supra.
89See East Meadow Community Concerts Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 18 N.Y.2d 129,
219 N.E.2d 172, 272 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1966) ; Egan v. Moore, 20 App. Div. 2d 150,
245 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1963); Ellis v. Allen, 4 App. Div. 2d 343, 165 N.Y.S.2d 624
(1957); Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1962);
cf. Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 268 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
modified and af'd, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968) ; Kissinger v. New York City
Transit Authority, 274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
90 The California cases emerged from a controversy of several years duration between
the ACLU and various southern California boards of education. See ACLU v. Board
of Educ., 59 Cal. 2d 224, 379 P.2d 16, 28 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1963) (en banc) ; ACLU
v. Board of Educ., 59 Cal. 2d 203, 379 P.2d 4, 28 Cal. Rptr. 700, cert. denied, 375
U.S. 823 (1963) ; ACLU v Board of Educ., 55 Cal. 2d 167, 359 P.2d 45, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 647 (1961); Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171
P.2d 885 (1946) ; cf. Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867,
57 Cal. Rptr. 463 '(1967) ; Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 434 P.2d
982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967) (en banc).
I There has been almost no speaker ban litigation in the Fifth Circuit, But cf. ACLU
v. Houston Independent School Dist., Civil No. 25151 (5th Cir., Mar. 8, 1968),
vacating an unreported decision from the southern district of Texas in light of
James v. Gilmore, 374 F. Supp. 75 (N.D. Tex. 1967), affd per curiam, 389 U.S.
572 (1968). No reported cases can be found from midwestern circuits. Only one
Fourth Circuit case can be found. See Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486
(M.D.N.C. 1968) (not appealed).
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each college campus. In the spring of 1968, there were no substitutes
for William Sloan Coffin, Dr. Benjamin Spock, and Dick Gregory
as social critics, and these men spoke on hundreds of campuses,
2
although they were excluded from severalY
It has been suggested that a college may "conceivably justify a
uniform prohibition on the use of campus facilities by outside speakers as necessary to prevent the diversion of students' time and to
preserve an intellectual atmosphere."" This is not persuasive. A
blanket prohibition of outside speakers contracts the spectrum of
knowledge available to students, 4 discriminates against political and
intellectual figures from outside the campus,9 5 and is an indefensibly
sweeping means of regulating student time.9 6 In any event, most
colleges bring hundreds of speakers to their students each year, and
there is almost no possibility that any institution would undertake
to promulgate such a prohibition.
More difficult questions are presented by the exclusion of selected groups of speakers or those with special characteristics. The
North Carolina speaker-ban law and regulations promulgated under
its authority sought to exclude known members of the Communist
Party, persons known to advocate violent overthrow of the federal or
state government, and persons who had pleaded the fifth amendment
before state or federal legislative committees investigating communist
or subversive activities. A three-judge federal court found the regulations unconstitutionally vague,9 7 relying in part on the loyalty oath
cases 98 and other decisions emphasizing the requirement of statutory
precision. 9 However, the court gave no indication concerning the
content of regulations which would not be unduly vague.
A University of Alabama student group, after lengthy negotiations with the university administration, rescinded an invitation extended to Coffin to speak at its Emphasis '68 program. Dick Gregory was also excluded from the University of Alabama
campus in the spring of 1968. A student organization invited Gregory and obtained
a meeting place, but gave only one week's advance notice to the university when
two were required.
13Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1133
(1968).
4
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
95 Cf. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
96See, e.g., Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18 (1966): "[Llegitimate legislative
goals 'cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties
when the end can be more narrowly achieved.' " Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381
U.S. 301, 310 (1965): "[In the area of First Amendment freedoms, government
has the duty to confine itself to the least intrusive regulations which are adequate
for the purpose."
97Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1968) (not appealed).
9
8E.g., Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967) ;Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589 (1967) ; Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) ; Baggett v. Bullitt, 377
U.S. 360 (1964). The district court voided the provision against speakers who had
invoked the privilege against self-incrimination, relying on Spevack v. Klein, 385
U.S. 511 (1967).
99
E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147
92

(1959).
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Litigation in the California system followed a parallel trend
with the California Supreme Court ultimately holding that a school
could withhold the use of its auditorium from any organization
refusing to guarantee in writing that they would not use the auditorium for commission of any crime or act prohibited by law."' 0
New York cases have generally involved the exclusion of specific
individuals rather than the requirement of an oath, and have uniformly held that public facilities made available for public gatherings cannot be closed in a discriminatory fashion.'
Neither the New York nor California cases suggest guidelines
for the solution of such future problems as those presented by speakers with past histories of violence10 ' or the variety of narrow but
bothersome regulations which could be dreamed up by college bureaucrats in moments of vision. These issues will inevitably be placed
before judicial tribunals, and their resolution will have more than a
fanciful impact upon the quality of education received by the student
as resident.
III.

THE ROLE OF EDUCATORS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN
PROMOTING FREE INQUIRY ON THE COLLEGE CAMPUS

An appropriate conclusion for this Comment would be some
statement of projected activity for educators, attorneys, and organizations concerning what steps can be taken to promote free expression
on the campus. Such a statement, of course, will be decried by
groups or individuals who fear either that students already have too
much freedom or that they would somehow abuse further liberty,
using it to disrupt "law and order" on the campus. My own experience, at least in the Deep South, has been that students have too little
freedom and are seldom, if ever, encouraged to participate in movements to improve society. In Alabama, where the plagues of government corruption, poverty, and crude racism reign, these topics are
still taboo at institutions which regard themselves as the most progressive in the region. Students are actively discouraged from inviting
speakers who might criticize the "Southern way of life." Few courses
are offered and none required on topics of race relations, poverty, or
improvement of state government. Institutions shuddered at the
thought of lowering the American flag following the death of Dr.
Martin Luther King, and no classes were suspended on that day
of mourning.
100 ACLU

v. Board of Educ., 59 Cal. 2d 203, 379 P.2d 4, 28 Cal. Rptr. 700, cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 823 (1963). For additional California cases see note 90 supra.
101 See cases cited note 89 supra.
102 Cf. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
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Within this region, and to a lesser degree throughout the United
States,'10 8 there is considerable room and rationale for encouraging increased free inquiry by students. Educators can update curricula to
emphasize major issues of present and future national significance contemporary foreign policy, poverty problems, race relations, public
television, medicaid, problems of local governments, and many others.
Perhaps even courses on the problems of political and academic
freedom, with particular reference to concrete issues faced by the
student on his own campus, might be instituted.10 4 These courses
could be supplemented by student field work to provide firsthand
knowledge of problems which most students do not know exist. Most
of all, educators can promote free inquiry by practicing it themselves.
This is particularly critical for the administrator who may be subjected to pressure to curtail student activity, cancel speaker invitations,
or harass vocal students and faculty members.
The legal profession, through individual and organizational
activity, can also encourage free inquiry on the campus. Attorneys
can provide administrators and students with free legal advice on
civil liberties issues and suggestions for the establishment of fair
disciplinary procedures for campus tribunals. The problem of the
unpopular client is frequently the problem of the student client
against the might and legal staff of a respected institution of higher
learning. Attorneys can ensure that the rights of students are not
sacrificed to administrative convenience while simultaneously advising students on ways to seek peaceful solutions to campus problems.
Students and faculty members can also ally themselves with such
national organizations as the American Civil Liberties Union and
the American Association of University Professors, groups which
are experienced in defending the rights associated with academic
freedom and in instituting on-campus public education programs
pertaining to student rights and responsibilities. Finally, students at
large institutions could assess a small fee from each student, using
this sum to retain a full-time civil liberties attorney to personally
ensure that ignorance of the law will not thwart student expression.
The above are but a few of the ways in which free inquiry on
the campus can be made more meaningful. Students today are continually and justifiably demanding that they be accorded greater
freedom. However, only future developments can reveal the extent
103 The most comprehensive study of student expression reveals that public and private

IC4

institutions throughout the country almost universally indulge in some degree of
questionable practices. See E. WILLIAMSON & J. COWAN, THE AMERICAN STUDENT'S
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 150-70 (1966). The tradition of tolerance toward minorities and minority beliefs, however, has always been weakest in the South. See C.
EATON, FREEDOM OF THOUGHT IN THE OLD SOUTH (1964).
For a similar suggestion by a Supreme Court Associate Justice see Brennan, Education and the Bill of Rights. 113 U. PA. L. REV. 219 (1964).
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to which student freedom will become a greater reality and, more
importantly, the degree to which this freedom can be used to advance
the goals of the theoretical free society.

THE PRIVATE-PUBLIC LEGAL ASPECTS OF
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
BY WILLIAM COHEN*

OR legal purposes, the distinctions between public and private
schools are much less significant than would appear. To understand this, it is necessary to consider the problem of student legal
rights in its historical context. Some decades ago, the problem in
both public and private institutions was treated largely as that of
insuring the student some protection against arbitrary institutional
action which affected his justifiable expectations. If the student had
completed all the requisites for the degree, and the school had taken
his time and money, then it ought to be precluded from arbitrary
action denying him his degree. At some point, the actions of institutions could become arbitrary enough that the courts would step in.
But it is clear that what was to be protected was the student's justifiable and reasonable expectations based upon what was, to a large
extent, an economic investment.
That approach was reflected in the related field of constitutional law. Two cases, for example, now interpreted as milestones
of academic freedom, Meyer v. Nebraska' and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters,' protected the right to maintain private schools and the right
of private schools to maintain some control over curriculum free of
state interference. Those cases were not decided on the basis of the
first amendment, as they might be today. Their rationale was the
protection of economic rights of private schools. They were decided
as a part of the pattern of cases protecting all kinds of economic
rights under the due process and equal protection clauses. Given
that view of constitutional law by the United States Supreme Court,
it is not surprising that the approach to the rights of students by
state courts would be similar- protecting a student's reasonable
expectations after he had made an investment and had not received
what he had bargained for.
The obvious legal concept to invoke in order to protect economic
expectation is contract. For that reason, the cases involving student
rights in both public and private institutions talked and thought
about the problem in terms of contract concepts. However, courts
did not apply the contract concept as they would in other cases.
*Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles; B.A. 1953, LL.B. 1956,
Univeristy of California, Los Angeles.
'262 U.S. 390 (1923).
2268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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They were ready to protect a student's justifiable expectations at
some point, but competing considerations made courts reluctant to
interfere with institutional decisions.
Obviously, the view of the role of the institution to the student
as one of paternalism left little room for legal interference. There
was, moreover, a fear of interference with institutional autonomy
and institutional judgments in areas where courts doubted their own
competence to second-guess supposedly expert school administrators.
A third important factor regarding both public and private schools
was the concept of privilege. Public education was a privilege that
the state could give or withhold on its own terms. In 1934, the
Supreme Court decided that a state university could insist that
a conscientious objector take military training, because his alternative was not to go to the state university.' A similar concept existed at the private level. A private school was an institution with
which the student could deal or not as he chose. The legal concept,
that education was a privilege that had to be taken on the terms the
school imposed, was the same for private and public schools.
The important point to be emphasized is that, until recently, the
courts perceived almost no difference in their treatment of public
and private schools. In both cases, judicial interference was nearly
nonexistent. In both public and private schools, student rights - at
least in terms of rights protectable in court - were minimal. While
a few cases could be cited of judicial veto of extreme institutional
decisions to expel students late in their careers, student rights did
not loom large.
What has happened to change all of this? To a large extent,
cases from the South, initially involving racial policies of public
schools, have been the source of pressure for change. Through the
racial cases, the precedent of judicial interference with some decisions
by public schools has been established. The result has been increasing recognition of the rights of students in public schools in cases
where no racial policy was at stake. Greater judicial involvement
with the public school necessarily will mean greater judicial involvement with the private school. The reasons for rejection of the earlier
policy of noninterference with reference to public institutions are
exactly the reasons why courts will be less reluctant to interfere with
similar judgments by private institutions.
Does this mean that there are no differences between public
and private schools? It is tempting to say "there is no such thing as
a private school," and turn to the hard questions of fairness to students and appropriate school policy. However, that would be an
oversimplification. The point is not that there are no differences
3

Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
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between public and private schools, but that among the differences
between institutions, the public-private distinction is the least important, or one of the least important, distinctions.
Functionally, there is more similarity between the University of
California and Harvard than there is between the University of
California and a small, residential, state-run teachers college located
in a rural area. The same is true of private schools. There is more
difference between Harvard and a small theological seminary than
there is between Harvard and the University of California. But the
content of rules that should be applied, both with reference to student substantive rights and student procedural rights, must take into
account institutional differences. That is obviously true in terms of
their legal aspects as well as their nonlegal aspects. The content of
those rules, however, is not within the scope of this article. But in
framing those rules, many of the most important institutional differences will involve only incidentally the private-public distinction.
Both private and public schools may be residential or commuter colleges. Both may be either large, general institutions of higher learning
or special purpose institutions.
The remainder of this article will be concerned with the legal
theories by which private educational institutions' decisions concerning student rights may be subjected to judicial control. These theories
fall into two categories. First is the concept of state action, by which
a private school may be subjected to some of the same minimal constitutional restrictions as a public school. Second is a group of common law theories by which state courts might subject a private school
to legal norms, whether or not those schools are subjected to constitutional limitations. However, a caveat at this point is appropriate.
The theories by which public and private institutions are subjected
to judicial control may differ. It is easy, however, to overemphasize
the importance of the legal theories involved. For example, even if
the relevant theory for protecting student rights were contract, it
would be possible for a sensitive court to evolve sensible rules about
private institutions under a contract theory - particularly if the
contract were treated as one of adhesion and the court retained the
power to disregard any terms of the contract it determined to be inappropriate. A court which had made appropriate judgments about
the extent of judicial involvement could utilize the contract theory
and solve most student-institution problems correctly. On the other
hand, the contract theory could lead to inappropriate results in the
hands of an insensitive court. A substantial number of courts have
read general language in university catalogs as a blanket waiver of
a student's substantive and procedural rights. Probably, these same
courts would not so broadly construe a waiver of rights written on a
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ticket that a student received in parking his car in a commercial parking lot.
It is dangerous to assume that the development of legal theories
is the major problem, because the real problem is determining the
extent of legal control that is desirable and appropriate in a particular situation. That question is independent of the legal theory
invoked. With this in mind, a brief survey of the legal theories can
be considered.
The most obvious theory for developing legal control of private
institutions is the theory of state action - that some institutions
which are apparently private are actually public, and therefore subject to some restrictions imposed by the Constitution. The large
private institutions of learning carry with them most of the indicia
of state action for application of constitutional controls that have
been found in the cases involving public universities. On the other
hand, it should be remembered that no United States Supreme Court
decision, except in the racial context, has decided that the Constitution applies significant control over private educational institutions.
The most obvious of the indicia of state action, of course, is
public funding of nominally "private" schools. It will be increasingly
difficult to draw the distinction between "public" and "private"
schools in terms of who is funding them. Further, formal state regulation and involvement varies in intensity and in kind from situation to
situation. The developing theory is that institutions which perform a
public function become public for some constitutional purposes,
without reference to the extent of formal state involvement. The
latest case to apply that theory involved a municipal park.4 Justice
Douglas' opinion for the court argued that city maintenance of a
segregated park was so much a governmental function that the park
might be public for fourteenth amendment purposes, no matter who
was in formal control. Justice Douglas distinguished the problem of
private schools as perhaps being different, 5 but it is significant that
Justice Harlan's dissent argued that, under the Court's view of the
public function theory, it would be impossible to say that any school
is a private school.'
Before examining some common law bases for judicial control
of private schools, another disclaimer is in order. One difficulty with
the state action theory is that some have viewed it as an oversimplified syllogism which goes something like this - due to state involvement, a private school is the state, and therefore cannot do anything
that the state could not do. In my opinion, that view is clearly erro4 Evas v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).

5 Id. at 300.
6Id. at 321-22.
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neous. State action may be more of a scalpel than a club. For example, significant state involvement in Catholic schools may give
some constitutional rights to students in those schools. If most of the
money for student tuition in a Catholic college comes from federal
and state funds, some admission policies at that college would come
under constitutional scrutiny. It would not follow that the Catholic
college would be bound by the establishment principles of the first
amendment so as to lose its right to give religious instruction.
In summary, the question of state action is more than the technical issue of sufficient governmental involvement which would
treat all decisions of a "private" institution as a governmental decision. The question will be partly determined by the merits of the
issues involved. It has not been surprising, given the clear application of the equal protection clause to the arbitrary exclusion of
students on racial grounds, that in such cases federal courts have
extended the reach of the fourteenth amendment even to institutions
lightly involved with government. It would not follow that an institution more heavily involved with government would be precluded
from using private funds to construct a chapel on the campus. The
nature of the question involved gives different judicial perspectives
to the state action question.
The Constitution is not the sole source for legal controls over
private educational institutions. State courts, applying state common
law doctrines, may set some significant limits on unfair treatment
of students by private schools. Thus, in enlightened states, it may
not be necessary to invoke the Constitution to provide a legal base
for the protection of student rights in private institutions. As mentioned above, it is possible and appropriate for a court to develop
some kinds of contract theories which, if expansively handled, could
be used to provide significant legal protection for students. Professor
Seavey has suggested a theory that the institution is a trustee acting
in a fiduciary capacity to the student.7 WXhile I have some trouble
with the concept, it is a legal theory that could be invoked, although
no court has used it. Another possible theory that has not been applied to a private school might borrow on tort principles. The rights
of people in other private associations have been protected by some
courts under the theory of prima facie tort. It has been used, for
example, where a member is excluded from a labor union for arbitrary reasons with a loss of his economic rights. Proceeding from
the theory that deliberate destruction of valuable economic rights is
actionable unless justified, it is possible to work out a theory that the
student's separation from the institution, or his loss of substantial
rights, represents tortious conduct unless justified. What the institu7 Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HARv. L. REv. 1406 (1957).
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tion can and cannot do would then be determined through definition
of the scope of the privileges. However, one obstacle to utilization
of this theory may be the immunity in some states of charitable institutions from liability in tort.
In conclusion, it is apparent that the court that has decided to
impose legal controls upon what an institution may or may not do
with reference to its students has an armory of legal theories at its
disposal. The theories are interesting arguing points for lawyers.
But, as law in this area begins to develop, defining the theories will
be much less important than defining the legal restrictions that are
appropriate for various kinds of institutions. School administrators
should begin to think in functional terms rather than in terms of
legal concepts. Rules that have been developed for some institutions
are not appropriate for others. If the specialized function, size, or
location of a school requires a different kind of approach, the development of sensible rules in advance will make it less likely that
the institution will have to live with inappropriate rules imposed by
a court.

THE STUDENT AS A STUDENT
By PHILLIP

MONYPENNY*

the rubric of the "student as a student" is included a
U NDER
multitude of topics which arise in the academic relationship between the student and the institution, especially those which have to
do with his presence as a student enrolled for a degree. This necessarily begins with his admission and continues through the general specification of requirements for a degree, the setting of levels of performance in individual courses, the evaluation of specific projects
such as theses and field work, the determination of levels of performance required for continuance, and maintenance of a record system
by which his progress may be checked. It includes the question of
whether his work in a specified period meets the standards set for
the awarding of a degree. It includes rules about the transfer of credit
from or to other institutions, recommendations to support applications to graduate or professional schools, certificates necessary for
professional licensure, and the awarding or denial of financial assistance.
In what follows, I rely heavily on those who have inquired into
the general relationship between the student and the university before
me. M. M. Chambers, who edited a little journal called Educational
Law and Administration' 30 years ago, compiled and reviewed some
basic cases. He expanded these articles into a series of volumes
appearing periodically called The Colleges and the Courts,2 the last
of which covered decisions through 1963. An early article by Zechariah Chafee on the determination of individual rights by private
associations and the subsequent articles by Warren Seavey, Alvin
Goldman, Clark Byse, and William Van Alstyne, cited by Van
Alstyne in his article for this conference, provide a necessary starting
*Chairman of the Department and Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois;
A.B. 1936, M.A. 1937, Washington University (St. Louis) ; Ph.D., University of
Minnesota, 1942.
1 1-6 EDUCATIONAL LAW AND ADMINISTRATION (M. Chambers ed. 1932-1939).
2 M. CHAMBERS & E. ELLIOTT, THE COLLEGES AND THE COURTS, JUDICIAL DECISIONS
CONCERNING HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1936); M. CHAMBERS,
THE COLLEGES AND THE COURTS, 1936-40, JUDICIAL DECISIONS CONCERNING HIGHER

EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1941)
COURTS,

1941-45,

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

; M. CHAMBERS, THE COLLEGES AND THE

CONCERNING

HIGHER

EDUCATION

IN THE

UNITED STATES (1946); M. CHAMBERS, THE COLLEGES AND THE COURTS, 1946-50,
JUDICIAL

DECISIONS

CONCERNING

HIGHER

EDUCATION

IN

THE

UNITED

STATES

(1952); M. CHAMBERS, THE COLLEGES AND THE COURTS SINCE 1950 (1964).
These are compilations of decisions in all aspects of law affecting colleges and univerversities, but do regularly review cases on the legal aspects of student-university
relationships.
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point, even though they deal primarily with
the question of dismissal,
3
which is not the direct topic of this article.
However, the principles which govern this section are not different from those sketched earlier in Van Alstyne's article, The Student as University Resident. Although the sections on Colleges and
Universities in Corpus Juris Secundum and in American Jurisprudence
2nd list pages of references indicating an unlimited discretion for
private colleges and universities in admitting students, setting up
standards for awarding degrees, and dismissing students for failure
to meet these standards, and almost as unlimited a discretion for
public universities (checked largely by procedural requirements),
there are a variety of legal principles on the basis of which legal
limitations on university discretion have been successfully urged.'
The variety of approaches to the limitation of discretion has been
set out in four classes by Alvin Goldman. They are constitutional
theories, in loco parentis theories, contract theories, and a trust or
fiduciary theory which is his own.' Constitutional limitations have
so far been found only to apply to public institutions, although some
authors argue that the public-private distinction is untenable in this
field.6 The in loco parentis theory provides for Goldman the elements
of a status or fiduciary theory, even though as a literal justification
for college regulation of student nonacademic affairs it is being abandoned. The contract theory has provided both a justification for
unlimited discretion and a basis for finding an obligation to respect
certain student rights. The fiduciary theory which Goldman propounds has yet to find a positive affirmation in any court decision
affecting the relationships between the student and the university.
However, if we stay only within the established doctrines which
apply to universities and colleges in general, without reference to
their public or private status, there is still ground to assert that colleges and universities have legal obligations to their students which
cannot be obliterated simply by reference to the discretion and presumed good faith and judgment of institutional authorities. Nor can
3

See Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, 45 DENVER L.J. 582 (1968),
listing the principal references. Much use has been made of the Note, Private Government on the Campus -Judicial Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362

(1963).

4 15 Am. JUR. 2d Colleges and Universities §§ 16-28 '(1964) ; 14 C.J.S. Colleges and

Universities §§ 8-29 (1939). These summaries are very firm in asserting the very
large discretion of all schools, particularly the virtually unlimited discretion of private
schools, although the classic cases to the contrary are also cited.
5
See Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its Students- A Fiduciary Theory,
54 Ky. L.J. 643 '(1966).
6 Parker, Evans v. Newton and the Racially Restricted Charitable Trust, 13 How. L.J.
223 (1967). The distinction between public and private is explored and its significance for the assertion of certain constitutional rights minimized by Pollitt, Dime
Store Demonstrations: Events and Legal Problems of First Sixty Days, 1960 DUKE
L.J. 315, 347-65. See also Comment, ProceduralLimitations on the Expulsion of College and University Students, 10 ST. Louis U.L.J. 542, 547 (1966).
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these obligations be obliterated by the retention of an unlimited discretion as a part of the body of institutional regulations which the
student presumably accepts as part of his contract of admission and
attendance.
In recognizing that the acceptance of a student as a student
creates a mutual obligation which cannot be wholly defined by a
unilateral and wholly discretionary act of institutional authority, the
courts have placed explicit or implicit stress on the value to the individual and to society of the opportunity to gain an education.
Although for some purposes attendance at either a public or a private
institution may be defined as a privilege rather than a right, it is still
a valuable privilege, having for certain purposes almost the status of
a property right.' Privileges may be made subject to a reasonable, but
not an arbitrary, discretion, and reasonableness implies the possibility
of judicial intervention where the limits of reasonableness are passed,
and this in turn implies ultimate judicial determination of whether
a particular act or rule is reasonable. The consequences of given acts
or rules to the individual student who complains of them will have to
be weighed against the normally valid institutional claim of expertise
and discretion.
This weighing process is easy to reach, since the privileged position of public and private institutions, their status as perpetual trusts
in the case of private institutions, the tax exemption they normally
enjoy, and the restraints on political authorities in regulating their
affairs, all rest on the great benefit of their services to the general
society. 8 In order to protect against entirely arbitrary or discriminatory
decisionmaking by those institutions having control over the disposition of many beneficial services to others, their conduct cannot be
relieved of the possibility of legal review; however, many decisions
in individual cases may hold that they acted within the limits of their
discretion and within their fields of presumptive competence.
Even the contract theory, which has often been used to justify
unlimited discretion in individual cases, implies obligations which
cannot be determined entirely by the unilateral decision of the institution. The university or college has been held obliged to provide
7Berea College v. Commonwealth, 211 U.S. 45, 58 (1908) (dissenting opinion by
Harlan, J.). This case arose out of the attempt to enforce a state law requiring segregation in all institutions of education. Justice Harlan asserted a liberty which could
not be breached by state regulation. That the value of an education to the individual
creates a most important right which can be limited only by due process requirements
is strongly asserted in Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
8 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). This classic case and others, asserting the right to offer and receive an education which cannot be abrogated by state
law, are reviewed by Constanzo, Wholesome Neutrality: Law and Education, 43
N.D.L. REv. 605, 615 (1967). See also Parker, supra note 6, at 265-68, for an argument on the parallelism of private and public activity in education and welfare as
creating the basis for the assertion of constitutional rights as against private authority.
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that which is stated or implied in the contract, including an opportunity to study, receive credit, and whatever degree or other certificate
is normally given at the end of successful work. Schools have also
been held to an orderly and accustomed procedure in determining
what is successful work. The reserved power of dismissal which is
often asserted as part of the contract between the school and the
student, being set out in bulletins or rules, does not warrant the
university in arbitrarily refusing readmission after a period of attendance, or refusing to grant a degree once stated conditions have
been complied with. One may speculate on whether the contract
doctrine, so cherished by administrators, might justify an inquiry
as to whether the institution is in fact offering what it purports to
offer by way of educational programs, supporting facilities, safe
dormitories, edible food, adequate provision for medical emergencies,
and perhaps even a Christian atmosphere.' 0
The fiduciary principle which Goldman proposes to substitute
for the contract principle as the major basis for determining legal
relationships between the student and the institution draws in part
from the in loco parentis principle. That doctrine asserted not only
an authority over the student but an obligation to him; it was justified by the need to protect him against his own immaturity. It is a
status conception, an obligation inhering in a relationship not derived from, nor more than partially modifiable by, the specific terms
of a contract. A university or college which acts against a student's
9 The basic cases on the right to a degree are summarized in Legal Right of a Student
to a Diploma or Degree, in 4 EDUCATIONAL LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 7 (M. Chambers ed. 1936). Among the more striking cases holding against unqualified discretion
are Baltimore Univ. v. Colton, 98 Md. 623, 57 A. 14 (1904) ; Booker v. Grand Rapids
Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909) ; State ex rel. Nelson v. Lincoln Medical College, 81 Neb. 533, 116 N.W. 294 (1908) ; People ex rel. Cecil v.
Bellevue Hosp. Medical College, 60 Hun. 107, 14 N.Y.S. 490 (Sup. Ct. 1891). Cases
asserting that discretion was not abused in refusing to grant graduate degrees are
Moore v. Lory, 94 Colo. 595, 31 P.2d 1112 (1934) ; Edde v. Columbia Univ., 8 Misc.
2d 795, 168 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Sup. Ct. 1957), aff'd, 6 App. Div. 2d 782, 175 N.Y.S.2d
556 (1958). For an interesting discussion suggesting limits on handling student
records see Strahan, Should Colleges Release Grades of College Students to Draft
Boards? 43 N.D.L. REv. 721 (1967).
Recent cases indicating limits on public institutions to arbitrarily limit the admission of students are Woody v. Burns, 188 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1966) (improper exclusion
of a student from a school of architecture, who, while not conforming to regulations,
had acted in accordance with the advice of an advisor) ; Kolbeck v. Kramer, 46 N.J.
46, 214 A.2d 408 (1965) (requirement of vaccination may not be imposed on a student whose religion is contrary to it, if no showing is made of a danger to the health
of others).
On the right to judicial review of the question of whether discretion was exercised arbitrarily in excluding students because of a change of academic standards
after their initial enrollment see Schoppelrei v. Franklin Univ., 11 Ohio App. 2d 60,
228 N.E.2d 334 (1967) (overruling a demurrer sustained in the trial court). On the
right to a degree where an institutional authority had waived an ordinarily imposed
continuous enrollment requirement see Blank v. Board of Higher Educ., 51 Misc. 2d
724, 273 N.Y.S.2d 796 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
10
On the liability to an injured student see Jay v. Walla Walla College, 53 Wash. 2d
590, 335 P.2d 458 (1959) (the defense of implied assumption of the risk in the
student's contract with the university was denied, as it has been in similar cases).
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interests without an offsetting necessity rooted in the university or
college purpose and a reasonable means for achievement of that
purpose clearly departs from the obligation to protect the interests
of the students entrusted to its care. It would be rash to say that
the student's interest might never be protected by the courts."
What has made these principles so far a matter of logical
assertion rather than of law is that, except in a few deviant cases,
the courts have chosen not to review in detail the university or
college's use of discretionary authority in relation to students. This
does not mean that obligations and limits on discretion are not
recognized in the very process of entertaining cases for decision;
rather, the opinions suggest that the situations, at least as presented
in the formal proceedings, have not seemed to the judges to be such
a departure from a reasonable use of discretion that intervention was
justified.12 Some of the cases seem to have taken the rights of the
students rather lightly, but as the completion of some phase of
education beyond high school becomes more of an absolute condition
for success in achieving gainful employment and a respected position
in the world, the value given to the student's interest in remaining
in school and in earning whatever formal credits or degrees his work
justifies should rise, and the reasonability of a given rule or decision
3
is likely to be more closely scrutinized.1
In the fields of institutional authority covered by this article,
most decisions are provisional and intermediate. Except for denial
of admission, or expulsion, the decisions made about a student's
fate are cumulative. For example, his admissibility or nonadmissibility to various curricula, and the degree which he seeks, depend on
many factors, including all his grades, the completion or noncompletion of a variety of courses and tasks prescribed for a degree, and
the cumulation of the nonpayment of library fines or dormitory
bills. Given the disposition of the courts not to interfere in the details
of any complicated enterprise, especially a private one, and to avoid
judgment until final questions are presented, it is not likely that any
adverse decision other than the critical and final one can be brought
11 See Goldman, supra note 5; Byse, Procedures in Student Dismissal Proceedings, in
THE COLLEGE AND THE STUDENT 305 (L. Dennis & J. Kaufman eds. 1966). The
classic decisions holding due process necessary in the dismissal of a student by a
private institution, because of state support received, include Commonwealth ex rel.
Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. County Ct. 77 (1887).
12
See State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942), cert.
denied, 319 U.S. 748 '(1943); Wright v. Texas Southern Univ., 277 F. Supp. 110
'(S.D. Tex. 1967), aj'd, 392 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1968). In an earlier case of dismissal
in a state court, People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of Trustees, 10 Ill. App. 2d 207, 134
N.E.2d 635 (1956), due process was found satisfied, although the plaintiff was only
informed of the charge and not the evidence against her and could only make an
unsupported statement in rebuttal.
13 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 930 (1961). But see Woody v. Burns, 188 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1966) ; Schoppelrei
v. Franklin Univ., 11 Ohio App. 2d 60, 228 N.E.2d 334 (1967).
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successfully into court. Also, if deference to the wisdom and good
faith of faculty and administrators continues in academic and disciplinary matters, even final judgments are not likely to be overturned unless they appear on their face to be arbitrary. 4 A general
analogy to the relationships between the courts and the public
bureaucracies would seem to be in order here. The existence of an
appropriate procedure for defining issues, for gathering data with
respect to them, and for making a decision after due consideration of
relevant circumstances is likely to minimize the chances of an
independent decision by the courts on the merits of the case. If the
procedure stands, the administrative decision might also stand.15
There is a corollary, moreover, from the field of administrative regulation - if the courts take on too many institutional decisions
because they appear to be bad, they may develop confidence in their
own expertise and routinely set aside decisions in apparently technical
fields. The experience of the Federal Communications Commission
in the federal courts seems to support this point.' 6
The application of constitutional limitations to student rights
in general rests on the continued tenability of the distinction between
public and private institutions. The recent cases overturning decisions of dismissal for asserting the civil liberties of faculty and
students have all arisen at public institutions. They have rested on
the view that the fourteenth amendment applies to the campus
as to other areas of state governmental action, and that neither
attendance nor employment can be made to rest on a waiver of fourteenth amendment rights. When the institution involved is a public
one, there is ample precedent for going into court over a denial of
civil liberties rights, including the right to procedural due process.
The due process and equal protection conceptions presumably also
include the question of whether regulations are reasonable, fair in
relation to various situations and parties, and whether their application in a given instance rests on some kind of evidence.
The undecided question is the extent to which private institutions may ignore the standards of the fourteenth amendment,
especially its due process and equal protection standards, in the
government of their campuses and the regulation of their student's
14 State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942), cert. denied,
319 U.S. 748 (1943); Wright v. Texas Southern Univ., 277 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Tex.
1967), a/I'd, 392 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1968); People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of
Trustees, 10 Ill. App. 2d 207, 134 N.E.2d 635 (1956).
15 RCA v. United States, 341 U.S. 412 (1951).
16 FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953). Here, the Court apparently
reacted to a sloppy justification of an FCC decision.
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academic and nonacademic lives." It has been argued that they
8
cannot ignore them.1
One basis for such a conclusion is a reexamination of the publicprivate distinction. Under what circumstances is a private agency or
institution sufficiently associated with government to come under
legal restraints which apply to government itself? A key case representing a shift in the thinking of the federal courts is Shelley v.
0 in which a private freedom of contract was not denied
Kraemer,"
but the right to its judicial enforcement was. In the much cited case
of Marsh v. Alabama,2 0 a company town, admittedly the private
property in every respect of a private corporation, was found to be
bound to the standards of the fourteenth amendment in respecting
freedom of expression (the distribution by Jehovah's Witnesses of
their characteristic tracts), because it acted in lieu of a government.
There are other cases where seemingly "private discrimination" has
been held violative of the fourteenth amendment because of the
public function being served.2 '
The special relationship of educational and other eleemosynary
corporations to government has long been recognized. As noted
above, their purposes have been held to justify exemption from
taxation and tort liability.22 The grant of public money to educational
institutions and hospitals operated by religious bodies has been
upheld because of the public value of their services. 23 The right to
17 Equal protection now provides a constitutional guarantee not only against racial
discrimination or legislative malapportionment but also against various unreasonable
classifications as in welfare policy, Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa.
1967) ; Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp. 31 (M.D. Ala. 1967) ; the violation of religious
freedom in the setting of requirements for the receipt of unemployment compensation,
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) ; and the prohibiiion of a fair housing act
by state constitutional amendment, Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). Problems of classification are central to the question of the reasonableness of the decisions
by college authorities on such questions as admission, the grant of scholarship assistance, and of whether reasonable standards of scholarship are being met by degree
candidates.
18 See Note, supra note 3, and Goldman, supra note 5.
19 334 U.S. i (1948).
20 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
21 For a carefully detailed discussion see Parker, supra note 6. Cases finding apparent
private action sufficiently governmental to require conformance to the standards of
governments include Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
The refusal to admit a doctor to the staff of a private hospital has been found
contrary to due process. Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817
(1963). This case contains a careful and persuasive discussion of the limits of the
distinction between public and private when an important individual "right" is being
decided by an institution which, though "private," provides an important public
service and is heavily dependent on tax exemptions and government subsidies.
22 M. CHAMBERS, THE COLLEGES AND THE COURTS, JUDICIAL DECISIONS CONCERNING
HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1936). This work has an extensive

discussion on the doctrine of tort immunity for charitable trusts, a doctrine whose
modifications toward the imposition of full tort liability is noted in successive editions.
23Horace Mann League v. Board of Pub. Works, 242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d 51, cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 97 (1966), noted in 43 N.D.L. REV. 659 (1967).
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operate independent religious schools, despite a state act forbidding
them, has been asserted because of the general interest in providing
education through whatever available type of organization or institution.2 4 That these exemptions and benefits depend on the public
service provided is underlined by a recent Maryland decision denying
the right of the state to spend money on buildings for schools which
have a clearly religious content to their curriculum and educational
purposes. 5 Increasingly, the activities of private eleemosynary institutions, including educational institutions, are parallel to the much
larger operations of government, and they operate in part with direct
or indirect governmental funding. How long can their existence
depend on a privileged legal status and their relationships with
faculty and students be regulated by a rather far-out view of the law
of contract?
A second approach to the question of the applicability of general constitutional guarantees to private schools is to ask under what
circumstances private power, whether over employment or over
such benefits as admission to and continuance in private institutions
of higher education, can be conditioned upon a waiver of what are
otherwise constitutional rights? Contracts which require a waiver
of constitutional rights may be unlawful.2 " It has been decided that
unions may not require a waiver of a legal or a constitutional right
as a condition of continued membership, that employers must provide meeting places for their employees attempting to organize and
obtain bargaining recognition for a union, and that the state itself
may not attach unconstitutional conditions to a contract of employment.17 Similarly, academic freedom has been cited as a freedom
which may not be breached by attaching a condition to an employ28
ment contract.
The great weight of decided cases favors a virtually unrestricted
freedom of private institutions to determine the conditions of student
attendance, to set up regulations to govern them in nonacademic
as well as academic matters, and to discipline them for breaches
of regulations, including the ultimate penalty of expulsion. Only
24

See Constanzo, supra note 8.

2Horace Mann League v. Board of Pub. Works, 242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d 51, cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 97 (1966).
On the failure of loyalty oaths as proper conditions attached to employment see Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183 (1952).
27 Affeldt & Seney, Group Sanctions and Personal Rights -Professions,
Occupations
and Labor Law (pts. 1-2), 11, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 382, 179 (1967), citing Mitchell
v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 196 Cal. App. 2d 796, 16 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1961).
The tenor of the article with respect to labor unions applies, and is also intended to
apply to other social institutions who are able to exercise coercive power over their
members.
28
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
26
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recently have public universities been restricted, and these restrictions
arise largely in the areas of free speech and free expression. If universities and colleges have this freedom where extreme penalties are
involved, the restraints on them in less final actions taken in the
general course of university administration are clearly even less
extensive. The questions raised in the preceding pages arise because
there are counter tendencies or postulates which might be taken to
justify the existence of rights on the part of students and far more
vigorous judicial intervention in their defense than has occurred.
Perhaps it is not at all likely to occur, despite isolated decisions.
However, there are parallels in other fields which should make us
cautious about denying all such possibilities.
The thoroughgoing judicial pursuit of racial equality in all of
the areas where some use of public authority seems to impose or
buttress inequality; the equally thorough pursuit of enforcement of
the rights of defendants in criminal cases; the explosion of litigation
enforcing the rights of Indians in long-disregarded tribal claims;
the relentless application of equal protection principles to the question of representation in state and local government; the discovery
of a right of travel which cannot be wholly restricted at the discretion of the State Department; and the extensive intervention in
deportation cases, all show a sensitivity of the courts to the claims
of the disadvantaged which would have been hard to predict from
decisions of a quarter of a century ago, and a present willingness to
take on burdens from which earlier generations of judges flinched.
Given the dramatic intensity of interest in all phases of higher education at the present time, the courts may well be provoked to take
a new interest in the problem of just relationships on the campus.
The new activism of the courts in cases affecting civil liberties may
be a forewarning.
Apart from what the courts may do, there are sound educational
reasons for asserting that explicit standards of justice and equal
treatment should enter into all of the regulatory phases of the
relationship between an educational institution and its students. The
achievement of an atmosphere of free inquiry to which the faculty,
students, and administrative officers of higher education have committed themselves through their approval of the Joint Statement on
Rights and Freedoms of Students also requires an atmosphere in
which justice is not only done but seen to be done.2" The world of
educational administration, like the world of politics, is a world of
negotiations, of adjustment and accommodation of interests, and of
29

Monypenny, University Purpose. Discipline and Due Process, 43 N.D.L. REV. 739
(1967); Monypenny, Toward A Standard for Studenl
& CONTEMP. PROB. 625 (1963).

Academic Freedom, 28 LAW
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high-minded deals and payoffs. It is a world of insiders, despite the
structure of participation by the rank and file faculty and student
body. Like politics, however, it must be conducted within an overarching framework of just principle if those who are not directly
parties to the negotiation, but are affected by them, are to accept
the outcomes and have confidence in those who conduct them. It is
to questions of just principle rather than to questions of the permissible legal limits of authority that the attention of those who govern
institutions should be turned. The cautions of this article are directed
to that end, rather than an assertion of a clear body of legal principles
defining and binding institutional discretion. If the agencies of
education act justly, and seem to act justly, the courts will find very
few occasions to impose a judicially developed view of justice on
them.
In closing, I want to reflect for a moment on the planning
session which preceded this meeting. It seems to me that some
of the technical discussion we have engaged in today about the defensibility or indefensibility of various kinds of legal formulas for
defining the university's control over students could have been
avoided if we reflected again on the purpose for which the doctrines
of contract, status, in loco parentis, and the equal protection of the
laws were brought into the discussion.
One of the implicit assumptions which seems to be part of many
administratively oriented discussions about the college or university
relation to students draws on the legal tradition which, as summarized in the most available sources, indicates a very large and
apparently unreviewable discretion not only to make rules but to
decide whether they have been transgressed. The conclusion in these
discussions is that, legally, the ground is open and you could do as
you pleased. Such a conclusion seems to have been behind the institutional handling of a great many disciplinary as well as academic matters. From a legal standpoint, there is no difference between the two fields.
One of the purposes of this conference was to discover whether
there were some rather impersonal sets of rules derived from legal
principles which had application to student-university relationships,
which indicated appropriate restraints on institutional powers, and
which also had implications for institutional responses to crises and
provocations. An indication that such restraints exist, i.e., that discretion is not absolute or unreviewable, is one of the conclusions
of all of the principal speakers at this conference, although none
of them has provided an absolutely firm conclusion of law applicable
in very specific situations, unless the fourteenth amendment restraints
on the public colleges and universities are regarded as having a
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very specific content. What the articles, including mine, are saying
is rather, "Gentlemen, you don't have a completely free hand in
dealing with students. There are some legal doctrines which imply
restraints applicable to you if you transgress a set of limits, not too
well defined to be sure, but limits all the same."
The issue is not what these restraints are, but how to use the
recognition of legal restraints as a caution, that is, the student's place
in the institution, and his recognizable rights and privileges as a part
of that institution are matters about which we need to do some
rather hard thinking, free of the clichs which the law so readily
provides. Obviously, whatever the applicable law, we should think
about such concerns for their own sake, or at least we should do so
because of the realistic prospect of being punished in court as a
consequence of not having thought hard and well before we acted
in a difficult situation. Of course we may be in trouble, whether
inside or outside of the courts, no matter how hard or well we
think, but that does not justify a lack of effort. It therefore seems
to me that what I and others have had to say on various legal topics
is less important than the extent to which our discussion, which has
been remarkably thoughtful and intense, will have an impact on
how we operate in our various fields of responsibility on the campus.
Having paid my respects to the framework of the discussion, I
would like to comment on the question of how we regard the structure of the university, a matter which has not been dealt with squarely by the articles in this symposium, with the exception of Mr. Lunsford's discussion of this particular topic as being a question of
community. For this purpose I would like to introduce a distinction
between authority and power.
In talking about legal restraints, one talks about something
which I will roughly define as power, that is, one is talking about
where the legal capacity to determine certain questions lies, and what
limits, if any, there are on that capacity. Most of the law on the
topic of university or college power conforms to this usage.
Power is an attribute of the university or college as a corporation. Our earlier discussion was fascinating, because the university
was referred to as though it was something which did not include
the students, the faculty, most of the administrative officers, or the
nonacademic staff. To be sure, it controlled them, but it was not
them. It was spoken of as something independent of the particular
personalities and defined internal roles, which are its corporeal
manifestation, an impersonal being which comes to conclusions and
acts on them. This is the appropriate legal view of a corporation as
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a fictitious personality which cannot be subsumed in the individual
personalities who may at any time man the various offices within it.30
If an individual is summoned to court as the president or a
member of the board of trustees of X university, that is in some
ways an impersonal matter. The individual is represented by counsel
who actually appears in court, and the president or trustee is not
likely to be personally fined or jailed. However, in the operating
life of the institution in which the acts of legal consequence arose,
it was not this impersonal abstraction which was working. As Mr.
Lunsford has pointed out so eloquently, the university is an internal
and differentiated structure with various roles and various responsibilities, a structure in which whatever legal powers exist cannot
readily be exercised in a simple and direct way from any single point.
The internal process of decisionmaking is a very diffuse one, as the
politically responsible administrators know, much to their occasional
distress. 3 ' The important question in understanding or prescribing
for the academic institution is not that of power but of authority who does what, who shares in the decision, even if only by inaction
rather than action, and who eventually writes the signature which
commits the institution. The question of authority is far more diffuse than the question of power, because various people enter into
the decisionmaking process who cannot be said in any formal sense
to be a part of the institutional power structure, if one uses power
as meaning that which has direct legal effect.
In the spirit of the old public law employee-officer dichotomy,
I note in browsing through the law books some reference to the
faculty as having the status essentially of employees, not as officers
of the corporation. This is undoubtedly an accurate statement. On
the other hand, in the normal conventions of academic institutions,
the faculty members operate as persons who have independent areas
of decision - one might say independent jurisdictions - or who
make independent contributions to the decisionmaking process, since
most of these processes are collaborative and not in any simple
sense hierarchical. In this sense of defined areas of competence and
independence of action within those areas, they are much more like
a common law officer than a common law employee, even though
their legal relationship to the institution is governed by contract.
In this, as in so many other areas of institutional life, the law on
The reference is to the discussion by von Gierke of the evolution of views concerning
the character of associations and corporations in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries
when this was a central issue. 0 VON GIERKE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF
SOcIETY, 1500 TO 1800, ch. 1, § 5, at 62 et seq. (E. Barker transl. 1957).
31 Politically responsible administrators are those who must account to the outside public
for the conduct of the institution, whether the institution is public or private.
30
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the matter is an inadequate guide to developing workable operating
relationships.
The mention of the pattern of authority within the institution
brings us to the question of ends, since authority has meaning in
terms of the purposes for which it is used. One of the most characteristic and important uses of institutional authority is in defining the
ends or purposes of the institution, at least that is what the writers
on administration tell us for organizations in general. If we deal
with power, then those who have legal power define the ends of
the institution. In this sense, we see at once that the definition
of the ends or goals of the institution is by no means a prerogative
of the board of trustees, whatever the law may hold. None of our
academic institutions have their ends defined strictly by boards of
trustees. They are also defined in various parts by the incorporating
body, society, the accrediting association, and the endless interaction of the administrative officers, faculty, student body, and, I
might add, the nonacademic staff, which disposes of a considerable
portion of institutional authority. The bookkeepers, the parking lot
operators, the student union staff, the dormitory managers, the
architect, the engineer, and the registrar, all have a sizeable impact
on the character of the institution.
It is interesting to note that in none of the discussions on the
actual or ideal government of a university does anyone ever refer
to the nonacademic staff, although they are very clearly part of the
government. If one takes some of the challenges which are currently being put to the university, such as the obligation to act morally
in all relationships with the community or society, one must consider
such matters as employment, purchasing, land acquisition, and investment, which are not normally controlled either at the faculty
or presidential level but by another group of persons entirely. Their
connection with the rest of the campus is unfortunately slim. They
are not part of the general discussion of ends and purposes, but
they influence these ends, not perhaps those which are espoused,
but those which are achieved. The question of ends cannot therefore be said to be in fact the exclusive or particular concern of any
single element of the academic institution.
The complexity of the university in its procedures for defining
ends has something to do with the question of the relationship of
the students to the institution, both with respect to what the relationship is or should be and as to the mode of resolving questions with
respect to it. The legal authority of the institution to define its
academic character and to judge student accomplishments in achieving the standards for institutional awards determined by that academic character has gone virtually unchallenged in the courts. The
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courts normally settle the cases in terms of jurisdiction - the institution has power in these matters, and its use of that power is virtually nonreviewable. Thus, difficult questions of justice, including
the procedure for achieving justice, are avoided. However, for the
institution itself the question is not what legal competence it has
to set academic standards but what standards should be set and with
whose participation. The question of standards must embrace also
the question of academic purpose - What are the ends to be achieved
in the educational program? The challenge we have faced from the
students is that these are not matters solely for decision by the
faculty and the administrative officers.
We must meet the student challenge by means other than the
reiteration of legal authority, or even the reiteration of the doctrine
of special competence. The processes of decisionmaking must be
looked at in terms of who has a legitimate interest which ought to
enter into the decision. It is not a question of who has established
rights but of who has legitimate interests, whether those interests
are recognized in the decisional pattern or are being protected by it.
I recognize that there may be more than one way of advocating,
advancing, or recording an interest when it is not apparently included in the formal arrangements, but there should be some way
in which it has an impact if it is a legitimate interest.
The feeling of outrage which we may quite properly sense in
viewing certain events must be moderated by reflection on the questions of who are members of our community, who has a right to
make assertions about its character, and in what way can those
assertions be incorporated in the self-definition of the institution.
It is not a matter of abandoning perquisites. It is a matter of recognizing that the pattern of authority in educational institutions is one
in which many share; that there are many forms of authority including enrolling or not enrolling for classes and curricula; that all of
these modes of authority shape institutions; and that a claim to
authority by those who have never possessed it is not necessarily an
indication that the walls have been mined and the torch is being
laid to the powder train. If one approaches institutional decisions in
this broader context, then the function of a cautionary statement of
legal limits is clear, and one need not be concerned with the questions of whether status, contract, or constitutional principle is the
best way of defining this obviously complex relationship.
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T he outset, I completely agree with Professor Monypenny that

the most important decisions made in an educational institution are not those that turn solely or directly on legal concepts.
Clearly, the most important decisions are those involving questions
of educational policy, financial policy, community relations, and
similar policy matters. But this is not to say that the legal concepts
which underlie these policy questions are of little consequence.
Rather, it is only when we have a common understanding and acceptance of these underlying legal concepts that we are truly free to
devote our attention to the important matters of educational policy.
We are open to misinterpretation (and there are those who do so
misinterpret) if we permit our preoccupation with policy matters
to override legal concepts to the point of obscurity.
In the present-day university, I sense a widespread confusion
about the nature and applicability of some of these basic legal concepts in the university-student relationship, and I assume that this
confusion is one reason this particular conference was called. University administrators are well accustomed to, and much experienced
in, dealing with the policy questions cited above. Until very recently,
they have had little need to focus attention on underlying legal concepts. Now they are finding some basic and long-established policy
postures subject to challenge by the student or faculty activist and
by other interests from off campus. Many of these challengers attack the underlying legal basis for university policy and practices,
not because their legal rights have been so seriously violated (except
in race discrimination cases), but rather because experience has demonstrated that the legal attack hits the administrator in his most exposed and vulnerable flank.
This point is underscored by the remarks of Mr. Schwartz of
the National Student Association in the opening session of this conference. He demonstrated considerable contempt for any serious
legal analysis of the university-student relationship, saying he was
interested only in using the law as a political tool for effecting
change in university policy.
Thus we find ourselves with an interesting situation in which
the university administrator, on the one hand, has little experience
with the formalities and technicalities of the law, and the student
*University Counsel and Secretary of the Corporation, Cornell University; A.B. 1940,
LL.B. 1942, Cornell University.
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activist, on the other hand, is exploiting this very lack of experience
to confound the administrator, disrupt the relaxed, daily routine of
the university community, and, in a surprising number of cases, win
concessions which have little basis in law or educational policy. It
is an interesting sidelight of the present confusion that the typical
college or university administrator, far from being calloused and insensitive to the rights of individual students, is so liberal in spirit
and kindly in nature that he falls easy prey to the loud but often
unsubstantiated protestations of the small but highly vocal group
of student activists at his institution. Consequently, I consider it
very important that we do give full and sharp attention to the legal
aspects of the university-student relationship without delay. I think
it important that we analyze this relationship in its several facets in
order to reassure our administrator-colleagues and help them to get
on with the critically important questions of educational policy as
Professor Monypenny has suggested.
However, as an operating legal counsel for a fairly large and
diversified university, my approach to the legal aspects of the university-student relationship is very much different than those of the
legal academicians. Whereas the teacher or scholar appropriately
deals in broad theories, documenting and amplifying by reference to
specific applications of these theories - usually by the footnote technique - the practicing legal counsel works in almost the opposite
direction. In the area of free speech, the scholar begins with the first
amendment to the Constitution and gives the doctrine meaning by
developing its application to various factual situations as considered
by the courts - usually the Supreme Court. On the other hand, the
operating legal counsel is initially confronted with a statement of
facts, usually flimsy and often obscure as to significant content. His
first problem is to analyze these facts in terms of their legal implications. Before viewing the facts in terms of the first amendment, or
any other constitutional doctrine, he must apply to them a whole
series of graduated regulatory concepts, running from the provisions
of a student conduct code through trustee legislation, institutional
charter, and finally local, state, or federal law. In fact, it can be said
that the operating legal counsel works in the area of the scholar's
"footnotes" and that his best work -- solving the problem without
ever going to litigation - is not even a footnote. I make a point of
this difference in approach because I think it is important for us to
characterize the point of view or posture from which several of the
distinguished papers at this conference have been presented. It is
one thing to deliver a sweeping analysis of the law as it is or as the
speaker thinks it should be. It is quite another thing to deal with the
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day-by-day specifics of the relationship between the university and
its individual students.
Against the background of the theme for this conference it is
important to consider what the legal nature of a university really is.
At this conference, the university has been variously described as a
"community" or an "institution," but these terms are hardly descriptive of the university as a legal entity. The university is in fact a
corporation. It has a charter from the state and a set of bylaws
from which it draws its life and which, at the same time, prescribe
and limit its purposes, powers, and functions. To be sure, the corporate purpose of a university is rather special: namely, to educate
young people, to provide a storehouse of existing knowledge, and
to add to this knowledge through scholarship and research.
If we look to the historical background of public and private
educational systems in this country, we are reminded that a basic
legal rationale for their existence is the interest of the state in an
educated citizenry as being essential to a well-ordered and successful
society. A university must, therefore, be responsive to this basic
legal policy consideration, since, of necessity, it bears upon the university's legal rights, powers, and responsibilities in its relationships
with students and other members of the community. In the university-student relationship, all of the rights and responsibilities of both
parties stem from this basic concept-the university's interest in
educating and its obligations to society, and the student's interest in
being educated. Viewed in this light, the university must have greater
freedom and flexibility in controlling the activities of the student
than do local, state, or national governments in controlling the activities of the citizen. At the same time, and this point also requires
emphasis, this greater freedom and flexibility which is so necessary
to the successful educational process has no relevancy with respect
to matters which are not central to, or reasonably incidental to, that
educational process. Thus, the university-student relationship is a
limited relationship, but within its limitations the university must be
free to exercise discretionary controls if the relationship is to be successful.
Let me enumerate briefly some of the more prominent relationships which exist between the university and the student involving
the application of various legal concepts. First, there is the individual's admission as a student. The university is prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race, creed, or national origin, but otherwise it practices widespread discrimination in the selection of students. The individual applicant, when accepted into the status of a
student, acquires both rights and responsibilities which stem from
this status. These rights are not the civil rights of citizenship, and
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thus all of the technical trappings of procedural due process which
control the relationship between state and citizen are not applicable
here. At the same time, the student's rights are recognized by society as being of very substantial value so that the university is not
free to terminate his status without a basically fair process in the
light of the total relationship between the two parties.
A second corporate relationship pertains to the provision of
room and meals. Fundamentally, this is a landlord-tenant relationship and is normally regulated by a fairly specific contract. Other
corporate relationships have to do with the provision of instruction
(teachers, classrooms, laboratories, library, etc.), health services,
and public services such as utilities, traffic control, and police and
fire protection.
One corporate relationship which requires special mention is
the financial support for the student. In the first place, the typical
university absorbs a very large portion of the cost of instruction
above and beyond the amount of tuition and fees paid. Secondly,
the university provides direct financial assistance to the individual
student from its own funds or from outside funds which are administered by the university. This relationship points up the fiduciary character of the total special purpose relationships between
university and student.
In analyzing these corporate relationships, it is apparent that,
rather than one particular legal principle controlling the entire relationship, a series of legal principles are directly and appropriately
applicable to its various aspects. The first legal principle which
comes to mind, in a negative sense, is the doctrine of in loco parentis.
I say "negative" sense because so many student groups, faculty
groups, and institutions have recently made a big point of announcing that they no longer adhere to the doctrine of in loco parentis.
In my mind, this never was a legitimate concept because it grossly
oversimplifies the relationship between a university and its students.
On the one hand, no university with a student body numbering in
the thousands could possibly assume the role of a surrogate parent
for each student. On the other hand, universities have adopted policies and practices in the past - and will hopefully continue to do so
in the future - which are solicitous of the welfare of its students. As
a case in point, we at Cornell issued the report of a University Commission in September 1967, in which it was made abundantly clear
that the University no longer recognized in loco parentis as a viable
doctrine. Less than two months later, the University adopted a policy
with respect to the dissemination of student records which gave the
students a privileged protection substantially in excess of their rights
under the law. The point here is that, while the university does not
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and should not pretend to regulate every aspect of the student's
private life, the university can and must continue to regulate and
protect those aspects of the individual student's activity which are
pertinent to the university's purposes and the university-student
relationship.
A second legal concept which comes to mind is the law of contract. We have heard much at this conference to the effect that contract is no longer a viable concept for regulation of the universitystudent relationship. Such broad statements must be taken with at
least a few grains of salt. It certainly is true that the university can
no longer print a very broad statement in the annual catalog, reserving the right to expel the student without a hearing or without
cause, and then expect the matter to stand up in the courts on the
theory that the statement was a contract term between the parties
which was accepted by the student at the time of registration. However, this is not to say that the basic university-student relationship
does not involve the elements of a contract. It is much more appropriate to say that public policy, as enforced by the courts, will no
longer countenance the enforcement of such an arbitrary contract
provision in this particular type of relationship. In short, the contract concept is used daily in a most satisfactory manner in many
facets of the university-student relationship. For example, we hear
no complaints about the need for formalities of procedural due
process when a student is dismissed for simple failure to pay tuition - the university's right of dismissal in this instance is certainly
based upon the law of contract.
I mentioned earlier the fiduciary or trust concept which applies
to the underlying eleemosynary nature of the institution as well as
to the more specific provision of financial assistance to the individual
student. This relationship and the legal and equitable principles
which govern it go far toward characterizing the total relationship
between university and student.
Finally, the university has a right to regulate its students for
the purpose of protecting life and property - a power which can
best be described as a sort of private "police" power. While a few
universities have the power of arrest on the basis of specific statutory authority, all universities are recognized as having this basic
right to regulate the activity of the individual when it may be harmful to the life or property of other members of the university community or of the university itself.
Thus, I hope it is clear from these few remarks that there are
several different legal concepts which are variously applicable to
different aspects of the total university-student relationship- the
relationship between this special purpose corporation and the in-
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dividual citizen who has been admitted and registered as a student.
Hanging over all aspects of this relationship and over all of these
legal concepts which have been discussed are the constitutional
rights of the parties. The individual citizen who becomes a student
surely does not forfeit the constitutional rights which are available
to all citizens under all circumstances. I state the matter in this
fashion because I think there is a tendency at the present time to
lose our perspective, particularly when dealing with student demonstrations or other activist maneuvers. When we are confronted with
a student demonstration, we are not ready to talk about the constitutional rights of anybody until we have engaged in a thorough
analysis of the facts surrounding the demonstration and have applied appropriate university regulations, or local and state law. It
is my own experience that this approach to the problem very often
results in a resolution of doubts, if not an actual solution, long before a consideration of constitutional concepts becomes necessary.
In conclusion, I would emphasize the importance in this very
confusing area of making very clear-cut distinctions between a legal
analysis of the university-student relationship on the one hand and
a discussion of applicable educational, philosophical, or sociological
concepts on the other. When there is a confrontation between university and student we need to know the respective rights and responsibilities of the parties. We may desire to waive some of these
rights (on behalf of the university) for reasons of educational policy, but, if this be the case, it is important that we do so knowingly.
With respect to the student, it is most important that we ascertain
his rights in the particular aspect of the relationship which is at
issue. Too often, questions involving the university-student relationship have found their way into the courts because attention was not
given to recognition of the student's rights early in the controversy.
If we do make clear distinctions between legal rights and educational
policy, we certainly can follow Professor Monypenny's admonition
to place emphasis on the educational aspect of this very sensitive
relationship within a legal framework which is not unduly restrictive or burdensome to either university or student.
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HE significant questions that are agitating the student community today are not questions involving the Bill of Rights; they
are rather questions about university governance, about democracy
and fairness within the university. As expressed earlier by Professor
Monypenny, "It is to questions of just principle rather than to questions of the permissible legal limits of authority that the attention
of those who govern institutions should be turned."'
The participants at this conference have generally agreed that
our state and federal courts have no interest in dealing with the
internal campus disputes regarding the relationships of authority
among students, faculty, and administrators. These conflicts are
now being adjudicated in most cases through the application of persuasion and discourse. Increasingly, though, discourse is being replaced by the harsh application of power and force by all sides, a
turn of events that should surprise no one who has watched the
growing class identity of college students over the past ten years
become increasingly frustrated by the closed process of university
decisionmaking. Fortunately, the courts have maintained a keen interest in the indiscriminate censorship of the student press and speaker
forums and have intervened occasionally to protect students from
such grossly unfair disciplinary procedures as was evidenced in Dixon
2
v. Alabama State Board of Education.
But the laws of our larger society will not be able to transform
the authoritarian structures of modern universities because in the
eyes of the law, as well as in the eyes of most administrators, our
universities are corporations, both in form and in essence. Therein
lies the reason the law has so far been unresponsive to student concerns about university governance. The ultimate governing power of
a university is almost universally vested in a small group of absentee
trustees whose perspectives of the task of building learning environments are too often at very great odds with those of the resident
faculty and student populations. Even the modified version of the
corporate-university theory, which includes the authority to delegate
various powers to the faculty, invariably leaves students powerless
to act in the significant aspects of university governance that touch
*Student participant; A.B., University of North Carolina, 1967. Presently enrolled at
the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. Former President of the Student Body, University of North Carolina.
I Monypenny, The Student as a Student, 45 DENVER L.J. 649, 658 (1968).
2 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cr.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
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their lives - discipline, rulemaking, curriculum and grades, to name
but a few. Professor John McDonough of Stanford Law School
recently had this to say in defense of corporate-university policies:
To [most student activists], what is wrong with present University
decision-making is that it is government without representation, insofar as the students are concerned.
Is this assumption about the nature of a University wellfounded?
It would be too harsh an answer, perhaps, to respond to the
students by pointing out to them that we do not let the inmates run
the asylum. But it may not be too harsh and it may be relevant to
point out that we do not let the patients manage the hospital; we do
not let clients manage the law firm; we do not let the passengers
manage the airlines; and we do not let the consumers manage a business enterprise. Is a University community really analogous to a civic
community? Or is it, correctly perceived, much more a kind of ongoing educational enterprise, in relation to which students are
essentially in the position of patrons or consumers ?3
Professor McDonough's corporate analogies are repeated daily
by university presidents and deans across the country as they resist
any democratic participation of students in university decisionmaking.
To be sure, the administrators usually modify their statements of
authority with the familiar "My-door-is-always-open" or "Weconsult-the-student-body-president-on-important-issues" gestures. Yet,
when the university, already possessing power over students, begins
the discourse with them and then ducks the issue of governance
by invoking a few glib metaphors about corporations and asylums,
it need only say, "Go somewhere else if you don't like it here."
The number of campuses that have undertaken major reformations, or even reevaluations, of their governing structure in the last
ten years is so small as to seem almost insignificant. The trend seems
to be in the opposite direction, toward even more centralization of
authority, as fundraising, public relations, research projects, and prestige faculty recruitment have virtually become ends in themselves for
administrators. This trend away from campus democracy should be
condemned as presenting a fundamental obstacle to university academic reform.
What passes for "higher learning" today is often 40 courses predesigned for the undergraduate and 50 other random students in
which the premiums are paid for unflagging class attendance, a good
memory, and very little argument about the style or content of what
happens in the classroom. Those now running our universities are
often quite arrogant about the way in which they have chosen to provide students with an education, as they censor student publications
and ff,. tuns or dictate by fiat when adult women must return to their
3
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dorms to be locked in for the night, or, using more sophisticated
methods of control, they prepare for the student who has just finished twelve years of rote learning in the public school system another
four years, equally as structured and rigid, and often less relevant to
the student's interests and needs. "Students," observed Moderator
magazine recently, "are being had."
These are not newly voiced criticisms, nor are they the only ones
presently being raised by students. They are presented here only to
point to the direction in which student disaffection is moving. The
key vector is not this issue or that one - the university's relation to
Harlem and IDA were the big issues at Columbia recently, while
campus free speech and the relevance of the curriculum were of
greater importance at Berkeley four years ago. The key is simply
power, not military or destructive or selfish power, but rather the
power of students to participate in the structuring (or unstructuring)
of their learning experience; the power of students to regulate and
supervise their own personal social conduct; the power of students
to have a significant voice in shaping the institution's value judgments which investment policies or admissions procedures often
reflect.
Here is where the courts may again become relevant. In a recent
and widely noted speech, Cornell President James A. Perkins voiced
an interesting concern:
None of us, least of all the faculty and administration, much mourns
the demise of the tradition of in loco parentis. But we do view with
some alarm the specter that seems to be rising out of its ashes and
taking the form of a rash of court cases challenging decisions in
areas that were once considered the educational world's peculiar
province. The filing of these cases seems to suggest that judicial
4
processes can be substituted for academic processes.

Unquestionably, that same concern is keenly felt by the participants at this conference. And yet, the specter of the law, rising up
out of the ashes of in loco parentis, has not made a serious penetration into the "educational world's peculiar province." Professor William Van Alstyne, in a recent survey of 72 major state universities,
found the following conditions with respect to student discipline and
due process:
(1) 53 percent of the schools surveyed did not provide students
with a written statement specifying the nature of the particular
charges against them, and only 17 percent provided such a statement
at least ten days before the determination of guilt or the imposition
of punishment;
4j. Perkins, The University and Due Process, at 1, Dec. 8, 1967 (reprint of address by
American Council on Education, Washington, D.C.).
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(2) 16 percent did not even provide for hearings in disciplinary
cases;
(3) 26 percent did not permit the student charged to question
informants or witnesses whose statements might be considered by the
hearing board in determining guilt; and
(4) 30 percent did not allow the student charged to be accompanied by an advisor of his choice.5
It is true, however, that the courts are reluctant to become substantively involved in the breaches of fairness suggested by Professor
Van Alstyne's findings. Given that reluctance, students must decide
what role the courts and the law can play in their fight for more fairness and more participation in their institutions.
The major on-campus role that I foresee for the courts is a
political one. Students will take a great many campus controversies
into the courtroom, even if they recognize the probable futility of
their efforts. But the merits of these issues can and will be actively
and publicly debated as a result of the legal challenge. Such issues
will certainly include the right of the university to meddle in the
private sex life of the student; the use of the campus police to search
indiscriminately student dorm rooms without student consent; the
right of students to hold demonstrations on campus property; the
fairness of suspending students under vague and sweeping prohibitions that are generally clarified after the fact; and the whole area
of procedural due process in disciplinary matters. The least that
students expect to emerge out of the frequent use of the courts as a
political weapon is a healthier respect for student rights on the
campus. Beyond that, we might hope that in the process of continually calling the deans and the university attorneys to task for arbitrariness and unfairness the courts may write some significant law in the
area. As the opportunity for higher education becomes increasingly
viewed as an essential opportunity for effective participation in our
culture, and not just a luxury for the wealthy, the courts may take
a harder look at the capriciousness with which many students are
now being expelled from campuses. Furthermore, as the levels of
government, particularly the federal government, assume an even
greater burden for financing higher education, the courts may expect
universities to start behaving within many of the same legal constraints that apply to other public institutions.
It is ironic - and for students, enraging - that in America,
one of the last of our institutions to reflect our national passion for
justice and democratic processes is the university. The illusion spread
to college freshmen during orientation and to graduates at commencement about the university being at the fringes of our society,
5Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and State University Students, 10 U.C.L.A.L.
Riv. 368, 369 (1963).
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leading it and constantly demanding that society reevaluate itself in
the light of new truths, new experiments, and new technologies, is a
lot of garbage. Don't look to our universities and colleges to help
teach America about the hard lessons of Vietnam; through the use
of their mammoth research facilities for military ends and their
unthinking complicity with the draft, our universities are as deeply
implicated in the shame of that American adventure as any other
institution in our society. If you share my concern about the portentous absence of creative, independent-minded citizenry in our culture,
about the inability of our past generation of college graduates to
cope with the basic problems of racism, war, violence, and poverty,
don't look to our universities for help. What is learned in today's
university is not how to take risks with yourself and your convictions,
but rather how to avoid risks and how to accommodate yourself to
the expectations of others (who are wiser, it is said); not how to
develop your own sense of what is wrong with this society and how
one can behave to change it, but rather how to memorize and return
undigested someone else's formulations of the problems and the
solutions. Education, indeed! Perhaps as nowhere else, young Americans can go to their nearby university for four years and learn the
game of dependency and conformity. Perhaps as nowhere else, students can see firsthand how fraudulent our institutions can become
under the leadership of men purporting to behave democratically
and in the students' best interests. "Go to school," says Joey Bishop.
"It's better than a kick in the teeth."
To reiterate my original point, students are most troubled today
not by the legal questions, but by the question of how we can establish a university that in its internal operations meets Professor Monypenny's desire for just and fair principles. To really answer that
question satisfactorily, one must move out of the context that views
the university as a corporation, out of the context in which roles and
authority are strictly ordered within the institution on a hierarchical
basis, where power flows from the top down, as do decisions. Campus
unrest will grow more militant the longer we continue to allow our
universities to function in the corporate context. Eventually what will
emerge from the student-institutional tension will be something similar to unions, where students will organize to bargain collectively
with the administration on the key power issues such as student discipline, curriculum, grades, admissions, the university's relationship
to the community, and draft policy.
It is true that no student union now exists on a major campus
in the country today. It will be only a matter of time, however, until
students see the futility of passing resolutions in the student senate,
meeting with deans behind closed doors to be neatly bought off on
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important issues, and playing student government as though it were
something to divert one's energy from real campus problems. We
have seen in the disruptions at Berkeley - and most recently, Columbia - the enormous tactical power in a strong, disciplined student
coalition that can frame specific demands as well as specific reprisals
for the administration to deal with. It will be only a few years until
union models will spring up on hundreds of campuses; strong numerically, representative of the students, and very skilled tactically in how
to deal with a fumbling or undemocratic administration.
I know that most of the administrators who came here to chat
about students and the law do not really want to see their campuses
polarized and politicized as a result of their own grip on the decisionmaking processes.6 But for students, what is the alternative? Students
have very little hope that anything like a "one man, one vote" decision regarding student participation in the universities will emerge
from the courts. The tragic failures of our culture that can be traced
to the educational institutions are so gigantic and so compelling that
we cannot simply disregard the challenges of university reform and
move on to something less basic.
The campus disorders are just beginning, I fear, if our university leaders do not become more responsive to the new demands of
our college population. The students want procedures in the classroom and in the residence hall that are enlightened, just, and fair;
they want to make the rules they will have to live under; they want
a representative stake in the decisions that are made in the name of
their institution, such as investment decisions, admissions policies,
and affiliations with defense-related agencies and organizations.
Students, in short, want a much bigger chunk of the power within
universities than they are now accorded. If that demand makes the
administrators feel a little closer to the wall, it is unfortunate, for
the essential formulations of student power on campuses today come
very close to the rhetoric in most college catalogues about student
responsibility, student autonomy, and freedom to live and learn for
oneself. When students do begin to assume their proper role as full
members of a university community, whether that happens as a
result of court action, through the application of more disruptive
and collective student action, or through some other mechanism, I
think we will be moving forward towards the creation of a higher
education in America that can serve our culture, rather than spoil it.
6while it is very true that decisionmaking processes vary widely from campus to

campus, and on paper many college presidents and deans hold little of the formal
power (it resides with the faculty and/or trustees), they possess great powers to effect
changes in decisionmaking procedures in nearly the entire range of student affairs
issues, from disciplinary to draft policies. In those areas such as curriculum, formally
relegated to the faculty for decisions, the administrator's informal powers are impressive indeed.
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ROFESSOR Monypenny's discussion of "The Student as a Student" is indeed thought provoking. Accordingly, as commentary on that discussion, I wish to consider an alternative status of
the student - the student as a colleague - as a further insight into
the total complex of the student-institutional relationship.
Two prefatory comments seem to be in order as an introduction
to what follows. First, Dean Robert Yegge proposed during our
previous discussion that graduate programs designed to prepare
student personnel administrators should involve a curricular experience with the law. Without rejecting that thesis completely, my
response is that student personnel administrators ought to be better
prepared as educators, and hopefully there would be no necessity of
their becoming trained in law. The second comment is something
of an alert. It is likely that when I am finished with these remarks
I will have established a position somewhere between a romantic
idealist and a militant dean. This, of course, assumes that such a
stance is possible. Let me turn now to my assignment.
The focus of this reaction to Dr. Phillip Monypenny's paper
will be on the not-so-hidden, but unfinished agenda of this conference - at least as I see it. For me, these sessions have been unique
in this regard. Seldom have I participated in a meeting where the
hidden agenda kept surfacing so regularly and still failed consistently
to claim center stage. To me, that agenda - the hidden one - involves the nonlegal issues and items that have been identified with
reference to student-institutional relationships, rather than the legal
aspects of those relationships. Perhaps the classic example of my
point is that Terry Lunsford was introduced at the luncheon yesterday with an indication that his topic - "Who Belongs to the
University Community?" - did not quite fit elsewhere into our
program. It seems to me that the lively discussion which followed
his presentation documents that these are the central issues. By the
end of the afternoon, however, we had managed to survive the
threat of too much uncomfortable attention to such concerns.
The papers presented and the panelists' responses are replete
with references which suggest that our central focus should be on
the student-institutional relationship independent of its legal aspects,
as the best prescription for minimizing involvement with the courts.
*University Dean of Student Affairs, Rutgers University; A.B. 1950, M.S. 1951, D.S.S.
candidate, Syracuse University.
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Parenthetically, I take that as a quite proper objective. Let me share
with you very briefly the references which document my point.
(1) Professor Beaney suggested that attention to the nature and function of the university was the intelligent approach,
"justifying [the courts taking] an essentially 'hands-off' policy
toward institutions of higher learning ....1
(2) Edward Schwartz talked, too, about the nature and
function of the university and the relationship of the student to
' 2
it as "the conference that must be held.
(3) Dean McKay discussed the nature of the university
and its purposes as "a central proposition," suggesting that rules
should be determined after goals and with reference to them.
In the last paragraph of his paper, Dean McKay refers to "a
forward-looking partnership between students and universities
in the educational process." 8 This implies an approach to
student-institutional relationships to which I will return.
(4) Robert Lutz advised us that the legal approach will
not eliminate the problems that confront us; that the real problem is the relationship question itself, independent of the legal
aspects; and that that relationship, in his judgment, can no
longer be based on an apprenticeship model - at least of the
old style.4
Professor Monypenny's paper also triggered the preceeding
comments. In fact, as the anchor man on this relay team let me pick
up the baton where he passed it in his concluding remarks.
As an educator rather than a legal expert, it seems to me that
educational communities - however difficult to define - rather
than the courts should continue to shape the style, content, and diversity of higher education. I agree most enthusiastically with Professor Monypenny that:
[i]t is to questions of just principle rather than to questions of the
permissible legal limits of authority that the attention of those who
govern institutions should be turned. .

.

. If the agencies of edu-

cation act justly, and seem to act justly, the courts will find very few
occasions to impose a judicially developed view of justice on them.5
Further, let me agree with his expectation of what I consider a dire
possibility that:
if the courts take on too many institutional decisions because they
appear to be bad, they may develop confidence in their own expertise
and routinely set aside decisions in apparently technical fields.6
I Beaney, Students, Higher Education, and the Law, 45 DENVER L.J. 511, 514 (1968).
2 Schwartz, Comment, 45 DENVER L.J. 525, 526 (1968).
3 McKay, The Student as Private Citizen, 45 DENVER L.J. 558, 570 (1968).
4See Lutz, Comment, 45 DENVER L.J. 574 (1968).
5 Monypenny, The Student as a Student, 45 DENVER I.J. 649, 658 (1968).
6 Id.at 654.
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At one point, however, in his description of Goldman's four
approaches to the limitation of discretion, Professor Monypenny
indicates that the contract doctrine is "cherished" by administrators.
I suspect he knows my views on this point, but it may be in order to
suggest that there are administrators who have abandoned that
stance, at least in disciplinary proceedings, with somewhat the same
degree of enthusiasm that marked the unlamented passing of the
in loco parentis doctrine. The reason for rejection in both instances,
it seems to me, was in part an emerging perception by student personnel administrators that their role in the university community was
broader than a housekeeping-management one, and, in fact, involved
an educational dimension. Under such a philosophy, the "contract"
doctrine is at least unnecessary and probably irrelevant.
Let me add a fifth perception of the relationship of the university to its students which, I think, is more distinctively a concept
drawn from the academic rather than the legal community. Dr. Peter
Armacost, President of Ottawa University, former Program Director
of the Association of American Colleges, and a member with me of
the final drafting committee on the Joint Statement on Rights
and Freedoms of Students, suggests in an unpublished paper that
"the most desirable formulation of the student-college relationship
is that of the student as a junior colleague in a community of
scholars." I believe that Professor Monypenny on a previous occasion may have also addressed himself to such a concept of studentinstitution relationship.
Because students are likely to have an unnecessary affective
hang-up with the "junior" adjective, and because it seems to me that
the "junior" is excess baggage (if merit and competence will, in any
event, decide the "junior-senior" distinction), my own preference is
to consider the relationship simply in the "colleague" context. Let
me explicitly add, however, that this is not to suggest an "equality"
among colleagues - any more than there is an equality among those
attending this conference or among colleagues on our several
campuses. It is intended, however, as a suggestion that we consider
extending the rights, privileges, and responsibilities of that relationship to students.
As Armacost points out in some detail in his paper, there are,
quite obviously, important implications of such a proposal. From
my point of view and biases, the first and most critical of these is
the resulting definition that the relationship between a college or
university and its students is primarily an educational one. The pursuit of shared educational objectives becomes the basis for association
with an academic community. And, because students are likely to
respond more positively to the colleague role than to that of a "foster
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child," for example, this approach to student-college relationships
may be substantially more conducive to the development of that
elusive ideal- an "academic community."
Second, the "colleague" approach is undergirded by a sense of
mutual respect which is a normal affective stance toward others involved in such a relationship. To paraphrase Professor Beaney on
this point, this would be the climate or relationship resulting from
the efforts of reasonable men to treat other reasonable men in a
just manner.
Third, real criteria - differences in experience and abilityrather than artificial assumptions of immaturity and irresponsibility
become the yardstick for evaluations that credit or discredit the contribution of the individual student as he participates as a colleague
in the institution's decisionmaking process.
Fourth, implementation of the colleague approach in the policy
making area results in all issues affecting the community being the
concern of all members of that community. It results, too, in the
development of a process to effectively involve them in any issue in
which they have a stake. It becomes just as important, for example,
for faculty colleagues to participate in discussions about student
social life as for students to be involved in curricular matters.
Fifth, if students are in fact to be colleagues, then rules and
regulations defining expectations of student conduct need to be reexamined. Consideration might even be given to the establishment
of standards applicable to all members of the community. Whatever
the outcome, however, such reexamination should begin with a clear
definition of institutional goals, and the resulting regulations should
be required to pass the test of being both reasonable and relevant
in terms of those goals.
Let me conclude this response to the topic "The Student as a Student," now amended to "The Student as a Colleague," by suggesting
that our choice appears to be whether we develop a "colleague"
status and relationship with judges and courts in the shaping of the
destiny of higher education, or whether we relate to students in that
status in real, not artificial, terms. My experience with students has
taught me that ultimately you cannot fool them and ultimately you
can trust them. Because students are where the action is, and because
they have a personal stake in higher education not dissimilar to my
own, let me cast a vote for students as colleagues.

